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GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
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WINTER 1979

NubmmR 2

"WAYWARD" CHILDREN AND THE LAW,
1820-1900: THE GENESIS OF THE STATUS
OFFENSE JURISDICTION OF THE JUVENILE
COURT
Peter D. Garlock*
I. INTRODUCTION

Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in In re Gault'
in 1967, in which due process rights were extended to juvenile delinquency proceedings which might result in commitment of youths to
reformatory institutions, numerous courts, legislatures, and private
study commissions have been re-examining the rights and obligations of young people in contemporary American society.2 In this
ongoing debate over juvenile jurisprudence, perhaps no issue has
provoked as much controversy as the question of whether juvenile
courts should continue to exercise jurisdiction over juvenile "status
offenses"-those unique forms of deviant behavior which are illegal
only for minors. While terminology and definitions differ from state
to state, all jurisdictions today provide for court surveillance of
young people who engage in noncriminal misbehavior as distinct
from violations of criminal law.3 Generally, such noncriminal mis* Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University. B.A., Yale, 1960; LL.B., Yale, 1966; Ph.D., Yale, 1972. Research for this Article was
supported in part by a grant from the Cleveland-Marshall Fund. I would like to thank
Professor Stephen Gard for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. I would
also like to thank Jane Knapp and Marjorie Komhauser, students at Cleveland-Marshall
College of Law, for their invaluable research assistance.
367 U.S. 1 (1967).
2 See, e.g., PRSMENr's COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADmrNisTRAXION OF JUSnCE,

THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME INA F IE SocIrrv (1967); NATONAL ADvISORY Commr= ON CnmNAL JusncE STANDARDS AND GoALS, JUVENILE JUSnCE AmD DmuQUECY PRV=oN: RrEPOr
OF rn TASK FORCE ON JUvENILE JUSTICE AND DELQUENCY PREVENTION (1976); IJA-ABA JummNILE JuSrcE STANDARDS PRoJErCT (1977); K. KENMSrN & Ti CARNEGIE CouNcIa ON CHILDREN,
ALL OuR CmLDREN: Th AmRICAN FAMILY UNDER PRESSU=E (1977).
IJA-ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO NoCmmL
MISBEHAVIOR 1, 74 app. (Tent. Draft, 1977) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS RELATING TO
NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR]. In New York, for example, such children are known as

"Person[s] in need of supervision" (PINS), N.Y. FAM. Cr. AcT § 712(b) (McKinney 1975);
in Colorado they are "Children in Need of Supervision" (CHINS), COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
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behavior falls into three broad categories: (1) children who are
"unruly," "wayward," "incorrigible," "beyond control of parents,"
or who otherwise act in a socially unacceptable manner; (2) children
who absent themselves from home without parental permission; and
(3) children who are habitually truant from school.'
Opponents of the present system argue that the status offense
jurisdiction unfairly discriminates against youth since it punishes
conduct for minors that would not be illegal for adults, that it requires society to devote expensive resources to trivial behavioral
problems, that the more serious behavioral problems of young people cannot be solved by compulsory legal intervention, that much
youthful "deviant" behavior is transitory and will pass as youths
mature, that involving wayward children in the legal process stigmatizes them and actually encourages future criminality, and that,
in any case, the status offense jurisdiction is unconstitutional.'
19-1-103(5), 19-3-106 (1978); in Illinois they are "Minor[s] Otherwise in Need of SuperviSion" (MINS), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37 § 702-3 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
Other states do not differentiate between criminal law violators and status offenders, but
group both under the general rubric of "delinquent." See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1753 (1975):
[A] child may be found "delinquent" (a) who has violated any federal or state law or
municipal or local ordinance, or (b) who has without just cause run away from his
parental home or other properly authorized and lawful place of abode, or (c) is beyond
the control of his parent, parents, guardian or other custodian, or (d) who has engaged
in indecent or immoral conduct, or (e) who has been habitually truant or who, while
in school has been continuously and overtly defiant of school rules and regulations, or
(f) who has violated any lawful order of the juvenile court ....
Some statutes include more detailed categories. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
2151.022 (Page 1976):
As used in.. . the Revised Code, "unruly child" includes any child:
(A) Who does not subject himself to the reasonable control of his parents, teachers,
guardian, or custodian, by reason of being wayward or habitually disobedient;
(B) Who is an habitual truant from home or school;
(C) Who so deports himself as to injure or endanger the health or morals of himself
or others;
(D) Who attempts to enter the marriage relation in any state without the consent
of his parents, custodian, legal guardian, or other legal authority;
(E) Who is found in a disreputable place, visits or patronizes a place prohibited
by law, or associates with vagrant, vicious, criminal, notorious, or immoral persons;
(F) Who engages in an occupation prohibited by law or is in a situation dangerous
to life or limb or injurious to the health or morals of himself or others;
(G) Who has violated a law applicable only to a child.
Until recently, Indiana included violation of detailed curfew regulations as a ground for
declaring a child "delinquent." IND. CODE ANN. § 31-5-7-4.1(d) (Bums 1976) (repealed effective Oct. 1, 1979, by IND. CODE ANN. § 31-5-7-4.1(a)(4) (Bums Supp. 1978)).
5 These arguments are explored in STANDARDS RELATING TO NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR,
supra note 3, at 1-13. Recent constitutional attacks have focussed on the vagueness and
overbreadth of status offense statutes. See, e.g., Stiller & Elder, PINS-A Concept in Need
of Supervision, 12 AM. Cram. L. REv. 33 (1974); Note, Juvenile Statutes and Noncriminal
Delinquents: Applying the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine, 4 STON HALL L. REv. 184 (1972);
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Those who would retain juvenile court jurisdiction over status offenders dispute all these points. They claim that noncriminal mis-

behavior is symptomatic of future criminal conduct and must be
caught early, that courts can and do intervene effectively to reform
rebellious personalities, and that the primary cause of failure to
date is a lack of resources rather than a faulty jurisprudence.6
It is not the purpose of this article to rehearse this debate, the
contours of which have been explored elsewhere. 7 Rather, I hope to
throw light on the current controversy by examining the historical
genesis and expansion of the status offense jurisdiction before the
invention of the juvenile court in 18998 and by showing the central-

ity of concern for wayward9 children in nineteenth century juvenile

Note, Juvenile Court JurisdictionOver "Immoral" Youth in California,24 STAN. L. Ray. 563
(1972); Note, Parens Patriaeand Statutory Vagueness in the Juvenile Court, 82 YALE L. J.
745 (1973). See also Katz & Teitelbaum, PINS Jurisdiction, The Vagueness Doctrine, and
the Rule of Law, 53 IND. L. J. 1 (1977-78). Status offense statutes have also been criticized
on the ground that they deny equal protection of the law to children. See, e.g., Katz &
Schroeder, Disobeying a Father'sVoice: A Comment on Commonwealth v. Brasher,57 MAss.
L. Q. 43 (1972); Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARv. ED.Rav. 487 (1973); Sidman,
The MassachusettsStubborn Child Law: Law and Orderin the Home, 6 FAIM. L. Q. 33 (1972).
For other criticisms of the status offense jurisdiction, see PassmF'r's Comaso.s
o.LAw
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMImSTRATION OF JUsTCE, THE CHALLEGE OF CrIE INA Fa SocrM,
ch. 8 (1967); Ketcham, Why Jurisdictionover Status Offenders Should be Eliminatedfrom
Juvenile Courts, 57 B.U. L. Rav. 645 (1977); Rosenberg & Rosenberg, The Legacy of the
Stubborn and Rebellious Son, 74 MicH. L. Rav. 1097 (1976); Note, CaliforniaRunaways, 26
HAsr Ns L.J. 1013 (1975); Note, Ungovernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction,83 YALE
L.J. 1383 (1974).
1 See, e.g., Arthur, Status Offenders Need Help, Too, 26 Juv. JuST., February 1975, at 3;
Arthur, Status Offenders Need a Court of Last Resort,57 B.U. L. REv. 631 (1977); Gill, The
Status Offender, 27 Juv. JuST., August 1976, at 3; Gregory, Juvenile Court JurisdictionOver
Noncriminal Misbehavior: The Argument Against Abolition, 39 Oruo ST. L.J. 242 (1978);
Martin, Status Offenders and the Juvenile JusticeSystem: Where Do They Belong?, 28 Juv.
JUST., February 1977, at 7.
7 See articles cited at notes 5-6 supra. Since I believe historians have an obligation to reveal
their relevant biases, I should note that I share many of the concerns of present-day critics
of the status offense jurisdiction of the juvenile court and am in general agreement with the
recommendations of the IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project's STADARD REiATiNG
To NONCRMUNAL MtSBEHAVIOR, supra note 3.
I have not attempted complete historical neutrality in this Article, and criticisms of
nineteenth-century efforts to regulate the behavior of children appear in the text. I do not
believe, however, that an historical inquiry "proves" that the status offense jurisdiction is
misguided, if only because these laws have been so widely adopted and have endured for such
a long time, despite challenges in legislatures and courts. Rather, the historian's task is to
illuminate the reasons why these laws were enacted, the extent of their adoption and implementation, the assumptions about human behavior on which they were based, and alternative
options not pursued, and thus to provide a background for more informed policy-making in
the present.
Act of Apr. 21, 1899, 1899 Ill.
Laws 131.
This Article will use the term "wayward" to stand for noncriminal misbehaving children
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jurisprudence.
In his provocative book on the juvenile court movement, Anthony
Platt contends that juvenile court legislation "brought within the
ambit of governmental control a set of youthful activities that had
been previously ignored or handled informally. .

.

. drinking, beg-

ging, roaming the streets, frequenting dance-halls and movies,
fighting, sexuality, staying out late at night, and incorrigibility
,,10 In his zeal to revise the previously accepted myth of the
...
juvenile court as a purely humanitarian institution, Platt obscures
the point that laws punishing children who engaged in these activities had been on the books for decades in many states. While the
juvenile court laws passed after 1899 sometimes spelled out prohibited conduct in more detail than previous statutes," the general
kinds of misbehavior they punished had concerned the child-savers"
of the 1820's as much as those at the turn of the twentieth century.
Indeed, it is not going too far to say that those who dealt with
children in the nineteenth century were obsessed with curtailing
unless a more specific category of status offense is indicated. Because the term implies a value
judgment about the children in question, it carries implied quotation marks whenever used,
as do such similar terms as "incorrigible" and "vicious."
"A.

PLATr, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY

139 (2d ed. 1977).

See, e.g., Act of Apr. 23, 1908, § 5, 1908 Ohio Laws 192:
For the purpose of this act, the words "delinquent child" include any child under
seventeen years of age who violates any law of this state or any city or village ordinance,
or who is incorrigible; or who knowingly associates with thieves, vicious or immoral
persons; or who is growing up in idleness or crime; or who knowingly visits or enters a
house of ill repute; or who knowingly patronizes or visits any policy shop or place where
any gambling device is, or shall be, operated; or who patronizes or visits any saloon or
dram shop where intoxicating liquors are sold; or who patronizes or visits any public
pool or billiard room or bucket shop; or who wanders about the streets in the night
time; or who wanders about any railroad yards or tracks, or jumps or catches on to
any moving train, traction or street car, or enters any car or engine without lawful
authority; or who uses vile, obscene, vulgar, profane or indecent language; or who is
guilty of immoral conduct; or who uses cigarettes; or who visits or frequents any
theater, gallery or penny arcade where any lewd, vulgar or indecent pictures are exhib.
ited or displayed.
In some states, such as New York, statutes penalizing children engaging in some of these
kinds of conduct antedated the passage of juvenile court legislation. See text accompanying
notes 251-57 infra. In 1891, Ohio made it a misdemeanor for a minor to enter any saloon, beergarden, or other place where liquor was sold, without a parent or guardian. Act of Apr. 28,
1891, § 1, 1891 Ohio Laws 409.
," While the term "child-saver" might have an ironic flavor today, nineteenth-century
reformers themselves used the term to apply to those concerned with the reformation of
delinquent children and the care of dependent children, whether managers of children's
"

institutions, elected officials, or private citizens. See, e.g., NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CHAITIES
AND CORRECTION, REPORT OF THE COMMrrrEE ON THE HISTORY OF CHILD-SAVING WORK: HISTORY

OF CHILD-SAVING IN THE UNITED STATES (1893).
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juvenile noncriminal misconduct, with increasing fervor as the century progressed, and were less concerned with children who committed serious crimes. The creation of juvenile courts contributed nothing new to juvenile jurisprudence but rather served to provide a
more effective means of implementing a wayward child jurisdiction
that had been in existence for three-quarters of a century, and which
3
had become the dominant approach to youth by 1900.'

Wayward child laws were but one aspect of a larger change in the
legal status of children. Increasingly after 1870, states passed laws
designed to protect the health, safety, and morals of children: stat,3The argument that the juvenile court continued a well-established tradition of controlling the behavior of wayward children and that this policy was central to nineteenth-century
practice has been previously advanced in a seminal article by Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform:
An HistoricalPerspective, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1187 (1970). Fox drew largely on data from a few
key states. One purpose of this article is to document more fully the extent of nineteenthcentury efforts to reform wayward children by investigating statutes and commitment practices in other jurisdictions. For a stimulating essay that seeks to place government regulation
of the family from Puritan colonial days through the nineteenth century in a wider social,
economic, and legal context, see Teitelbaum & Harris, Some Historical Perspectives on
Governmental Regulation of Children and Parents, in BF0YoD CorMoL: STATUS Onv'Dms
iN THE JuvemmL CouRT 1 (L. Teitelbaum & A. Gough eds. 1977).
Two excellent recent studies of the juvenile court movement have not emphasized sufficiently the nineteenth-century movement to reform wayward children, although both mention that before 1900 children could be incarcerated for behavior short of crime. See E. RYanSON, THE BEST-LAn PLANS: ArmcA's JuvEmm Cotnrr Expemnr 45 (1978); S.Scam ssm,
Love AND THE AMERicAN DEwquETh: THE THEORY AND PRAcTICE oF "PRoc Esszn"

Jut7vMz

JusTIcE, 1825-1920, at 8-14, 26-27 (1977). Stressing the juvenile court's "introduction of preventive and diagnostic purposes into judicial proceedings," as does Schlossman, supra at 53,
clouds the central jurisprudential point: both nineteenth-century reformers and juvenile
court proponents sought to prevent adult criminality by coercively reforming wayward children who had not violated the criminal law or who had committed only petty offenses, but
whose general character traits or conduct were deemed predictive of future criminality. The
techniques used to diagnose and treat juvenile misbehavior, while surely important, are ultiinately less significant than the issue of whether the state claims the right coercively to intervene in the lives of children on the basis of predicted criminality, when such intervention
would be constitutionally impermissible for adults. That this is still the central mission of
juvenile court authorities, as it was for nineteenth-century reformers, is borne out by the
following comments of a juvenile court judge:
Status offenses are an indication of some serious trouble. That this is the place where
we can help, where we can and should provide compulsory help if the family is not
willing to seek help. This is the place where we can reduce the crime rates of the future.
Because if we can help a child to unravel incorrigibility, absenting, truancies, drinking,
then I think maybe we can do much . . . to make . . . better citizens . . . .To
deny treatment at such a stage may well lead to mental illness or to crime.
Arthur, Status Offenders Need Help, Too, 26 Juv. JUST., February 1975, at 5-6.
Comparethe remarks of a mid-nineteenth-century reformer: "I would not wait till the child
grows large enough to commit some overt act, to be actually delinquent. I would snatch him
as a 'brand from the burning.' I would rescue him from the yearning gulf of poverty, drunkenness and crime, into which he is about to fall." Grimshaw, An Essay on Juvenile Delinquency,
in Pium EssAys ON JuvENILE DELNQUENCY 148 (E. Hale, T. Moore, & A. Grimhaw eds. 1855).
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utes required children to attend school part of the year and provided
for their incarceration if they did not, prohibited children from
working at certain occupations or activities and prescribed the number of hours they could work, and created a roster of places children
could not go without an adult." By 1900 their lives had been
hemmed in by a host of regulations defining what they could and
could not do, and the lines separating children from adults had
become sharper than at any time in American history. These developments created the legal framework for a concept of adolescence
as a stage of development distinct from adulthood. 5 Whether these
laws were protective or repressive of young people is a question that
is undergoing continuing examination today.' 6
This article will explore these themes through four kinds of evidence: (1) the ideas of the child-savers themselves, as expressed in
their writings; (2) statutes passed by certain key jurisdictions to
deal with wayward children; (3) statistics from houses of refuge and
reform schools illustrating the extent to which wayward children
were incarcerated throughout the nineteenth century; and (4) the
response of the judiciary when confronted with challenges to the
state's right to commit wayward children.
If we are successfully to re-evaluate the utility of wayward child
laws today, we must understand why they had such appeal for
nineteenth-century reformers. We must discover whether laws formulated in a different era to meet certain perceived social needs and
based on certain assumptions about human development are relevant in an age when we are less confident of our ability to predict
human deviance, less sure of the reformative capabilities of our
correctional system, and more concerned with insuring justice for
previously ignored minority groups, including children.
II.

REFORMERS AND "WAYWARD"

CHILDREN,

1820-1840

A.

The "DangerousClasses"
To discover the roots of modem American concern for wayward
children, we must look to the mounting anxiety experienced by elite
groups in the 1820's and 1830's over what they perceived as more
" See section IV.(A.) infra.
"5 On the history of the concept of adolescence in the United States, see J. KETr, RiTES OF
PASSAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA, 1790 TO THE PRESENT (1977).
" See, e.g., IJA-ABA JUVENILE JusTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO RiGoiT
OF MINORS, pt. 5 (Tent. Draft, 1977); Note, Child Labor Laws-Time to Grow Up, 59 MINN.
L. Rav. 575 (1975).
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serious forms and degrees of poverty and criminality than
eighteenth-century America had known. 7 As David Rothman has
pointed out, colonial Americans had depended on closely knit associations-family, church, a network of social relations-to manage
what levels of poverty and criminality existed." Colonists, sharing
a fatalistic view of human nature, assumed that because of man's
natural depravity some degree of poverty and crime would always
be with them. They did not expect to reform individuals or eradicate
crime, but they were confident that through the use of severe pun-

ishment and close scrutiny of strangers in communities they could
control deviance in their midst. Locating the cause of crime in the

individual rather than the environment, colonists did not believe it
seriously threatened the social order.'
17Laws governing wayward children reach even deeper into the American past. In 1646,
Massachusetts Bay Colony imposed the death penalty on "stubborn and rebellious" sons,
sixteen years of age and over, who would not obey their parents. Act of 1646, 3 Mass. Records
101 (1854), reprinted in 1 CmLDREN AND Youtm I AwCA 38 (R. Bremner ed. 1970-74)
[hereinafter cited as CiauDnRN AND YoUTH]. Apparently the death penalty was never inflicted. G. HASKINS, LAw AND AuTHoRr INEARLY MASACHUSrFS 81 (1960). Another statute,
enacted in 1654, provided for the whipping of children who acted "disrespectively [sic],
disobediently, and disorderly" towards their parents. Act of 1654, 3 Mass. Records 355 (1854),
reprintedin 1 Cma m AND YouTH, supra at 39. (Until 1973 it was still a criminal offense to
be a "stubborn child" in Massachusetts. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 272, § 53 (West 1968)
(amended to exclude "stubborn children" and "runaways" by Act of Nov. 21, 1973, ch. 1073,
§ 20, 1973 Mass. Laws 1108). Disobedient children in Massachusetts are still subject to
juvenile court jurisdiction as "children in need of services." MAss. ANN. IAws ch. 119, § 39E
(West 1975). The Massachusetts "stubborn child" provision previously had been held constitutional in Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550, 270 N.E.2d 389 (1970)).
In 1650, Connecticut permitted selectmen to apprentice "rude, stubborne and unruly"
children until the age of majority. CODE OF CoN. GEN. CT., Children, 39 (1650). By 1672,
the colony had provided that children convicted of "stubborn or rebellious carriage" could
be sentenced to the house of correction, "there to remain at hard labour and severe punish.
meat, so long as said authority shall judge meet." 1 CONN. PUB. STAT. Lws tit. 33, § 7 (1808).
As of 1866, both Connecticut provisions were still on the books. CoNN. GEN. STAT. tit. 13, ch.
4, §§ 44-45 (1866). New Hampshire and Rhode Island also enacted laws permitting children
to be confined in the house of correction if they were stubborn or failed to obey lawful
commands of their parents. Act of May 13, 1718, reprintedin N.H. Acts and Laws 73 (1771);
An Act for Punishing Criminal Offenses, R.I. Acts and Laws 4 (1719). While these laws
provided for official intervention into the lives of children, it would seem that colonial Americans looked primarily to families to discipline misbehaving youths. See generally,E. MoRGAN,
THE PuRIrTAN FAMILY: RELIGION AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN SRVENT
rIH-CM =IYNEW
ENGLAND 102-08 (rev. ed. 1966); D. ROTmmN, Tea DiscovERY OF TtE AsvU.M: SOCL. ODRn
AND DisoRDER N Tma NEw REunuc 16-17 (1971).

D. RoTHMAN, supra note 17, at 16. See generally id. at 1-56.
"Haskins observes that the Puritans of Massachusetts Bay Colony laid great stress on
persuading an offender to acknowledge his or her wrongdoing, a process known as "due
conviction." The Puritans believed that logic and reasoning, aided by divine grace, could
restore the innate human sense of right and wrong and thus bring the offender back to a
'
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According to Rothman, this consensus broke down between 1790
and 1820, for a number of reasons: an upsurge in population, especially in the cities; a corresponding increase in geographic mobility,
accelerating in the 18 30's as people began to seek jobs in the new
factories; and the broader social mobility that industrialization and
commerce precipitated.20 The old sense of loyalty to an insular community broke down, and wider political loyalties-to the state and
nation-began to flourish. One no longer knew or trusted one's
neighbors, at least in the larger communities, especially when those
neighbors were poor immigrants. Further, crime and poverty no
longer appeared unimportant: the spectre of a whole class of people
pauperized or engaged in crime-the "dangerous classes"' ,haunted Americans after 1820.
For nineteenth-century Americans, pauperism and crime were
inextricably linked. Many attributed the appearance of chronic poverty among the masses to the addiction of poor people to idleness,
drinking, and gambling-an addiction that might be caused either
by the inherent moral culpability of the poor or the overwhelming
nature of the temptations to which they were exposed. Reformers
continually commented on the shocking increase of taverns, brothels, and gambling dens and their wicked influence on the poor,
especially the immigrant poor. It was widely assumed that anyone
who succumbed to these perils would eventually engage in criminal
activities as well.2
respectable place in society. Punishments were often mitigated if a criminal freely acknowledged his or her error. Thus, despite their belief that original sin obscured man's moral
faculties, the Puritans were in a sense more optimistic than later colonists that moral persuasion could reform offenders. G. HASKNS, supra note 17, at 204-11.
The importance of the settlement provisions of colonial poor laws as a device for excluding
potentially disruptive persons and thus controlling the level of crime within a community
cannot be overemphasized. See M. CnaxcH, THREE CENTRIES OF POOR LAW ADMINISTRATION:
A STUDY OF LEGISLATION IN RHODE ISLAND (1936); D. ROTMAN, supra note 17, at 20-25.
" D. ROTHMAN, supra note 17, at 57-58.
2t Id. Charles Loring Brace, founder of the New York Children's Aid Society, employed this
commonly used term in the title of his memoir, C. BRACE, THE DANGEROUS CLASSES or NEw
YORK AND TWENTY YEARs' WoRK AmONG TMw (1872).
22 D. ROTHMAN, supra note 17, at 62-78, 155-72. Bradford K. Peirce, an influential early
nineteenth-century child-saver and the first superintendent of the Massachusetts Industrial
School for Girls, summed up the easy equation that linked poverty, immigrants, and crime:
The immense importation of the poorer and lower classes of Europe, the most destitute
portion of which lingers in our Eastern cities, greatly increases the statistics of exposed
and criminal children. Poor blood, low moral culture, the pinch of poverty, the habit
of indulgence, predispose this class to early crime.
B. PmRcE, A HALF CErNURY wrm JuvENuL DELINQUENTS 249-50 (1869). See also SocrTY ron
THE REFORMATION OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS, ANNUAL REPORT No. 24, at 11 (1849).
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It followed that if adults could not avoid the manifold temptations of poverty-stricken neighborhoods, children must also give in
to a life of crime. To prove this was so, managers of institutions for
children compiled abundant evidence to show that the parents of
their charges had been intemperate, had smoked, had gambled,
had not held jobs, or had not sent their children to church.Y Clearly,
in their view, the children's waywardness was the fruit of the parents' vices.
Charles Loring Brace, who founded the New York Children's Aid
Society in 1853 with the avowed purpose of "draining the city"' u of
vagrant children by sending them to live with farming families in
the West, wrote that these children, "if unreclaimed, [will] poison
society all around them. They will help to form the great multitude
of robbers, thieves, vagrants, and prostitutes who are now such a
burden upon the law-respecting community."' s Brace, however,
went beyond many of his contemporaries in articulating political
fears as well. Commenting on New York City's draft riots of 1863,
in which boys fifteen to eighteen years of age assumed positions of
leadership, Brace observed:
It should be remembered, that there are no dangers to the value
of property or to the permanency of our institutions, so great
as those from the existence of such a class of vagabond, ignorant, ungoverned children. This "dangerous class" has not
begun to show itself, as it will in eight or ten years, when these
They will vote. They will have
boys and girls are matured ....
the same rights as we ourselves, though they have grown up
ignorant of moral principle, as any savage or Indian. They will
poison society. They will perhaps be embittered at the wealth,
2

See, e.g., Fourth Annual Report of the Massachusetts State Reform School 24 (1851):
The following facts have been gathered, to throw some light upon the causes of crime,
as developed in the commitments to the Reform School.
Whole number received, 440.
169 have lost their father.
108

21

2

"

"

.

mother.

138 " fathers who have no steady employment.
194 "
"
" are intemperate.
57
" mothers who are intemperate.
170 " fathers who use profane language.
t
"
"
" mothers "
45
145 " fathers who were Sabbath.breakers.
t
"
"
" mothers "
71
" fathers, mothers, brothers or sisters, who have been, or are imprisoned.
72
C. BRACE, supra note 21, at 92.
Id.
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and the luxuries, they never share. Then let society beware,
when the outcast, vicious, reckless multitude of New York
boys, swarming now in every foul alley and low street, come to
know their power and use it!26
Brace here formulated the ultimate agenda of nineteenth-century
child-savers. Wayward children must be reformed, not merely because they would engage in individual acts of crime, but because an
impoverished and embittered lower class might one day imitate
their European counterparts and engage in 2social revolution, destroying the very system of private property.
Brace was writing at mid-century, when immigration and industrialization had exacerbated the division between the classes. Yet
the men who founded the first houses of refuge for children in the
1820's, with the memory of the French Revolution still in their
minds, also shared this fear of class conflict. Descendants of old elite
families, prosperous merchants and professionals, although no
longer controlling the levers of political power as their families once
had, they feared class warfare could erupt at any time. Charity
toward the poor and inculcation of proper values in lower-class
youth, they believed, were the only ways of avoiding the destruction
of the social structure in which they still occupied prominent positions.2
B.

"Wayward" Children
Who were these children whom reformers felt compelled to take
in hand, or, more to the point, how did reformers perceive them? A
picture emerges from their writings of a large and growing population of young children with no homes, sleeping wherever they could
find shelter, annoying respectable citizens by begging, stealing
small items, or selling apples or newspapers. Reformers often
seemed as irritated by young children engaged in "honest" street
trades as by those who were shiftless or even stole. 9
CHILDREN'S Am SocIm, ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1864), reprintedin 1 CHILDREN AND
YOUTH, supra note 17, at 757.

Harper'sWeekly commented that the New York draft riots "bore a closer resemblance
AND YoUTH, supra note
17, at 757.
Is R. MENNEL, THORNS & THismrEs: JUVENILE DELINQUENTrS IN THE UNrrED STATES, 1825-1940,
at 4-7 (1973). See also, J. HAWES, CHILDREN IN URBAN SocIrv: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN
"

to a European riot than any thing we have ever had here." 1 CHIDREN

NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 33 (1971); R. PIcKETT, HOUSE OF REFUGE: ORIGINS OF JUVENILE
REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE, 1815-1857, at 26 (1969).
"See,

e.g., SOCIETY FOR THE REFORMATION OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS, ANNUAL Rnroitr No.

17, at 8-9 (1842):
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The Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents in New
York, in an 1824 petition urging the New York legislature to create
a house of refuge, commented on the "ragged and uncleanly appearance, the vile language, and the idle and miserable habits of great
numbers of children, most of whom are of an age suitable for
schools, or for some useful employment."" Josiah Quincy, chairman
of the committee which recommended a house of refuge for Boston
in 1821, saw its potential inmates as
those idle and vicious children, of both sexes and different ages,
which often under the command, and always with the permission of thoughtless and abandoned parents, are found begging
in our streets, or haunting our wharves, market places, sometimes under the pretence of employment, at others for the purpose of watching occasions to pilfer small articles, and thus
beginning a system of petty stealing. .... 3.
In 1851, a New York diarist singled out gangs of street girls for
condemnation:
Many, as soon almost as they are able to run alone, are found hawking the penny
papers through our streets, and vending matches and other small wares to the great
annoyance of our citizens. By such sauntering employments they are not only deprived
of the opportunity of acquiring an education, but are thrown, at this early age when
their characters and habits are forming, into dissolute society, and exposed to all
manners of temptation and enticements to evil.
SocIErY FOR THE PREVmNIoN OF PAUPERISM IN THE CITY OF NLw YORK, REPORT ON Ttm
SUBJECT OF EnRINo A HOUSE OF REFUGE FOR VAGRANT AND DEP'Avn YOUNG PmoPLV, reprinted
in SOCIET FOR THE REFORMATION OF JuvEwLz DEmuQunNms, Doctmamrs REIAva To THm
HousE OF REFUGE 13 (N. Hart ed. 1832) [hereinafter cited as DocUMENs].
The problem seemed to worsen as the century progressed. The managers of the New York
House of Refuge noted in 1842:
We see hundreds of [youth], of all ages . . . congregated on the Sabbath in the
suburbs of the city, desecrating that holy day by their unhallowed amusements. They
hang round the numerous dram-shops with which our city is cursed, the dock-yards
and public squares, mutually contaminating each other-drinking in iniquity, plotting
mischief, and by their oaths and filthy badinage, disturbing the quiet of the neighborhood.
SOCIETY FOR THE REFORMATION OF Juvarmm DEuNQuETs, ANNUAL REPORT No. 17, at 8 (1842).
By mid-century, New York officials believed the situation had reached critical proportions.
In a report that received widespread publicity, the New York Chief of Police, George W.
Matsell, referred to "the constantly increasing numbers of vagrant, idle and vicious children
of both sexes who infest our public thoroughfares, hotels, docks, &c.," who were allowed "to
roam day and night wherever their inclination leads them," staying away from their parents'
homes for weeks at a time, and engaging in begging, pilfering, "vice, prostitution, and rowdyism." NEw YoRK Crrv, PoucE DEPArmENT, Smu-ANNuAL REPORT, MAY 31-OcToBER 31,1849,
app. [hereinafter cited as MAsELL REPORT], reprintedin 1 Ctnenr AND YoUr, supra note
17, at 755-56.
'1 REPORT OF THE COMMITEE ON THE SUBJECT OF PAUPERISM AND A HOUSE OF INDUSTRY IN THE

TowN OF BOSTON 8-9 (1821), reprintedin 1 Cmunnr

AND

YOUTH, supra note 17, at 753.
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No one can walk the length of Broadway without meeting some
hideous troop of ragged girls, from twelve years old down, brutalized already almost beyond redemption by premature vice,
clad in the filthy refuse of the ragpicker's collections, obscene
of speech, the stamp of childhood gone from their faces, hurrying along with harsh laughter and foulness on their lips that
some of them have learned by rote, yet too young to understand
it; with thief written in their cunning eyes and whore on their
depraved faces.

....

.1

Other practices that infuriated child-savers were the "wrangling
and fighting" and "reckless oaths and blasphemies" of youngsters
gathered on street corners in the evenings and on the Sabbath," and
the habit of street boys of racing after fire engines to the scenes of
fires, where they would "crowd around the flames,.

. .

dare danger

with the boldness of older spirits," and seek for booty among the
ruins."
While some observers stressed the spirit of camaraderie that characterized these street youths and their gangs, Charles Loring Brace
described a lonelier existence:
For the most part, the boys grow up utterly by themselves. No
one cares for them, and they care for no one. Some live by
begging, by petty pilfering, by bold robbery; some earn an hon" 2 THE DIARY OF GEORGE TEMPLEToN STRONG 56 (A. Nevins & M. Thomas eds. 1952),
reprintedin 1 CHILDREN AND YoUTH, supra note 17, at 756.
SMATSELL REPORT, supra note 30, reprinted in 1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 17, at
756.
3 J. LATROBE, ADDRESS ON THE SUBJECT OF AMANUAL LABOUR SCHOOL (1840), reprintedin 1
CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supranote 17, at 755. See also SOCmTr FOR THE REFORMATION OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS, ANNUAL REPORT No. 15, at 7 (1840):
The first cry of fire, and the first stroke of the bell, sets in motion the whole class of
children from 10 to 20 not possessing parents or guardians, or who are not strictly
attended to. They are known as volunteers, they are the first at the engine house, they
are the moving power to the engine; the strife to get first at the conflagration leads to
an exertion disproportioned to their strength, and then comes, not infrequently, additional fatigue, and subsequently the gratuitous distribution of liquor to a company of
boys; the free access to valuable merchandise and property scattered about, and the
total absence of elder persons and friends to advise and guard them, are circumstances
which, when taken together, make the New-York fire establishment, as now conducted, a most prolific source of juvenile delinquency and crime.
Historian Joseph Kett, while admitting that youthful volunteers in fire companies frequently
occasioned street brawls, presents a more charitable view of the volunteer companies: "In
their heyday. . . the volunteer companies . . . provided an outlet for youthful high spirits,
opportunities for display and parades, and a quasi-legitimate form of involvement for youth
in civic affairs." J. KErr, supra note 15, at 90-92.
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est support by peddling matches, or apples, or newspapers;
others gather bones and rags in the street to sell. They sleep
on steps, in cellars, in old barns, and in markets, or they hire
a bed in filthy and low lodging-houses. They cannot read; they
do not go to school or attend a church ...
The girls, too often, grow up even more pitiable and deserted. . . They are the cross-walk sweepers, the little applepeddlers, and candy-sellers of our city; or, by more questionable means, they earn their scanty bread. They traverse the low,
vile streets alone, and live without mother or friends, or any
share in what we should call a home.",
One other trait of wayward youths struck the child-savers: they
were older than their years in worldly wisdom, no longer children.
For Brace, they were "shrewd and old in vice, when other children
are ihleading-strings." 36 It was the very precociousness of wayward
children, their "cunning," that made it all the more necessary to
impose on them a properly dependent role. Already Americans were
developing the notion of childhood as a prolonged period of dependency, with ever-clearer delineation of what were and what were not
proper roles for young people. This development marked a sharp
break with the colonial period, when Americans expected children
to act as miniature adults and encouraged them to adopt adult
functions, including starting a farm and raising a family, in their
early teens.3 7 The exclusion of young people from responsible social
and economic roles in society, and the corollary insistence that certain activities and behavior were inappropriate for minors, were to
be ever-intensifying features of nineteenth-century culture.
C.

The First Houses of Refuge

Acting on their fears of social unrest and assumptions about
lower-class morality, reformers began to agitate in the 1820's for the
construction of special institutions for criminal and wayward children to permit their incarceration separate from adults. In these
new "houses of refuge" deviant children would be isolated from the

3

C. BRACE, supranote 21, at 91-92.
Id. at 91. For another writer, their minds had become "sharpened to a degree unnatural

to their years" and they had learned "to comprehend the business and the feelings of men,
before they have passed the first periods of childhood." J. LATRoa, supra note 34, reprinted
in 1 CHILDREN AND YoUTH,supra note 17, at 754.
0. & M. HANDuN, FACING LIFE: YouTH AND Tnm FA~Y& IN AMtUcAN HISroRY, chs. 1.2
passim (1971). See also J. Karr, supra note 15, ch. 1 passim.
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corrupting influences of family and town and taught the value of
hard work, discipline, and obedience. How long they stayed there
would depend on how quickly they reformed, although they would
be committed for the length of their minority. Given the chance to
educate children for a prolonged period in an institutional setting,
child-savers were confident they could undo the effects of pernicious
environments and instill acceptable behavior in their charges."
At the very outset of their campaign, the future managers of the
New York and Philadelphia Houses of Refuge made clear that the
primary purpose of these institutions was the reformation of
wayward children. 9 In their petition to the state legislature urging
2 The movement toward reforming juvenile delinquents and other deviants in large institutions, isolated from such urban temptations as taverns, brothels, and theaters and from the
corrupting influence of degenerate families, is developed in D. ROTHMAN, supra note 17. After
1820, the colonial idea that children's anti-social tendencies should be restrained within the
family was discredited, as parents themselves came to be regarded as dissolute. The reformers
who created houses of refuge were frankly contemptuous of families. In its petition to the New
York legislature in 1824, the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents in New York
wrote:
The parents of these [vagrant] children are, in all probability, too poor, or too degenerate, to provide them with clothing fit for them to be seen in at school; and know not
where to place them in order that they may find employment, or be better cared for.
Accustomed, in many instances, to witness at home nothing in the way of example,
but what is degrading; early taught to observe intemperance, and to hear obscene and
profane language without disgust; obliged to beg, and even encouraged to acts of
dishonesty, to satisfy the wants induced by the indolence of their parents,-what can
be expected, but that such children will, in due time, become responsible to the laws
for crimes, which have thus, in a manner, been forced upon them?
DOcUMEMts, supranote 30, at 13. A Boston reformer called them the "thoughtless and abandoned parents" of "idle and vicious children," while a Philadelphia refuge official inveighed
against "the debased and besotted parent." R. MENNEL, supra note 28, at 15.
" DocumNrs, supra note 30, at 21-23. The New York reformers also hoped the new institution would include neglected children and milder criminal offenders. Since they believed "the
gradations of crime [were] almost infinite," id. at 22, they were confident they could reform
the latter and saw no problem in committing them with merely wayward youths. The impetus
to place young criminal offenders in special institutions for children came from the fear that
children sentenced to adult jails would listen to adult criminals' stories, "acquire their habits,
and by their instruction .. . be made acquainted with the most artful methods of perpetrating crime, and with the surest means of avoiding its detection." SocirY FOR THE REFORMATION
OF JuvENLE DELIQUENTs, ANWUAL REPORT No. 2 (1827), reprintedin DocUMENTS, supra note
30, at 74-75. Observers also noted that courts and juries were reluctant to convict young
people at all if they had to be sent to adult prisons. DOcUMENTS, supra note 30, at 14; Socimry
FOR THE REFORMATION OF JUVENILE DEuqUENTS, ANNUAL REPORT No. 1 (1825), reprinted in
id. at 48; First Annual Report of the Philadelphia House of Refuge 18 (1829).
The New York reformers described neglected children as those "whose parents, either from
vice or indolence . . . leave them exposed in rags and filth, to miserable and scanty fare,
destitute of education, and liable to become the prey of criminal associates." DocUMEwS,
supra note 30, at 22. Their concern was motivated not so much by the suffering of these
children as by the fear that they would soon develop "vicious" habits and inevitably turn to
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the creation of a house of refuge, the Society for the Reformation of
Juvenile Delinquents in New York mentioned as worthy of institutional care "boys under a certain age, who become subject to the
notice of our Police, either as vagrants, or houseless, or charged with
petty crimes," who would then be classified "according to their
degrees of depravity or innocence." 4 0 Given the frequency with
which children were committed to the New York House of Refuge
on charges of vagrancy," this category was probably used as a catchall to immure those children of "idle and miserable habits" and
"vile language" referred to earlier in the same report.', A second
group of wayward children whom the reformers wished to include
were
delinquent females, who are either too young to have acquired
habits of fixed depravity, or those whose lives have in general
been virtuous, but who, having yielded to the seductive influcrime. See the 1824 petition of the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents in
New York, quoted in note 38 supra. The managers of the Philadelphia House of Refuge
published a letter from a citizen which reflected their own assumptions about the linkage
between parental neglect and juvenile crime:
Vicious propensities are imbibed at a very early age by children, in the crowded
population of a city. Parents, whose extreme poverty, casual calamity, or moral turpitude, induces a neglect of their offspring, expose them at once to be caught up by the
profligate and knavish, to be made unsuspected agents in the commission of offences,
and to be trained into habits of cunning and predatory vagrancy.
First Annual Report of the Philadelphia House of Refuge 16-17 (1829).
4Doctmuars,
supra note 30, at 21. Vagrancy, of course, was itself a vague concept based
on status. Called "disorderly persons" in New York, vagrants were statutorily defined as "all
persons wandering abroad and begging, and all idle persons, not having any visible means of
livelihood." Act of Feb. 9, 1788, ch. 31, 1785-88 N.Y. Laws 643. In 1822, over 450 youths in
New York City under 25 years of age were convicted by police magistrates of being disorderly
persons. DocUMENTS, supra note 30, at 14. By 1829, "vagrant" had replaced the term
"disorderly person" in an expanded provision:
All idle persons who, not having visible means to maintain themselves, live without
employment; all persons wandering abroad and lodging in taverns, groceries, beerhouses, out-houses, market-places, sheds or barns, or in the open air, and not giving a
good account of themselves; all persons wandering abroad and begging, or who go
about from door to door, or place themselves in the streets, highways, passages, or
other public places, to beg or receive alms, shall be deemed vagrants.
1 N.Y. Rxv. STAT. pt. 1, ch. 20, tit. 2, § 1 (1829).
41See text accompanying note 166 infra.
2 Docuhrms, supra note 30, at 13. That "vagrant" was probably a synonym for "wayward
child" in New York is further borne out by the comments of a New York refuge official some
years later: "Vagrants will generally be found to be those who have broken away from parental
restraint, who have turned their backs upon wholesome instruction, and have followed the
inclinations which have sprung up in their youthful minds, disregarding the restraint thrown
around them, and resolved upon having their own way." PROCEEDINGS OF TE SECOND CO.'vTION OF MANAGERS AND SUPERINTENDENTS OF Housrs oF FRrU
AND ScHooLs oPFft'OPim IN THE
UNrrED STATES OF AMmEcA 14 (1859) [hereinafter cited as PROcEEnGs].

HeinOnline -- 13 Ga. L. Rev. 355 1978-1979

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:341

ence of corrupt associates, have suddenly to endure the bitterness of lost reputation, and are cast forlorn and destitute upon
a cold and unfeeling public ....13
It was simply assumed that a girl no longer chaste stood in need of
reformation, whether or not she had turned to prostitution.
Throughout the nineteenth century, young women were incarcerated on vague charges of sexual promiscuity."
Philadelphia child-savers also wanted their house of refuge to
receive the "idle and deserted" children of Pennsylvania, who
"might be received with a chance of reformation when inclined to
vice, and with the hope of useful instruction, when they might be
merely ignorant but not habitually depraved."4 They were convinced that if all wayward children could be incarcerated before
they committed crimes, adult criminality would vanish from the
city46
When the New York and the Philadelphia Houses of Refuge finally opened, in 1826 and 1829 respectively, they were empowered
by statute to receive children convicted of vagrancy or specific criminal offenses, if committing officials considered them "proper objects" of institutional care. In addition, the Pennsylvania law allowed the managers to receive children "taken up . . .upon any
DocuMEmNS, supra note 30, at 23.
See text accompanying notes 59-61, 287, 299 infra. It is still the case today that one of
the principal grounds for status offense allegations against young women is sexually preco.
cious activity. A study done of PINS cases in New York and Rockland counties in New York
State showed that while girls accounted for 57% of all PINS petitions filed in one year, they
accounted for 100% of the cases involving allegations of prostitution, promiscuity,
"cohabiting," and "general sex innuendo." Note, Ungovernability: The Unjustifiable Juris.
diction, supra note 5, at 1388 n.41. See also Sussman, Sex-Based Discriminationand PINS
Jurisdiction,in BEYOND CONTROL: STATUS ONDms INTHE JUVENILE CoUwr 179 (L. Teitelbaum & A. Gough eds. 1977). It has also been argued that because of official concern to curb
sexual promiscuity by young women, wayward minor statutes are applied more frequently to
females than to males, and such statutes may therefore be suspect constitutionally on equal
protection grounds. Id. at 179-80, 186-91. See also STANDARDS RELATING TO NONcINIiNAL
MISBHAVIOR,supra note 3, at 13.
First Annual Report of the Philadelphia House of Refuge 6, 9 (1829).
11 Second Annual Report of the Philadelphia House of Refuge 6 (1830). The managers
wrote:
If the vigilance of the magistracy were so exerted, as to leave not one infant beggar in
the streets, not one vagrant child, and of consequence not one person, capable of
instruction and relief, and unable to receive them elsewhere, who should not be received and instructed here; the darling hope might be realized of an almost total
cessation of prison discipline. Let every unprotected child . . . be placed under the
parental guardianship of this institution; and where will be the material to compose
future criminals?
Id. (emphasis in original).
"
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criminal charge," which would seem to indicate that children could
be committed even without having been formally convicted of the
offense charged."
Refuge officials themselves were indifferent to whether charges of
crime against a youth were proved or not. Seeking to rebut criticism
that incarceration in a house of refuge was a deprivation of liberty
that could only be imposed after trial by jury, the managers of the
Philadelphia house argued that "the inquiry which precedes admission here, is not necessarily into the guilt or innocence of the subject,
with a view to punishment."4 The whole purpose of the institution
was to make a trial and criminal conviction unnecessary. A charge
of crime merely supplied the occasion for examining a child's entire
condition:
[T]he inquiry has been directed mainly to the criminal tendency and manifestations of their condition, to their means of
support, to the protection and guidance they receive from their
natural friends. If adequate securities against guilt are wanting, and they must in all probability become criminal as well
as wretched, they are entitled to a place within these walls,
even though they may not have committed specific
crimes. .

.

. Almost every child that steals is a vagrant as well

as a thief; for theft is the result of a want of honest occupation
and support; and a want of honest means of subsistence is
vagrancy. When a commitment, therefore, is made by a magistrate, it is not simply or even necessarily because of crime, but
because of want and bereavement, of which crime is both the
proof and the consequence. It would be equally cruel and unnecessary to subject to trial and conviction, and thus to lasting
" Act of Mar. 29, 1824, ch. 126, § 4, 1824 N.Y. Laws 110; Act of Mar. 23, 1826, ch. 47, § 6,
1826 Pa. Laws 133. A variety of tribunals, including those presided over by such minor
officials as justices of the peace, police magistrates, aldermen, and commissioners of the
almshouse or Bridewell, could hear cases against children. Act of Mar. 29, 1824, ch. 126, § 4,
1824 N.Y. Laws 110; Act of Mar. 23, 1826, ch. 47, § 6, 1826 Pa. Laws 133. Procedural
protections for children tried in minor city tribunals, especially before administrative officials, were probably minimal. In both New York and Pennsylvania trial by jury was unavailable in vagrancy prosecutions; in petit larceny cases, it could not be claimed in New York,
but may have been available in Pennsylvania. Fox, supra note 13, at 1191, 1212; Frankfurter

& Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39
HRv. L. Rxv. 917, 945-47, 956 (1926). Since most children being prosecuted were poor, one
imagines that they rarely had access to counsel. Coupled with the breadth of the vagrancy
jurisdiction and general suspicion of lower-class morals, this must have made it difficult for
a child to disprove a vagrancy or petit theft charge. But see Joseph v. McKeagy, 1 Ashmead
248 (Phila. C.P. 1831), discussed in text accompanying notes 62-68 infra.
" Second Annual Report of the Philadelphia House of Refuge 8 (1830).
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infamy, when the requisitions of the law are fulfilled without
them, and the child is instructed, cherished, saved, without
exposing it to the melancholy satisfaction of knowing, that
there are two motives for its restraint when one is sufficient."
To support their contention that proof of crime, accompanied by
due process, was not a necessary condition for commitment to the
house of refuge, the Philadelphia managers also argued that the
purpose of their institution was "education," not punishment. Children's errors, they said, resulted from their parents' failure to educate them properly, and every civilized community had the power
to establish a special guardianship over children if the natural parents failed to provide adequately for their needs. Especially since
overseers of the poor" could already "coerce [indigent children] to
" Id. at 9. The description of the new juvenile court's task offered in 1909 by Judge Julian
Mack could have been uttered just as easily by the Philadelphia refuge managers in 1830:
The problem for determination by the judge is not, Has this boy or girl committed a
specific wrong, but What is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be
done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward career,
Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REv. 104, 119-20 (1909).
One of the current criticisms of the status offense jurisdiction is that in cases where a child
might be charged with a criminal offense, the prosecution and court can avoid the stricter
procedural formalities constitutionally required when the minor is so charged, In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970) (extending the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt to minor charged
with committing a crime); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), by filing a wayward minor petition
instead, under which the allegation of crime becomes merely evidence of the child's need for
supervision. IJA-ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO
ADJUDIcATION 59-60 (Tent. Draft, 1977); Note, Ungovernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdic.
tion, supra note 5, at 1393-94. Only a few states, such as New York in In re E., 68 Misc. 2d
487, 327 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Fain. Ct. 1971), have determined that the Winship requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt extends to wayward minor proceedings. Note, Ungovernability:
The UnjustifiableJurisdiction,supra note 5, at 1390 n.51. Even when the standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is applied to wayward minor proceedings, usually very little is
required to overcome it. New York has held, for example, that to prove "habitual" disobedience of parental commands there need only be proof that the minor was involved in more
than "a single isolated incident." Id., citing In re W., 28 N.Y.2d 589, 590, 268 N.E.2d 642,
643, 319 N.Y.S.2d 845, 846 (1971). Fewer witnesses are usually required in waywardness cases
than where the petitioning party must prove that the youth committed a specific criminal
act at a specific time. Perhaps as a result, in New York ungovemability cases are tried only
seven percent of the time, four or five times less often than are delinquency cases. Note,
Ungovernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction,supra note 5, at 1394 n.80. While these
results are now regarded as unfair to youths by critics of the status offense jurisdiction, both
nineteenth-century child reformers and twentieth-century juvenile court proponents thought
it desirable to treat an allegation of crime merely as evidence of a minor's need for reformation
and to minimize the burden of proof required to make such a finding.
5 Overseers of the poor were local officials, either appointed or elected, who, under both
colonial and nineteenth-century legislation, had responsibility for determining which members of a community were eligible to receive public relief and what form that relief should
take. In some cases their duties were assumed by other officials, such as aldermen or church
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a course of servitude or apprenticeship," the managers saw "nothing
new in the principle" by which the state could coercively "educate"
wayward children.-"
Not all institutional officials agreed with these views, however; a
few candidly admitted that the main purpose of their institution
was punishment. In 1826, the president of the board of managers of
the New York House of Refuge lectured the new superintendent of
that institution:
My own view of this establishment is, that. . . those who are
committed to our care . . . are offenders against the laws of
their country, that they are in a place of punishment, and that
that punishment is confinement and labor, from which they
can only be redeemed by a continuation of good conduct that
will give such assurance of reformation, as that they may be
trusted to mix with society. I cannot think, therefore, that
these children are to be treated exactly as they would be if they
52
were the innocent inmates of a college.
This description, which accurately forecast the harsh and forbidding worlds that houses of refuge were to become,53 was conveniently
ignored by the courts when they came to deal with challenges to the
confinement of juveniles. Nor did many child-savers like to advertise such thoughts, for they cut against the argument they wanted
the public to accept, namely, that because incarceration was premised on misfortune and lack of education, it involved no more reofficers. One of their specific powers was to remove children from pauper families and apprentice them to tradesmen to receive an education and learn a trade. On the operation of the
poor law system in eighteenth and nineteenth-century America, see M. CREECH, supra note
19; A. KENNEDY, THE Omo POOR LAW AND rrs AD mrAxnoN (1934); R. MOHL, PovEmv IN
NEw YORK, 1783-1825 (1971); D. ROTHEAN, supra note 17, chs. 1-2, 7-8; W. TRATTNER,
FROM
POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE, A HISTORY OF SOCIAL VELFARE IN AMERCA, chs. 2.4 (1974).
Second Annual Report of the Philadelphia House of Refuge 9-10 (1830).
SocIEr FOR THE REFOMATION OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS, ANNUAL REPORT No. 2 (1827),
reprinted in DocuMENTs, supra note 30, at 102. In 1830, the New York managers reaffirmed
the primacy of punishment:
[lit must not be forgotten, that the House of Refuge is in fact a prison for children,
and that whilst the greatest tenderness is due to their youth, and the greatest passion
should be displayed toward their involuntary errors, no such relaxation of discipline
can be permitted, as may tend to call off their minds from the severer duties of life, or
encourage the illusory expectation of exemption from wholesome restraint, and from
inevitable punishment whenever it is deserved.
SOCIETY FOR THE REFORMATION OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS, ANNUAL REPORT No. 5 (1830).
reprinted in id. at 202.
0 For a graphic portrayal of the grim conditions in houses of refuge, see D. RomtEAN, supra
note 17, at 221-36. See also R. MENNELL, supra note 28, at 19-21.
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straint than other social institutions of the time (family, almshouse,
boarding school), and therefore neither a finding of criminal guilt
nor the procedural guarantees of the criminal process were germane
to the commitment of children to houses of refuge.
Information gleaned from the annual reports of the New York and
Philadelphia Houses of Refuge in their early years indicates that
after their opening these institutions in fact were used primarily for
wayward children. In New York, for example, in 1825 ten children
were committed by the criminal court for larceny, while sixty-three
children were sent by police magistrates or commissioners of almshouses54 for stealing, vagrancy, and absconding from the almshouse.
The next year, the figures were thirty-six committed by the criminal court for larceny, and 181 by the magistrates or commissioners
for stealing, vagrancy, and absconding."5
Published case histories of inmates also provided reasons for commitment. Some of the youths were committed for petty theft, some
for a combination of theft and vagrancy, while others apparently
were institutionalized for "bad habits" alone, or "bad habits" in
conjunction with previous thefts." Typical was the case of a boy who
had "played about the streets" for six 'months after returning from
a sailing voyage, had "once" stolen a copper kettle and some old
iron from his mother, and, in general, was a "very bad boy, associating with the worst of boys, idling about the streets." 7 Another
youth, found drunk in a public place, had stolen trifling items in the
past, visited theaters and circuses frequently, and had disobeyed
his mother.
3,Commissioners of the almshouse, the central relief agency in New York City, were appointed by the New York city council to manage that institution. In 1785 they took over tho
functions of overseers of the poor for New York City, replacing an elected board that had
exercised largely overlapping duties. R. MOHL, supra note 50, at 54.
SOCIETY FOR THE REFORMATION OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS, ANNUAL REPORT No. 1 (1825),
reprinted in DOCuME.NTS, supra note 30, at 41; SOCmTY FOR THE REFORMATION OF JUVENILE
DELINQUENTS, ANNUAL REPoRT No. 2 (1827), reprinted in id. at 89. It is impossible to tell if
all of the "stealing and vagrancy" cases involved an allegation of theft in addition to vagrancy
and, if they did, whether the charge of theft was proved.
See, e.g., DOCUMENTS, supra note 30, at 57-62, 92.96, 157-72.
'7

SOCIETY FOR THE REFORMATION OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS,

ANNUAL REPORT No. 4 (1829),

reprinted in id. at 158-59.
51Id. at 164. Another boy was committed for "getting with other boys into the cabin of a
steamboat." SOCIETY FOR THE REFORMATION OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS, ANNUAL REPORT No. 1
(1825), reprintedin id. at 58. Yet another was committed "on suspicion" of having stolen a
shawl and for playing the tambourine in dancing-houses. SOCIrTY FOR THE REFORMATION OF
JUVENILE DELINQUENTS, ANNUAL REPORT No. 2 (1827), reprinted in id. at 93.

Similar examples can be found in the reports of the Philadelphia House of Refuge. Typical
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The case histories of girls demonstrate even more clearly the emphasis on bad morals, especially sexual precocity, as a sufficient
basis for commitment. One child had associated for two and a half
years with "lewd and abandoned women," although she was finally
committed by her father "for leaving his roof, and frequenting
houses of ill fame."59 A twelve-year-old girl had been "receiving
men's company for more than a year," had been "very active and
successful in winning other little girls from the paths of virtue," and
h ad attended theaters and circuses.c" Another twelve-year-old was
committed for "going out and staying with different boys, about
fourteen and fifteen years of age" and "carry[ing] on badly in the
streets." 6
D. Initial Challenges to Wayward Minor Statutes
The first significant challenge to the use of the vagrancy jurisdiction to incarcerate children who had misbehaved came in Pennsylvania, in the 1831 case of Joseph v. McKeagy.62 This case, which
sharply limited the utility of the vagrancy provision as a tool for
reaching predelinquent behavior, may have been important in persuading the Pennsylvania legislature to pass a new wayward minor
statute in 1835 that radically extended the grounds for commitment
and created a model that other states would soon follow.
The case arose when Abraham Joseph succeeded in committing
his fourteen-year-old son, Lewis L. Joseph, to the Philadelphia
House of Refuge as an "idle, vagrant, and disorderly boy," then
apparently repented of his action and tried to secure the boy's release on a writ of habeas corpus before the Philadelphia Court of
Common Pleas. The boy was in the habit of staying away from home
one or two days at a time, sometimes prolonging his stays for fear
of punishment. His home was a prosperous and comfortable one, his
parents intelligent, and the boy had been educated in good private
schools. The father seems to have had him committed in a pique of
frustration at not being able to find ways to keep his son at home.
was a boy committed because "his mother was unable to manage him, and he spent most of
his time in the streets, frequently absenting himself altogether from his mother," and running
away from masters to whom he was apprenticed. Second Annual Report of the Philadelphia
House of Refuge 25 (1830).
SOCIETY FOR ne REFORMATMON OF JUVENILE DEUNwQENTS, ANNUAL REronr No. 2 (1827),
reprinted in DOcUMENTS, supra note 30, at 95.
3 SOcie
FOR THE REFORMA7tON OF JUvENII

DELmQUENTS, ANNUAL RETsOr No. 4 (1829),

reprintedin id., at 171.
"

Id.

1 Ashmead 248 (Phila. C.P. 1831).
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The court rejected two arguments made by counsel for the father.
It held, first, that the commitment was not unconstitutional on the
ground that the boy had not been accorded trial by jury. Both before
and after the adoption of the state constitution in 1790 courts had
exercised the power to convict for this kind of "police offense," as
the framers of the constitution were aware; had the framers intended to alter that summary jurisdiction, they would have done so
explicitly. Second, the court held that the commitment could not
be invalidated on the ground that it was for the duration of a child's
minority. Commitments of this nature were similar to those ordered
by the overseers of the poor to apprentice "poor but virtuous" children during minority. If a child could be placed coercively because
of parental poverty, asked the court, "why is it, that.

. .

the public

cannot assume similar guardianship of children whose poverty has
degenerated into vagrancy." 3
The court would not assume, however, that vagrancy included all
kinds of juvenile misbehavior, or that Lewis Joseph met the definition of a vagrant merely because an angry parent and a committing
magistrate agreed he needed the discipline of a house of refuge. The
offense of vagrancy was "degrading, if not infamous," so much so
that the Pennsylvania courts had held that calling someone a vagrant was actionable at civil law." Thus the term had to be construed strictly, and for the commitment to be valid the boy would
have to fit one of the statutory categories defining the offense. The
only one of these possibly relevant here, said the court, defined
vagrants as "those who are found loitering and having no visible
means of subsistance, and who can give no reasonable account of
themselves or their business." 5 The court held, as a matter of
law, that this category could not apply to "children of tender years,
living with parents of undoubted means, and under their care and
protection, even if such children happen to be forward and somewhat ungovernable." 6 Rather, the child must be found to demonstrate a "malicious capacity for wickedness" and a "wanton and
continued indulgence in it," or a "wandering and abandoned course
of life."6' 7 Lewis Joseph did not meet the definition of a vagrant,
"3Id. at 253.
Id. at 256 (citing Miles v. Oldfield, 4 Yeates 423 (Pa. 1808)).
1 Ashmead at 256-57. The other statutory categories defining vagrants were: (1) "an
emigrating pauper from any other poor district"; (2) "a person who has not wherewith to
maintain himself and his family, living idle and without employment and refusing to work
for the usual and common wages given to other labourers"; and (3) "a wandering beggar."

Id.
" Id. at 257.
,"Id. at 258.
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properly construed, for the legislature "never meant to constitute
the Refuge a place to correct refractory children.""
The McKeagy decision was handed down by an intermediate
court, but if followed by successive courts it would have meant that
the status offense of vagrancy could no longer have been used to
commit children guilty of only minor misconduct-the very children
reformers felt had to be restrained if they were not to become
criminals. Fortunately for Pennsylvania child-savers, and possibly
in-response to McKeagy, four years later the legislature enacted a
new statute that explicitly provided for commitment to the Philadelphia House of Refuge of the kinds of children McKeagy had
held could not be admitted under traditional vagrancy law.", While
continuing to allow commitment of children as under prior law, i.e.,
for vagrancy or crime, the law set out two new grounds of commitment. A parent, guardian, or next friend could bring a complaint
against a child on the ground that "by reason of incorrigible or
vicious conduct, such infant has rendered his or her control beyond
the power of such parent, guardian or next friend."TD Further, any
person could bring a complaint if there were concurrence of proscribed conduct on the part of parent and child. The court had to
find that
such infant is a proper subject for. . . the House of Refuge, in
consequence of vagrancy or of incorrigible or vicious conduct,
and that from the moral depravity or otherwise of the parent
or next friend, in whose custody such infant may be, such parent or next friend is incapable or unwilling to exercise the proper care and discipline over such incorrigible or vicious infant."
The law thus introduced two new concepts to juvenile jurisprudence-children who were "incorrigible" or "beyond control" of
their parents-which took their place alongside existing vague
terms that described children's status, such as "idle," "vicious,"
72
and "vagrant.
- Id. at 259.

Act of Apr. 10, 1835, No. 92, § 1, 1835 Pa. Laws 133.

"'

70Id.

7,Id. On its face, this provision required a finding of parental unfitness in addition to filial
incorrigibility. There is no way of knowing whether the Pennsylvania courts in fact required
an independent showing of parental neglect, or whether they permitted proof of the child's
incorrigibility to demonstrate the parents' inability to exercise proper discipline. (The statute
required a showing of parental inability to exercise control "from. . .moral depravity or
otherwise." Id. (emphasis added)).
n The terms "incorrigible child" and "beyond parental control" are still used in statutes
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It was not long before the new law was challenged. In 1838, Mary
Ann Crouse was committed to the Philadelphia House of Refuge by
her mother for being "vicious" and "beyond control"; the complaint
merely quoted the language of the statute and provides no clue as
to what the girl had really done. Her father apparently disagreed
and sought her release from the institution on a writ of habeas
corpus, which was denied. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court affirmed the commitment, 3 in a brief per curiam opinion
which became the leading authority nationwide on the powers of
juvenile institutions and the constitutionality of incorrigibility laws.
The father argued that commitment to the Philadelphia House of
Refuge without jury trial violated the state constitution. He clearly
hoped that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would reject the
McKeagy court's conclusion that incarceration in a house of refuge
for the child's minority did not constitute punishment for a crime,
for which a jury trial would be necessary. The court, however, accepted at face value the claims of the refuge managers about the
nature of their institution and confidently announced, "The House
of Refuge is not a prison, but a school." 4 By implication, if the child
were not being punished there could be no criminal proceeding, and
the issue of trial by jury was not germane.
Rebutting the argument that the child had "indefeasible rights"
(apparently to liberty) which were being abused, the court maintained that a child had no right to freedom from "restraints which
conduce to an infant's welfare," such as those imposed by the
"school" here. By a sleight of hand, the state had been awarded the
power to "restrain" a misbehaving child that under common law
had been exercised by parents alone.7" The court, furthermore, fully
governing juvenile misconduct. See, e.g., ILL. ANN.STAT. ch. 37, § 702-3(a) (Smith-Hurd 1972)
("beyond the control of his parents, guardian, or other custodian"); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACr
§ 712(b) (McKinney 1975) ("incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control of parent or other lawful authority"). See also STANDARDS RELATING
TO NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR, supra note 3, at 74-83 app. In the nineteenth century, "in-

corrigible" had two meanings: first, as a general term describing wayward children for purposes of court jurisdiction; second, as a term describing children who refused to abide by the
rules of an institution to which they were committed. Statutes frequently provided that the
latter kind of "incorrigible" child could be transferred from the children's institution to an
adult prison. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 9, 1847, ch. 165, § 6, 1847 Mass. Laws 405 (if trustees of
state reform school find boy committed to school is incorrigible, he may be committed to jail,
house of correction, or state prison).
, Id. at 11.

, Blackstone mentions only the power of a parent to "lawfully correct his child, being
under age, in a reasonable manner." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF
ENGLAND 452 (15th ed. London 1809) (lst ed. London 1765-69). He does state that a father
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accepted the notion that wayward conduct would lead inevitably to
criminality and thus was untroubled by the vagueness of the term
"incorrigible": "The infant has been snatched from a course which
must have ended in confirmed depravity; and, not only is the restraint of her person lawful, but it would be an act of extreme
cruelty to release her from it.""T
The court was aided in its conclusion that the state had the power
to discipline wayward children by a doctrine it called parens
patriae.Apparently in response to an argument that parents had a
natural right to custody of their children which the state could not
abridge, the court stated that when the natural parents were unequal to or unworthy of the task of educating their children, they
could be superseded by "the parens patriae,or common guardian
of the community." Without citing authority, the court adumbrated a theory that parental rights derived entirely from the will
of the state ("the public") and could be withdrawn by the legislature, subject only to possible
constitutional restrictions which the
78
court did not elaborate.
The court's use of the doctrine of parens patriae in this case was
curious. As Rendleman has observed, the phrase described the
power of English chancery courts in the late medieval period, acting
on behalf of the Crown, to order feudal relationships, particularly
in matters of property and guardianship, and did not constitute a
"roving commission to improve parent-child relationships."" In the
may delegate part of his parental authority to restrain and correct a child to a tutor or
schoolmaster in order that they may fulfill the purposes for which they are employed, id. at
452-53, but such private and temporary delegation of power over a pupil is quite different
from the state's assumption of power to confine any misbehaving child.
7 4 Whart. at 11.
7Id.

Id. The court argued:
[May not the natural parents, when unequal to the task of education, or unworthy
of it, be superseded by the parenspatriae,or common guardian of the community? It
is to be remembered that the public has a paramount interest in the virtue and
knowledge of its members, and that, of strict right, the business of education belongs
to it. That parents are ordinarily entrusted with it is because it can seldom be put into
better hands; but where they are incompetent or corrupt, what is there to prevent the
public from withdrawing their faculties, held, as they obviously ai., at its sufferance?
The right of parental control is a natural, but not an inalienable one. It is not excepted
by the declaration of rights out of the subjects of ordinary legislation; and it consequently remains subject to the ordinary legislative power, which, if wantonly or inconveniently used, would soon be constitutionally restricted, but the competency of which,
as the government is constituted, cannot be doubted.
Id.
, Rendleman, ParensPatriae:From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S. CA.. L. REv.
205, 208 (1971). See also Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entranceof "Parens
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early nineteenth century, chancery did remove children from parents because of parental unfitness in two famous English cases,10 but
both cases involved custody battles between wealthy private parties, not proceedings where the state was the complainant against
parent or child. The cases also involved either heretical religious
ideas or scandalous behavior by an aristocrat, and thus reflected
exceptional use of the chancery power rather than settled practice.
The Pennsylvania court, however, used the parenspatriae concept
not to justify the inherent powers of the courts to deal with intrafamilial property or custody disputes, nor even-a possible extension of the doctrine-to justify legislative assertion of the power to
care for pauper or neglected children unable to care for themselves,
but to rationalize an assumption of power by the legislature, and its
delegation to courts and reformatory institutions, to incarcerate
minors who represented a potential threat to community security.
Thus the parenspatriae doctrine entered nineteenth-century jurisprudence as the vehicle by which the legislature, as "common
guardian of the community," could not only remove children from
families who were neglecting their elemental physical needs but
also confine children whose moral standards did not accord with
those of respectable, middle-class society. A doctrine which originally was designed to protect the estates of incompetents became
a banner under which courts sanctioned legislatures' crime-prevention goals, in the name of "educating" children in their own
best interests.
Rendleman suggests that the Crouse court's approval of this dramatic extension of state power was facilitated by its familiarity with
the long-accepted power of overseers of the poor to take pauper
children from their families and apprentice them until majority.'
Since most of the candidates for houses of refuge came from poor
families, and since many children who came under the jurisdiction
of poor law authorities probably exhibited some kind of wayward
behavior, the court may have felt that a house of refuge was merely
an alternative method of handling poor children."
Patriae," 22 S. CAR.L. REv. 147 (1970); Curtis, The Checkered Careerof ParensPatriae:The
State as Parent or Tyrant?, 25 DEPAuL L. REv. 895 (1976).

Wellesley v. Wellesley, 4 Eng. Rep. 1078 (H.L. 1828); Shelley v. Westbrook, 37 Eng. Rep.
850 (Ch. 1817).
11Rendleman, supra note 79, at 216-17, 219. In upholding the power of the state to commit
vagrant children the McKeagy court had found an analogy in poor law provisions allowing
the state forcibly to apprentice children for their minority. 1 Ashmead at 252-53.
" Fox notes that the same children who could be sent to the New York House of Refuge,
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Despite the probable influence of the poor law system on the
court's endorsement of the incorrigibility law and use of the parens
patriae concept, it would be wrong to conclude that the house of
refuge served "essentially a poor law function" and that juvenile
reform was "a modification of the practice of committing paupers
to almshouses or workhouses because both operated on the lower
classes; both sent the presumed beneficiaries to a residential institution; and both apprenticed the children."' ' To assimilate the
house of refuge scheme to traditional American ideas about and
techniques of handling poverty is to miss the distinctively new element in early nineteenth-century thought, to which we have previously alluded-the heightened fear that the poor were potential
criminals and would provoke social disorder. As Rothman puts it,
after 1820 Americans came to believe that "[t]he same vices that
caused their poverty would inevitably bring them to lawlessness. . . Vice, crime, and poverty were stops on the same line, and
men shuttled regularly among them."8 '
Thus, the motivation for intervening in the lives of the poor itself
had changed, as Americans looked for ways to forestall the anticipated upsurge in criminality among the poor. The Crouse court
itself recognized that the refuge managers' primary motive was
crime prevention, when it declared that the institution sought to
reform minors "above all, by separating them from the corrupting
influence of improper associates." ' Had philanthropists merely
wanted to create separate almshouses for poor but "innocent" children to avoid housing them with adult paupers, there would have
been no need for statutes authorizing incarceration of children on
grounds of proto-criminal behavior."6
i.e., vagrants and beggars, could be incarcerated in county poorhouses outside New York City.
Fox, supra note 13, at 1200-01.
Rendleman, supra note 79, at 217.
,4D. ROTHmAN, supra note 17, at 164. See generally id.
at 30.43.
4 Whart. at 11.
U No cases comparable to McKeagy or Crouse arose in New York, but the managers of the
New York House of Refuge noted in 1840 that legal questions had arisen as to whether that
institution was a school or a prison and whether children could be removed via habeas corpus.
To bolster their legal position, the managers reprinted an 1835 memorandum written by
attorney J.R. Ingersoll, one of the leading members of the Philadelphia and federal bars.
SocmErY FOR THE REFORMATION OF JUVENILE DImQUENS, ANNuAL
v REpor No. 15, at 45-47
(1840) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT No. 151. On Ingersoll, see C. WARREN, HIsToRY
OF THE AiwuCA BAR 369, 411 (1966 ed.). (Ingersoll's memorandum reflected the same assumptions as the Crouse opinion, handed down three years later, and may well have been
the basis for it. His memorandum was concurred in by another eminent Philadelphia attorney, John Sergeant, ANNUAL REPORT No. 15, supra at 48, whose brother, Thomas Sergeant,
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New Institutions and the Dilemma of Classification
Although now firmly sanctioned in law, special institutions for
wayward children remained unique to Boston, New York City, and
Philadelphia until the late 1840's and 1850's. In those years,
authorities in other urban and some rural areas decided they had a
"child crisis" in their midst and emulated the eastern cities by constructing houses of refuge or "reform schools"" 7-the latter based
A.

was an Associate Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court when Crouse was decided and
would undoubtedly have known of Ingersoll's views. See C. WARREN, supra at 369, 396, 411;
WHO WAS WHO IN AMERICA, HISTOmCAL VOLUME 1607-1896, 546 (rev. ed. 1967)).
Ingersoll advanced the position that children had virtually no legal rights of their own at
common law and could be restrained in whatever way society saw fit, for their protection and
its own. Children, like mental incompetents, lacked "the means to exercise a sound judgment," and it was thus "indispensible . . . that their conduct should be regulated and
restrained." If they lacked parents or had inadequate supervision, society must step in to
protect them from "the enduring evils of ignorance and idleness." The house of refuge was
society's mechanism for providing "a substitute for parental authority and superintendence,
which have been either lost by misfortune or forfeited by misconduct." ANNUAL REPORT No.
15, supra at 46-47. According to this view, children had a "right" to protection by their
parents, which they could "forfeit" through their own waywardness, but had no corresponding
right to liberty. Ingersoll also agreed with the child-savers that the legislature had a general
power "resid[ing] at all times in the source of all authority" to take control of children who
refused to obey parental authority, and that trial by jury was unnecessary when children were
committed to houses of refuge since allegations of crime merely demonstrated a wayward
condition. Id.
Ingersoll's view that the child lacked rights at common law was not entirely accurate. A
child could sue by his "next friend," could inherit, acquire, and hold property, and could
make and enforce contracts. While the minor could disaffirm his contracts before the age of
majority, there was authority holding that he was bound to pay money due on a contract for
necessaries. 3 W. HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 513-20 (5th ed. London 1942); 2
F. POLLOCK & F. MAIrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 436-41 (1895). According to Black-

stone, parents had a duty under natural law to maintain their children, and children had a
right to receive such maintenance. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at 446-47. But cf. W.
TIFFANY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELA1ONS § 116 (2d ed. 1909)

(authorities conflicting over whether or not, at common law and independently of statute, a
parent is under legal obligation, or only moral, to support child). Prosser maintains that
"there is no good reason to think that the English law would not permit actions for personal
torts" by a child against a parent, subject to the parent's privilege to enforce reasonable
discipline against the'child. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 122, at 865 (4th

.ed. 1971). But see C. VERIER, AMERICAN FAILY LAw § 267 (1936) (parent not civilly liable
at common law for injury to his minor child, whether injury great or small, wilful or negligent).
"* Houses of refuge were constructed at New Orleans (1847), Rochester, New York (1849),
Cincinnati (1850), Pittsburgh (1854), St. Louis (1854), and Baltimore (1856). State institutions termed reform schools were opened in Massachusetts (1848), Maine (1853), Connecticut
(1854), and Ohio (1858). Variations on these institutional themes also appeared: the Now
York Juvenile Asylum for young neglected and incorrigible children, in New York City
(1853), municipal reform schools in Providence, Rhode Island (1850) and Chicago (1855), a
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on the supposedly new concept of a "family approach" to treatment. In most cases, the enabling statute or ordinance embodied
some version of incorrigibility as a basis for commitment.
The reform schools grew out of a reaction to the increasingly
repressive atmosphere of the original houses of refuge. The refuge
managers had insisted on the necessity for large, congregate institutions, in which children would all engage in the same activities at
the same time, in lockstep fashion. Intent on inculcating proper
habits, they saw no need at first to tailor treatment to the needs of
the individual child. Children were disciplined harshly, received
little formal schooling, and spent most of their time at tiring tasks
based on a contract labor system." One problem that particularly
plagued the New York House of Refuge in the 1840's was that the
courts were committing boys in their late teens, although the law
only permitted the managers to accept children up to the age of
sixteen. The older boys frequently had a longer history of criminal
violations, were harder to control than the younger inmates, and
were thought to exercise a bad influence on the latter."
To meet these problems a number of new approaches were developed. One was to create institutions that would cater only to
younger, noncriminal children. The New York Juvenile Asylum, for
example, admitted children between seven and fourteen who were
either voluntarily entrusted to it by their parents or committed by
a magistrate on grounds of neglect, begging, destitution, or abandonment attributable to parental fault."
Another group of reformers felt that the problem lay in the congregate nature of both houses of refuge and juvenile asylums, and
state industrial school for girls in Massachusetts (1856), a local industrial school for boys and
girls in Cleveland (1857), and an "Institution for Idle and Truant Children" in Brooklyn, New
York (1858). See table in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 42, at 119 app. (Dates given here are dates
the institutions opened.)
MENNzL,supra note 28, at 18-21, 59-62; D. RoTmiNm, supra note 17, at 221-36, 257-.
60. Under the contract labor system, outside contractors paid the refuges 10 to 30 cents a day
for the labor of each boy. Youths worked in large workshops within the institution at such
tasks as finishing cheap shoes, making brass nails, or caning chairs. At first regarded as a
progressive measure for training boys, the system later was criticized severely as economically exploitative and physically brutal. R. MENNEL, supra note 28, at 18-25, 59-62. On
institutional practices, see also J. HAYES, supra note 28, ch. 3; R. PIcKr, supra note 28, ch.
8; S. ScHLosshiAN, supranote 13, ch. 3.
'9 SocIETY FOR TH REFORMAT1ON OF JUVENILE DE NQUENTS, ANNUAL RFOmR No. 19, at 10
(1844); Socmry FOR THE REFORMATION OF JUVNLE DELIQuENrs, ANNuAL RE oRT No. 22, at
9-10 (1847); SocYry FOR TmEREFORMATION OF JUvENiLE DEIQUENTS, ANNUAL RPoRT No. 24,

at 9-10 (1849). The age limit is given in Act of April 10, 1840, ch. 100, § 1, 1840 N.Y. Laws
73.
soAct of June 30, 1851, ch. 332, §§ 7, 9, 1851 N.Y. Laws 633.
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that children needed more individualized attention. After 1850, a
fresh generation of child-savers rediscovered the colonial belief that
obstreperous children could best be reformed in an intimate family
atmosphere. The main body of these reformers did not allow their
nostalgia for the family to flower into an all-out attack on institutions, however. They believed that reformatories were still needed
to neutralize the baneful influences of a child's environment but
thought they should mirror family life, ideally by dividing children
among residential cottages, each holding approximately forty children, each presided over by a firm but affectionate adult as surrogate'parent11 The Massachusetts Industrial School for Girls and the
Ohio Reform Farm School were the first institutions to be established according to this so-called "family plan."
A third group of reformers carried the family approach to its
logical conclusion and rejected institutions altogether, except for
serious criminal law violators. The Children's Aid Society of New
York, founded in 1853, argued that children should be plucked from
the streets of large cities and placed immediately with families; the
arrangement would be informal and subject to termination either by
the child or the "foster parent. 9 2 Widely imitated in other eastern
cities, this policy was pursued with some success until the latter
part of the century, when legislation in the western states halted or
severely restricted the efforts of the so-called preventive agencies to
solve the East's dependent and wayward child problem by exportation."
The development of these new approaches to child care brought
to the forefront an issue that had been latent in the child-saving
enterprise since the first houses of refuge were established: was it
necessary or desirable, or even possible, to separate children for
purposes of treatment according to the reasons for which they were
believed to need state care? Should all children-criminal law violators, wayward, neglected, and destitute-be sent to the same institution, should different institutions be created for different categories, or should some be institutionalized and some not? If an institution organized on the cottage plan took in different categories of
" REPORT OF THE Co
smISIONEs
OF THE OHIO REFORM SCHOOL 4-7 (1856), reprinted in 1
CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 17, at 705-07; R. MENNEL, supra note 28, at 52. See also
sources cited in note 88 supra.
" J. HAWVs, supra note 28, at 100; R. MENNEL, supra note 28, at 85.
13 See M. LANGSAM, CHILDREN WEST: A HISTORY OF THE PLACING-OuT SYSTEM OF THE NEw

YORK CmILDREN's Am SocIETY, 1853-1890, at 17-30, 65 (1964), and sources cited in note 88
supra.
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children, should each cottage contain a cross-section of children, or
should criminal law violators be placed in certain cottages and wayward children in others? The managers of the New York House of
Refuge had stated in 1844: "Classification of subjects in a Refuge is
not very practicable; the true principle of reformation in such a
place, is to make the inmates-present as close an imitation as possible of the family life: with this, separation and isolation are inconsistent."9 ' If there were significant differences among children, then
perhaps this approach should be rethought. With some thirty years
of experience in reforming children, child-savers began to wrestle
with a dilemma that has plagued the juvenile justice system ever
since.
In 1859, representatives of houses of refuge and reform schools
gathered in New York to discuss child care issues, among which was
the topic, "The Distinction Which Should be Observed Between
Vagrancy and Destitution, on the One Hand, and Crime on the
Other." Resolutions were introduced proposing that neither destitution nor vagrancy should be considered criminal, unless vagrancy
had become "voluntary" and a "fixed way of life," and that entirely
different institutions should be established for the "reform of juvenile offenders" and the "prevention of juvenile crime."" These resolutions sparked a lively debate over whether children should be
classified for purposes of treatment, and if so, how.
Roughly three main approaches emerged, corresponding to the
policies of New York's two houses of refuge,"9 the New York Juvenile
Asylum, and the Children's Aid Society of New York. Spokesmen
for the houses of refuge maintained that criminal law violators and
vagrants (probably including incorrigibles)"7 should be institution-

Is SocrY FOR THE REFORMATMON OF JuvEmz DEuNQUEMrS, ANNUAL R rOR No. 19, at 10
(1844). Three years later, arguing against the commitment of older boys, the managers wrote:
"[Our] space and means are limited, and (we] cannot separate the good from the vicious.-The children must all mingle at their work, in their school and recreation." SocImY
FOR THE REFORMATION OF JuvENI

DEIUNQUENTS, ANNUAL REPOR No. 22, at 10 (1847).

at
9PROCEEDINGS, supra note 42, at 13-59, 82-91, 125-39, 163-75. The resolutions are in id.
34.
"The Western House of Refuge, established in Rochester, New York, in 1849, accepted
boys under 16 years of age for vagrancy or criminal convictions. The enabling statute provides an indication of why houses of refuge were coming to be perceived as "tough" places,
for courts were requiredto commit youths found guilty of felonies to the house, but had discretion whether to commit those found guilty of petit larceny or vagrancy. Act of May 8,1846,
ch. 143, §§ 13, 16, 1846 N.Y. Laws 150, as amended by Act of April 10, 1850, ch. 304, § 1,
1850 N.Y. Laws 670. Under the original New York City House of Refuge act, commitments
of both criminal and vagrant youths were discretionary. Act of Mar. 29, 1824, ch. 126, § 4,
1824 N.Y. Laws 110 (criminal and vagrant children to be committed only if "proper objects").
"See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra.
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alized in reformatory institutions, while merely destitute children
should be placed in separate facilities, strictly preventive in nature.
A representative of the Rochester House of Refuge contended that
if a child voluntarily chose the vagrant's life, he or she should be
classified as a criminal. He saw no problem in housing criminals and
vagrants together within the same institution, since its purpose was
not punishment but reform." On the other hand, he recognized that
some children might be forced into vagrancy because their parents
were too poor to feed them; if they were "merely suffering from
destitution" and had "not yet entered upon a course of crime," they
were not proper subjects for reformatory institutions. Thus the mere
street beggar, if he or she had a home, might not be a true vagrant. 9
Representatives of the New York Juvenile Asylum agreed that
houses of refuge should take in children convicted of crime and
possibly vagrants and suggested that the Children's Aid Society
should provide for merely destitute children-"those who had been
measurably well cared for [and] had enjoyed some of the influences
of comparatively decent homes; but who, through the misfortune of
parents, stood in need of assistance from the benevolent." ' This
left the great bulk of children who needed to be saved for the Juvenile Asylum: wayward children and children physically neglected or
morally endangered by their parents." 1 Spokesmen for the Asylum
"PROCEEDINGS,

supra note 42, at 14-15. The Ohio Reform Farm School, which accepted

both criminal law violators and incorrigible children, and which utilized a "cottage" system
to provide children with more individualized care, also remained orthodox in refusing to use
that system to segregate the two classes of inmates. Id. at 23. A delegate from the Philadelphia House of Refuge was alone in suggesting that three groups of inmates-older and harder

criminal youth, younger criminal offenders, and wayward children (including vagrants, runaways, and truants)-should be prevented from associating with one another when housed in
the same institution. Id. at 163-65 app.
" Id. at 13, 34. Not all delegates accepted the view that there was a clear distinction
between wayward children and "merely" destitute children. A representative of the Balti.
more House of Refuge advocated that the police "arrest all boys and girls of proper age.. .

who [are] found begging in the street, and bring them before the magistrate without disttnction"-presumably regardless of whether their begging was motivated by destitution or not.
Many beggar children, he thought, were sent out by their parents, "who are abundantly able
to support them, and who send them out with instructions not only to beg, but if they cannot
beg, to steal. . . ...
Id. at 18.

A delegate from the Ohio Reform Farm School thought that no "clear, well-defined line"
could be drawn between "vagrancy, destitution, and crime." Ohio had attempted the distinction but found it impossible. Destitution frequently led to crime, and therefore "each case
must be judged for itself, by the committing party" and the laws "must leave much to the
discretion of reform school officers, guarding it again by proper revisory power in the courts."
Id. at 23.
11 Id. at 27, 39-41.
"I!Id. at 40. Thus, their mandate embraced such wayward children as "beggars, petty
pilferers, children who take ash-barrels, fuel, sugar out of hogsheads on the wharves, fruit,
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saw no need to distinguish between incorrigible and neglected children for purposes of treatment, for if children had been exposed to
parents who were intemperate, sexually immoral, or criminal, they
"were in danger of speedily becoming.
incipient criminals"; left
to themselves they "were likely to go to ruin." A delegate from the
Northern Home for Friendless Children in Philadelphia summed up
the conviction that it was only a matter of time before a young
neglected child turned into an incorrigible child, and eventually a
criminal: "The . . . child, if neglected and uncared for, unre-

strained in its associations or habits, will. . . inevitably grow up
to be a person of loose moral character,-indolent and vicious practices, pernicious influences, a useless consumer, and a dangerous
depredator upon the society in which he exists."' ' ' For this group of
reformers, then, both neglected and incorrigible children were morally tainted, potentially dangerous, and in need of restraint. As Fox
has summed it up, it was the state's duty "to intervene in the lives
. ." Id. In addition, they
and other trifling things .... This class also embraced truants.
would house children who were either physically neglected or morally endangered by their
parents:
children of degraded women, and of low gamblers, children of poor parents, imprisoned
for crimes, and who were supposed to have been tainted by the example of such
persons, children of habitual drunkards, and the morally degraded or vicious children
who have been subjected to the contaminating influences of such evil associations.
Id.
The Juvenile Asylum, it should be noted, was in active competition for clients with the
other major child-saving organizations in New York City, the House of Refuge, and especially
the Children's Aid Society. While the Asylum managers agreed that children were best
reformed in families, they were appalled at the notion of placing unruly children taken right
from the streets in good homes without first attempting to change their ways through a period
of institutionalization, which might last from six months to five years. 1 Cuns AND YoUm,
supra note 17, at 739; R. MENNTL supra note 28, at 44-47.
" PROCEEDINGS, supra note 42, at 40.

at 125. A further expression of the view that parental neglect led inevitably to crime
by children came from a delegate of the Philadelphia House of Refuge:
From a personal knowledge of the parents of those committed to the institution for
vagrancy or crime. . .we are warranted in asserting that the causes of their moral
delinquencies may generally be justly attributed to improper parental influence, manifesting itself by undue severity or pernicious indulgence, sinful neglect or unhallowed
example.
Id. at 164. See also the remarks of Bradford K. Peirce, Superintendent of the State Industrial
School for Girls, Lancaster, Massachusetts:
The .. .legitimate subjects of reformatory training ...are, first, orphans, or motherless children, or worse than orphans, cursed with intemperate or criminal parents; they
are untrained save in the vices of the streets, vulgar and profane in speech, impertinent
and disobedient, truants from school, indisposed to all labor, their domestic affections
benumbed, the subjects of ruinous habits, and altogether beyond control of their legal
guardians, if they have any.
Id. at 128.
10 Id.
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of all children who might become a community crime problem. '"'
Having pressed the argument for a quadripartite classification
scheme-criminal, wayward, neglected, and destitute-and the
claim of the Juvenile Asylum to primacy in treating wayward and
neglected children, spokesmen for that agency called on the conference to declare that each agency should "keep within its own pecu-

liar duties," so that vicious children would not be placed in a family
"to pollute its atmosphere," and "poor unfortunate children of respectable parents" would not be put into a reformatory "amid a

hundred corrupted children."

'

In effect they were proposing an

entente cordiale among the three New York agencies "by which the
several classes of children [might] be divided up, and taken care
of properly"; 16 perhaps the Asylum feared that philanthropists were

losing credit in the eyes of the public by squabbling over the childsaving pie.

Charles Loring Brace of the Children's Aid Society would have
none of these hair-splitting attempts to classify children. For Brace
the only relevant categories were children who had committed
crimes-presumably Brace meant serious crimes, not petty larceny
or vagrancy-and all others.107 The former should be placed in
houses of refuge, while wayward, neglected, and destitute children
should be placed directly in families, without interference by institutions. If a family could be found who would give a home and
training even to a "bad" child, he saw no harm in placing the child

there."' While Brace opposed institutionalization, he did not disINFox, supra note 13, at 1193. Indeed, the temptation was strong to argue that the mere
fact that a child's parents were poor or immigrant established a presumption of neglect, and
thus a sufficient basis to predict future criminality, as a delegate from the Juvenile Asylum
indicated:
[E]ighty-one percent of the children we have to deal with are the children of emigrants born either abroad or in this city. . . . [I]n looking at the cause of juvenile
vagrancy and crime. . .we have to look at this parental neglect as it has been spoken
of. Now we must remember who these parents are, thus neglecting their children. Only
one-sixth of the arrests of children and of parents are of native population. This, then,
brings up directly the necessity of reaching the root of the evil in dealing with emigrants.
PROCEMINGS, supra note 42, at 28-29. A delegate from the New York House of Refuge went
further, arguing that since many vagrants were the children of poor widows vainly trying to
keep large families together, benevolent agencies "should break up the sympathy that exists
between these poor parents and their children" and abandon the idea that "they must
necessarily keep families together." Id. at 22. In this view, poverty alone became a predictor
of criminality and thus an adequate basis for institutionalizing children.
"' PROCEEMNGS, supra note 42, at 44-45.
I20Id. at 44.
'1 Id. at 46.
I' Id. at 48.
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pute the notion that predelinquent and neglected children should
be coercively restrained to protect society. Whether the children
were called destitute, poor, friendless, vagrant, or "bad," the Children's Aid Society was determined to send them west for their own
and society's good."09
The deliberations of the 1859 conferees reveal that child-savers
were divided over how children should be classified for purposes of
treatment, with wayward children at the center of the controversy.
All agreed that serious criminal law violators must be confined in
houses of refuge, but (1) representatives of the houses of refuge also
laid claim to treating vagrants and incorrigible children, (2) spokesmen for the New York Juvenile Asylum felt that incorrigibles should
be housed with neglected children in separate institutions, and (3)
the Children's Aid Society objected to institutionalization of incorrigibles altogether. These organizations continued to pursue their
competing theories of child reform, often clashing angrily in ensuing
years. 10 On one point they all agreed, however: children who had not
committed crimes but had merely disobeyed parents: run away from
home, or otherwise manifested disagreeable habits short of crime
needed to be coercively restrained and reformed. Most child-savers
continued to believe that incarceration in an institution for some
period of time was the best way to accomplish this task.
The Statutory Schemes
Between 1840 and 1870, laws providing for incarceration of wayward children proliferated. Often these statutes were passed in conjunction with the establishment of new institutions for children, but
sometimes older states expanded the jurisdiction of existing institutions to include wayward children more explicitly. In particular, the
creation of compulsory education in some states after 1850 gave rise
to a new status offense-truancy from school-that became a principal ground for committing youths and a key factor in shaping the
new legal status of dependency for young people. In this section we
will examine some of the major statutory innovations adopted in the
1840-1870 period in order to indicate the increasing diversity of approaches to wayward children and the growing popularity of such
laws throughout the United States. While scholarship dealing with
juvenile delinquency in the nineteenth century has focused largely
B.

Id. at 49-50.
M. LANGSm, supra note 93, ch. 5; R. MENNEL, supra note 28, at 45-48, 55.57, 113-14.
See generally 2 CmLREN AND YouTH, pt. 4, supra note 17, at 464-73.
'
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on such key states as New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and
Illinois, it will become apparent that by 1870 a truly national consensus was emerging around the proposition that noncriminal youth
should be subjected to coercive state intervention to "save" them
from future criminality.
As indicated above, one of the new institutions for children created in this period was the New York Juvenile Asylum, which
opened in 1853. Technically this institution was set up to receive
neglected children"' between seven and fourteen years of age, but
the directors interpreted their mandate liberally and accepted childrei more properly deemed wayward or incorrigible, at least where
parental failings also could be proved. 12 A unique feature of the
asylum's scheme was that parents or guardians could voluntarily
surrender their children age seven to fourteen to the agency without
any intervention by a legal authority.13 The parent had to consent
in writing and could specify the term of years for which the transfer
of custody would be valid,' but otherwise the asylum had full authority over the child and could apprentice him or her for a term of
years, as with a child entrusted to it by the courts."' We shall see
that a number of other states adopted this procedure, which clearly
permitted parents to incarcerate children without the formality of
a court hearing."'
The wayward child jurisdiction received new impetus in New
York when the law governing the New York City House of Refuge
was amended in 1865 explicitly to permit courts to commit youths,
deemed "disorderly children," found guilty of "deserting their
homes without good and sufficient cause, or keeping company with
dissolute or vicious persons against the lawful commands" of parents or guardians. "7 With the passage of this act, New York re"I Neglected children were defired as those "found in any street, highway or public place
. . . in the circumstances of want and suffering or abandonment, exposure or neglect, or of
beggary," where the child was proved to be a "proper object" for the agency "by reason of
the neglect, habitual drunkenness or other vicious habits of the parents or other lawful
guardian of such child." Act of June 30, 1851, ch. 332, §§ 7,9, 1851 N.Y. Laws 633.
SPRocEEDINGs, supra note 42, at 40. See note 101 supra.
"3

Act of June 30, 1851, ch. 332, § 7, 1851 N.Y. Laws 633.

"' Id. § 8.

15 Id. § 11.
"' See text accompanying notes 134 & 146 infra. In 1857, a second juvenile asylum opened
in Buffalo, New York, with the same jurisdiction as its New York City counterpart. Act of
April 17, 1857, ch. 759, §§ 3-4, 1857 N.Y. Laws 622.
"I Act of Mar. 22, 1865, ch. 172, § 5, 1865 N.Y. Laws 293. A complaint could be brought
by a parent or guardian before a police magistrate or justice of the peace; if the official was
satisfied by "competent testimony" that the complaint was valid, he was requiredto commit
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formers no longer were dependent on the courts' continued willingness to interpret "vagrancy" broadly, for they now had statutory
authority to commit rebellious children, especially runaways,
whether or not they fitted a technical description of vagrancy.
Even more significant for the future of children was the passage
in 1853 of New York's first compulsory education and truancy law.
Parents were required to send their children to public school at least
four months a year until they reached age fourteen. If a child was
found "wandering in the streets.., idle and truant, without any
lawful occupation,"' 118 a court could require the parents to agree in
writing that they would ensure the child's attendance at school. If
the child then "habitually or intentionally" violated this agreement,
the court could commit him or her to "some suitable place" for
employment and instruction, to be provided by every city and village. After commitment, jurisdiction over truants passed to the
overseers of the poor or commissioners of almshouses, who were
empowered to apprentice them for the length of their minority.",
The harshness of the penalty-removal from the custody of one's
parents-illustrates how seriously the new status offense was regarded.
Massachusetts also dramatically increased its means of coercive
intervention into children's lives during this period. In 1847, it created the first state reform school in the nation, with jurisdiction over
male juvenile criminal offenders. 1 Because it remained a criminal
offense in Massachusetts to be a "stubborn child,""' the institution
was effectively empowered to receive the same kinds of incorrigible
children who could be admitted to houses of refuge or juvenile asylums elsewhere.'" In 1855, a state reform school for girls was added,
the child to the house of refuge. Id. §§ 6-7. (There was no requirement that the official frind
the youth a "proper object" for the refuge.)
"' Act of Apr. 12, 1853, ch. 185, § 1, 1853 N.Y. Laws 358.
I' Id. 44 1-3.
12 Act of Apr. 9, 1847, ch. 165, §§ 1, 4, 1847 Mass. Laws 405.
121MAss. REV. STAT. pt. 4, tit. 1, ch. 165, § 28 (1860).
'2 Examples from the 1851 report of the reform school trustees show that the term
"stubborn" was used to cover every conceivable kind of juvenile noncriminal misconduct:
No.-Has spent most of his time idling about the streets in company with other bad
boys, and has been addicted to the use of intoxicating liquors and tobacco; has often
been intoxicated, has indulged in lying, profanity, pilfering, and sleeping out.
No.-Is a notorious truant from school, and home; addicted to the habits of chewing
tobacco and profanity. He has associated with the worst class of boys; ran away from
home many times, often staying away several days, and even months at a time, sleeping nights in stables, or any place that might afford him shelter. At two different times
he was absent three months.
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with a jurisdiction that explicitly included wayward children
("leading an idle, vagrant, or vicious life"), neglected children
("found.

.

. in any public place.

. .

in circumstances of. .. neg-

lect, exposure or abandonment"), and beggars, as well as criminal
law violators.s2
By 1866, the idea of classifying children more precisely had gained
influence in Massachusetts, as legislators established a state primary school for "dependent and neglected" children who had been
placed in the state almshouse. 14 This classification was still not
watertight, however, for the statute authorized the state reform
school to transfer to the primary school boys committed to the former for "trivial offenses, and [who] do not appear to be depraved
in character, or to need the restraints of imprisonment.', 2 Thus
officials saw no difficulty in mingling the milder cases of waywardness with children whose only reason for being institutionalized was
that their parents were poor.
Both the concern for separate treatment of neglected children and
the continued fuzziness of the line between neglect and waywardness were exemplified by a subsequent Massachusetts statute, "An
'
act concerning the care and education of neglected children, ))12

which authorized judges to commit neglected children under sixteen
years of age to institutions established by municipalities for their
care. Neglected children were defined as those "who, by reason of
the neglect, crime, drunkenness or other vices of parents, or from
orphanage, are suffered to be growing up without salutary parental
control and education, or in circumstances exposing them to lead
idle and dissolute lives.""' The language shows that officials still
No.-Was once fined for throwing stones at a market man; is a notorious pilferer,
having taken money and small articles too numerous to mention; also addicted to the
habits of chewing and smoking tobacco, lying, profanity and Sabbath breaking.
Fifth Annual Report of the Massachusetts State Reform School 18-19 (1851).
In 1859, the trustees offered a "typology" of stubbornness that further revealed the polymorphous nature of the offense. Some of the categories used were: "ungovernable and runaway. . . truant; leaving places of employment, rebellious at home"; "ungovernable and lying

* * * characterized by great dishonesty"; "ungovernable and a thief"; "idle, disorderly, arrested . . . for larceny"; "vagabond . . . disorderly, without fixed home, wandering about
the country, and arrested for notoriously bad conduct"; "vagabond, simpleton . . . intellect
quite low, without decided idiocy"; "trespass and bad conduct: generally disorderly, with
some act in particular of decidedly aggravated conduct"; "wanton destruction of property."
Thirteenth Annual Report of the Massachusetts State Reform School 5 (1859).
'1 Act of May 21, 1855, ch. 442, § 4, 1855 Mass. Laws 837.
"I4Act of May 3, 1866, ch. 209, § 1, 1866 Mass. Laws 161.
"

Id. § 6.

Act of May 29, 1866, ch. 283, 1866 Mass. Laws 266.
1v Id. §§ 1, 3.
"I
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saw no need to separate clearly the concepts of neglect and waywardness. Parental deviance was censured not merely because legis-

lators feared neglected children might suffer physically, but because
they believed neglect would produce imminently that "idle and
dissolute" behavior that characterized the wayward child.
Like New York, Massachusetts also instituted compulsory education and created the status offense of truancy at this time. In 1850,

judges were authorized to commit to houses of refuge or other suitable institutions children between six and fifteen years of age who

were "habitual truants" or "not attending school, without any regu-

lar and lawful occupation, growing up in ignorance." ' s Two years
later, the legislature required parents to send children between the
ages of eight and fourteen to public school at least twelve weeks a

year.' 0 In 1865, the state further authorized counties to establish

houses of reformation to receive both school truants and criminal
law violators.' °
While one must be cautious of reading too much coherence into
this pattern of legislation, it would seem that Massachusetts legisla-

tors shared the widely held view that wayward children-at least

"stubborn" boys-were most appropriately housed with criminal
law violators in the state reform school, while neglected and destitute boys should be housed apart, in the state primary school. On

the other hand, because they also viewed neglected and destitute
children as having begun the slide toward criminality, legislators
also sanctioned the incarceration of less seriously wayward boys

" Act of May 3, 1850, ch. 294, § 1, 1850 Mass. Lav 468. The distinction between the two
categories of commitment would appear to be that children "not attending school... grow.
ing up in ignorance" referred to children not attending school at all, while "habitual truants"
referred to those enrolled in school but attending infrequently. Commitments under the act
could be for "such periods of time as [the court] may judge expedient," id. § 3, later limited
to a two-year maximum. Act of Apr. 30, 1862, ch. 207, § 2, 1862 Mass. Laws 179.
' Act of May 18, 1852, ch. 240, § 1, 1852 Mass. Laws 170. In 1862, the legislature provided
that children could be committed as truants up to the age of 16. Act of Apr. 30, 1882, ch.
207, §§ 1-2, 1862 Mass. Laws 179. When one juxtaposes the compulsory education and
truancy laws, one sees a curious inconsistency: while parents could be fined for not sending
their children to school only if the children were under the age of 14, children could be found
truant for not attending school until they reached age 16.
Whereas the 1850 statute gave municipalities discretionary authority to deal with truancy,
Act of May 3, 1850, ch. 294, § 1, 1850 Mass. Laws 468, under the 1862 law they were required
to make such arrangements. Act of Apr. 30, 1862, ch. 207, § 1, 1862 Mass. Laws 179. Several
municipalities established special truant schools pursuant to this act. M. KAxz, TnH Ino
OF EARLY SCHOOL REFORM 167 (1968).

"I Act of May 9, 1865, ch. 208, §§ 1, 3, 1865 Mass. Laws 609. In practice, the Boston House
of Reformation became almost entirely a school for truants. M. KATz, supra note 129, at 167.
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with them. 3 ' Just as a wayward child in New York City might be
housed with criminal offenders in the house of refuge or with neglected children in the Juvenile Asylum depending on how seriously
a judge viewed his or her misconduct, whether a Massachusetts
predelinquent boy ended up in the state reform school or the state
primary school was entirely a matter of official discretion.
Connecticut created a state reform school in 1851 to which courts
could send boys under age sixteen who committed criminal offenses,
including that of stubbornness.' In 1855, however, the legislature
prohibited commitments based on stubbornness, thus departing
from contemporaneous Massachusetts practice; the law also forbade
commitments to the school based on idleness, vagrancy, begging, or
disobedience by apprentices to their masters' lawful commands.'
Paradoxically, a few years later the Connecticut legislature provided that any parent might indenture a son to the reform school
for any length of time mutually agreeable to the parent and the
school's trustees, as long as the parent paid the costs of the child's
upkeep.'34 No reasons for the commitment had to be given, and one
imagines that under this arrangement a certain number of stubborn
children found their way to the reform school after all. 3 ' Also surprising, in view of the 1855 ban on stubbornness commitments to
the state reform school, was the passage of legislation in 1869 that
allowed that institution to receive school truants. 3 ' Apparently legislators were no longer reluctant to incarcerate at least some status
offenders with criminal law violators. The truancy law was vigorously enforced, and commitments on that ground dramatically increased the population of the state reform school after 1870.111
Elsewhere in New England and the Middle Atlantic region, statutes authorizing state reform schools to accept wayward children
'n

See text accompanying note 125 supra.
Act of June 27, 1851, ch. 46, § 4, 1851 Conn. Laws 46.

'

Act of June 30, 1855, ch. 104, § 1, 1855 Conn. Laws 123. Curiously, the law allowing

'3'

justices of the peace to commit "stubborn and rebellious" children to the house of correction
or county jail remained on the books. CoNN. GEN. STAT. tit. 13, ch. 4, § 45 (Dutton, Waldo,
& Booth 1866).
'
Act of June 24, 1859, ch. 79, § 1, 1859 Conn. Laws 58.
'
In the 1860's, the school housed a few of these "boarders" every year. See text accompanying note 176 infra.
"I Act of July 9, 1869, ch. 123, § 1, 1869 Conn. Laws 339. Truants were defined as "all

minors between the ages of six and seventeen years, habitually wandering or loitering about
the streets or public places of [any city], or any where beyond the proper control of parents
or guardians, during the school term, and during the hours when school is in session." Id.
Commitments could last up to three years. Id. § 3.
In See text accompanying notes 178 & 289 infra.
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were enacted in New Hampshire, s Maine,' and New Jersey.'
Rhode Island created a municipal institution, the Providence Reform School, which could receive juvenile criminal offenders and
young persons of "idle, vicious, or vagrant habits" convicted by the
courts as "vagrant, disorderly persons.""' Among the southern
states, Louisiana,"' Maryland,"5 and Kentucky"' established municipal houses of refuge to restrain wayward children. The Baltimore House of Refuge possessed a jurisdiction copied almost verbaIn Act of July 14, 1855, ch. 1660, §§ 4,7, 1855 N.H. Laws 1553. The New Hampshire reform
school's jurisdiction was limited to criminal offenders under 18 years of age, but stubborn
children would have been included therein. In addition, New Hampshire still allowed stubborn children to be sent to the house of correction. N.H. Comp. STAT. tit. 14, ch. 122, § 2
(1853).
New Hampshire also provided for commitment of habitual truants and children not attending school, without regular and lawful occupation, to suitable institutions, including the
reform school. Act of Jan. 5, 1853, ch. 1278, §§ 1-4, 1853 N.H. Laws 1215.
Neighboring Vermont had no status offense jurisdiction aimed specifically at children. Its
1797 vagrancy act, listing categories of persons who might be committed to the workhouse,
did not include "stubborn children," although "stubborn servants" and "runaways" were
included. (The latter term usually referred to runaway servants and apprentices in colonial
legislation, rather than children absenting themselves from home.) Act of Mar. 3, 1797, ch.
18, § 13, 1797 Vt. Acts 262. Vermont established a reform school in 1865 but limited its
jurisdiction to criminal offenders. Act of Nov. 9, 1865, No. 1, §§ 1, 5, 1885 Vt. Acts 3.
In Act of Mar. 16, 1861, ch. 57, § 3, 1861 Me. Acts 35. The school's jurisdiction included
children guilty of Sabbath breaking, vagrancy, truancy, and being a "common runaway,
drunkard, pilferer [or] night walker." Id.
I Act of Apr. 3, 1867, ch. 253, § 12, 1867 N.J. Laws 529. A justice of the supreme court
could commit a boy if the youth's parent or guardian complained that he was "habitually
vagrant and disorderly or incorrigible." Id. While only boys under the age of 16 could be
committed for crime, minors of any age could be committed for incorrigibility. Both groups
could be confined until age 21. Id. §§ 3, 12.
"' Act of Jan. 1850, §§ 1, 4, 1850 R.I. Acts 10. The act also provided that parents could
commit their children over five years of age directly to the institution if they agreed to pay
for their upkeep. Id. § 4. Although the legislature authorized towns to commit school truants
to suitable institutions, Act of May 1856, § 1, 1856 R.I. Acts 15, they could not be sent to the
reform school. R.L REv. STAT. tit. 13, ch. 70, § 2 (1857). Apparently special truant schools
would handle this category of wayward children.
In 1871, the state, apparently dissatisfied with local efforts to combat truancy, required all
towns and cities to enact measures to control the problem. Act of June 2, 1871, ch. 960, § 1,
1871 R.I. Acts 14.
1' Act of May 4, 1847, No. 245, §§ 1,3, 1847 La. Acts 203 (juvenile criminal offenders and
vagrants).
Act of Mar. 7, 1850, ch. 374, §§ 1-2, 1850 Md. Laws.
"
Act of Mar. 3, 1860, ch. 1312, § 4, 1860 Ky. Acts 848 (boys under 16, girls under 15, guilty
of "vicious or immoral conduct, and idle or mischievous courses"). The age of commitment
was raised to 18 years for boys and 16 years for girls in 1866. Act of Jan. 27, 1866, ch. 247, §
3, 1866 Ky. Laws 206.
Elsewhere in the South, Florida included "stubborn children" within the definition of
"disorderly persons" and provided that they could be placed in the county jail for six months.
Act of Aug. 6, 1868, ch. 1637, subch. 8, No. 13, § 24, 1868 Fla. Laws 96.
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tim from Pennsylvania law: boys under twenty-one years of age and
girls under eighteen could be incarcerated for criminal offenses,
begging, vagrancy, or "incorrigible or vicious conduct," on complaint of parents or others."'
Perhaps the courts of Baltimore proved reluctant to commit children whose parents brought incorrigibility charges against them, for
in 1860 the Maryland legislature provided that the Baltimore House
of Refuge could receive "such children as their parents, guardians
or friends [might] desire to place them therein for temporary restraint and discipline," if the parent or guardian contracted to pay
the child's upkeep. "' The statute placed no upper limit on the time
a parent could keep his or her child in the house, and once again
seems deliberately to have been designed to circumvent judicial
supervision of parental institutionalization of children. Unlike Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, but like New York, Connecticut, and
Rhode Island, Maryland had opted for total parental discretion to
incarcerate difficult children.
A further development in Maryland was designed to meet the
rising opposition of Catholic groups to child-saving activities traditionally dominated by Protestants. Protests by Catholic parents
bridling at what they viewed as attempts by Protestants to proselytize their children had been heard in major urban areas since the
1840's. In response to their concern, homes for neglected and destitute Catholic children had been opened in New York City and Boston, and as far west as Indiana and Michigan. "7 In 1867, Maryland
licensed the St. Mary's Industrial School for Boys to receive the full
gamut of youths in need of care: destitute or orphaned boys, boys
"I Act of Mar. 7, 1850, ch. 374, §§ 1-2, 1850 Md. Laws. In 1866, Maryland created a state

industrial school for girls to receive girls not accepted by the Baltimore House of Refuge or
other child-saving societies. Act of Feb. 8,1866, ch. 156, §§ 5, 7, 1866 Md. Laws 256. While
its statutory jurisdiction was unclear, the legislature appears to have intended that it duplicate that of the house of refuge. In 1872, it was stipulated that the Baltimore House of Refuge
should receive only white males, Act of Apr. 1, 1872, ch. 218, § 1, 1872 Md. Laws 324; after
that date incorrigible girls undoubtedly were sent to the Maryland Industrial School for Girls.
"'
Act of Mar. 3, 1860, ch. 205, § 2, 1860 Md. Laws.
' R. MENNEn, supra note 28, at 63-64. See also Twelfth Annual Report of the Massachusetts State Reform School 51 (1858):
Forty per cent. of the boys that have entered this institution for the last sixteen months

have Catholic parents, and the percentage would be greatly increased if these parents
were as willing to place their children here as Protestant parents usually are. The latter

very frequently make complaint against their own children for the sake of placing them
under the discipline and influence of the Reform School, while the former, quite as

frequently endeavor by various expedients to keep their children away from this discipline and influence when complaint has been made against them by officers of the law.
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convicted of criminal offenses, beggars, and vagrants, up to the age
of sixteen. The statute stipulated that boys should be sent to the
school only at the request of their parents."'
Incorrigibility laws spread beyond the Alleghenies in this period,
as the notion of reforming predelinquent children through institutionalization gained adherents even in less populated areas of the
country. In 1852, Ohio authorized cities to construct houses of refuge
for youths who violated the criminal law,"' and five years later
permitted the courts to commit the same "incorrigible, beyond control" youths whom Pennsylvania and Maryland had included in
their houses of refuge.150 The state also followed the practice of authorizing commitments without any judicial intervention at all, in
Ohio's case by trustees of the town in which a house of refuge was
located, or by a child's mother if the father was dead, had abandoned the family, did not provide for their support, or was an habitual drunkard.15'
Ohio introduced two further grounds of commitment widely copied by other jurisdictions. If a youth was brought before a grand jury
on a criminal charge and the grand jury found evidence sufficient
to place the accused on trial, it could authorize commitment to the
house of refuge instead of finding an indictment against the youth.
Further, if an accused youth consented, a court could arrest his or
her criminal trial at any stage of the proceedings and commit the
accused directly to the house of refuge. 5 ' Presumably these procedures were designed to spare youths and their families the pain of a
full criminal trial and conviction, but the effect was to permit incarceration on mere suspicion of a criminal offense. In this respect,
Ohio was formalizing the earlier practice of the New York and Pennsylvania Houses of Refuge, the managers of which had also assumed
that children against whom criminal charges were lodged stood in
need of reformation, whether the charges were proved or not.ss
In 1857, Ohio proudly opened its Reform Farm School, an instiI" Act of Apr. 11, 1874, ch. 288, § 1, 1874 Md. Laws 428; Act of Feb. 28, 1867, ch. 402, § 1,
1867 Md. Laws 840. (The 1874 act defined the school's jurisdiction.)
'o Act of May 3, 1852, § 78, 1852 Ohio Laws 223.
Act of Apr. 16, 1857, § 6(1)-(2), 1857 Ohio Laws 163.
"' Id. § 6(3). Children so committed had to be either "destitute of a suitable home and of
adequate means of obtaining an honest living" or "in danger of being brought up to lead an
idle and immoral life." Id. Houses of refuge could also accept children who had committed
criminal offenses, id. § 7, indicating Ohio's lack of concern with separate classification of
children.
'

Id. §§ 8-9.

"'

See text accompanying notes 47-51 supra.
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tution for boys that utilized the new cottage plan for housing youths
in small groups under the guidance of cottage "elders." The school
was located in a rural area and stressed training in agricultural
labor, which was assumed to produce a healthy effect on moral

character. 54 Although the institution's penology was new, its jurisdiction was not, for the grounds of commitment were the same as
for municipal houses of refuge, including crime and incorrigibility.'
The division of inmates into cottages opened the possibility of classifying youths on grounds of age, "toughness," or basis of commitment, but the cottage system was not used for this purpose. As the
board of commissioners reported in 1869, "In our system no classification, based on character, is admitted. Our families are constituted
without any regard to the previous character of the boys or their
5
ages." 8
Elsewhere in the nation, the city of Chicago established a reform
school in 1855 to receive children "destitute of proper parental care,
wandering about the streets, committing mischief and growing up
in mendicancy, ignorance, idleness and vice,"'' 7 while San Francisco
created an industrial school to house "idle and dissolute" children.'5 8 Other new institutions that could accept wayward children
were the Indiana House of Refuge, "I and the state reform schools
of Illinois,'6 Iowa,' Kansas,' and Minnesota.'63
"- See R. MENNEL, supra note 28, at 52; A. PLATr, supra note 10, at 61-67. Mennel notes
that the cottage plan, or "family" plan, gained wide popularity in the second half of the
nineteenth century. New Jersey and Indiana opened cottage reform schools in 1864 and 1866,
respectively. Older states converted existing congregate institutions to the cottage system,
sometimes relocating them on farms. The Western Pennsylvania House of Refuge in 1876 and
the Philadelphia House of Refuge in 1892 were typical. R. MENNEL, supra note 28, at 55.
Act of April 2, 1858, § 10, 1858 Ohio Laws 27.
t.4 Fourteenth Annual Report of the Ohio Reform School, reprinted in OHio, GENMHL
ASSEMBLY, EXECUTIVE DOCUMENTS 7 (1869) [hereinafter cited as ExEcurnvE DOCUMENTS].
'" CHARTER AND ORDINANCES oF THE CrrY'OF CHICAGo, TOGMER wrm ACTS or THl GENERAL
ASsEMBLY RELATING TO THE CITY, AND OTHER MIsCELANmOUs ACm, wrrH AN APPENDIX 338.39
(G. Thompson & J. Thompson eds. 1856), cited in Fox, supra note 13, at 1208 n.103.
"'
Act of Apr. 15, 1858, ch. 209, § 10, 1858 Cal. Stats. 166. In addition, the California
Reform School briefly allowed parents to commit their sons to the school directly, whether
or not they had committed a crime. Act of May 20, 1861, ch. 524, § 3, 1861 Cal. Stats. 591.
In 1868, California closed its state reform school and transferred the inmates to the San
Francisco Industrial School. Act of Mar. 30, 1868, ch. 515, §§ 1-2, 1868 Cal. Stats. 683.
"I'Act of Mar. 8, 1867, ch. 62, § 10(1)-(2), 1867 Ind. Acts 137. The town trustees or a
child's mother could commit a destitute child or one "in danger of being brought up to lead
an idle and immoral life." Id. § 10(3). A criminal court, with the consent of the accused, could
commit a minor to the house of refuge at any stage of a criminal proceeding. Id. § 13.
11 Act of Mar. 5, 1867, § 1, 1867 Ill. Acts 38. The jurisdiction was virtually identical to that
of the Chicago Reform School. Id. § 17.
" Act of Mar. 31, 1868, ch. 59, § 17, 1868 Iowa Acts 71. Parents or guardians could bring
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In all, by 1870, at least eighteen American jurisdictions had

adopted laws authorizing commitment of youths engaging in status
offenses to special children's institutions. Although there were semantic variations among the statutes, overall they convey a numbing similarity. Whether the terms used were "incorrigible," "idle,"
"vicious," "stubborn," or some other colorful moralistic phrase,
parents had acquired the power to transfer their child-rearing problems to the state, and the state had assumed the power to remove

from families youths whose behavior was socially threatening. The
next section will address the problem of the extent to which these
new powers were actually wielded.
C.

Implementing the Laws: Institutional Commitments

The mere fact that many states passed laws proscribing predelinquent conduct by youths does not tell us whether or not these laws

were implemented. Fortunately, many of the institutions for children kept statistics on causes of commitment, which reveal that
children were incarcerated for wayward behavior in large numbers.
Vagrancy, incorrigibility, stubbornness, truancy, and other variations on the predelinquent theme often provided the largest category of inmates, or the second largest after petit larceny."' We will
summarize here data on status offense commitments from six jurisdictions in the 1840-1870 period. A more detailed breakdown by
category of status offense including absolute numbers of those coma complaint that their children were "habitually vagrant or disorderly, or incorrigible." Id.
112 Act of Mar. 3, 1869, ch. 93, § 17, 1869 Kan. Sess. Laws 191. Children could be committed
if they were "disorderly," i.e., persons under 16 years of age "convicted of vagrancy, or any
disorderly practices, or who shall have deserted their homes without good and sufficient
cause, or who shall keep company with dissolute or vicious persons, contrary to the lawful
commands of their parents, or other persons standing in the place of a parent." Id. Children
under 16 could also be committed for "residing or staying in any house of ill fame or with
vicious persons." Id. § 20.
In Act of Mar. 3, 1870, ch. 7, § 3, 1870 Minn. Laws 7 ("incorrigible or vicious conduct,"
"beyond control" of parents).
I" The data used in this essay permit only limited conclusions. All we can safely say is that
nineteenth-century child-saving institutions received large absolute numbers of children and
that high percentages of the inmates were committed on grounds of waywardness. Lacking
figures on the total number of children processed by the courts, we cannot say what percentage of all children processed or adjudicated by the courts these incorrigibility commitments
represent. Thus, there is no way of comparing the numbers of children sent to reform
schools on waywardness charges with wayward or criminal children incarcerated in adult
prisons. Lacking adequate data from the nineteenth century we also have no way of knowing
whether juvenile courts which committed wayward children to reformatories after 1900 reduced or increased the percentage of youths committed by nineteenth-century courts. See
text accompanying notes 391-95 infra.
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mitted and a comparison with commitments for crimes may be
found in the tables in the Appendix." 5
In New York City's House of Refuge, where vagrancy was interpreted broadly to reach various kinds of wayward children, admissions for that offense constituted 35 percent of total commitments
in 1863 and 44 percent in 1865.166 After 1865, the refuge could accept
wayward children explicitly (as "disorderly children")16 and the
combined commitments for vagrancy and disorderliness represented 45 percent of total commitments in 1868 and 41 percent in
1870.111
In the eleven years immediately following the opening of the Massachusetts State Reform School, that state actively utilized its
"stubbornness" law to incarcerate boys. Commitments for that allencompassing offense fluctuated between a low of 34 percent in 1849
and a high of 50 percent in 1854. (Usually the figure was around 45
percent). Additional commitments for vagrancy and being "idle and
disorderly" brought total status offense commitments in 1849 to 47
percent and in 1854 to 59 percent.'69
Apparently something of a backlash against sending boys to the
reform school developed around 1860, as the next two years saw only
a handful of youths committed to the school.' The school's trustees
"3 Both here and in section IV.(B.) below, the years for which data are presented have been
chosen in order to document the persistently high level of waywardness commitments at
representative time intervals. Unless indicated, the percentage of waywardness commitments
in any given year are neither atypically high nor low for the particular institution in question.
Most of the institutional reports from which these data are drawn are available in the Massachusetts State House Library, Boston, Massachusetts.
IN SOCIETY FOR THE REFORMATION OF JUvENILE DELINQUmNTS, ANNUAL REPORT No. 39, at 26
(1863); SocmT FOR THE REFORMATION OF JuVENILE DELINQUENTS, ANNUAL REPo'r No. 41, at
21 (1865).
" Act of Mar. 22, 1865, ch. 172, § 5, 1865 N.Y. Laws 293.
'u SOCIETY FOR THE REFORMATION OF JUvENILE DELINQUENTS, ANNUAL REPORT No. 44, at 23
(1868); SOCIETY FOR TM REFORMATION OF JuvENLE DELINQUENTS, ANNUAL REPORT No. 46, at
27 (1870).
" Third Annual Report of the Massachusetts State Reform School 21 (1850); Eighth
Annual Report of the Massachusetts State Reform School 23 (1855). See generally Third
through Twelfth Annual Reports of the Massachusetts State Reform School (1850-69).
I10 A total of 26 youths were committed for all causes in 1860, and 64 youths in 1861.
Fourteenth Annual Report of the Massachusetts State Reform School 23 (1860); Fifteenth
Annual Report of the Massachusetts State Reform School 27 (1861).
In 1860, the legislature restricted the power to commit to judges of the superior court and
probate courts; previously most of the commitments had come from the court of common
pleas, the Boston municipal court, and the various city police courts. Fourteenth Annual
Report of the Massachusetts State Reform School 4 (1860). The school's trustees reported
that recent legislation had made the process of commitment more complicated, so that now
"scarcely any boys are committed at all." Id.
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previously had intimated that the "stubbornness" jurisdiction was
being abused, commenting: "[Tihere is a large class convicted of
stubbornness, some of them very young, whose coming hither is of,
at least, doubtful expediency."'' They admitted that the term was
"vague" and could be "used as a cloak for many offences, or for no
offence at all."' 72 The school's population nevertheless began to
climb again, although admissions for stubbornness did not figure as
prominently as before, and in 1868 predelinquent children (including stubborn, disobedient, and vagrant children) constituted 37 percent of 115 total new admissions.'"
The pattern of commitments in Connecticut initially followed
that of Massachusetts: in the four years after the Connecticut State
Reform School opened in 1851, 42 percent of commitments were for
stubbornness and vagrancy.' After the legislative ban on stubbornness .commitments in 1855, most of the school's population in the
1850's and 1860's were incarcerated for theft, although there were a
few vagrancy commitments as well.7 5 Furthermore, some parents
made use of the law permitting them to place their children in the
school without court process, for a group of children labelled
"boarders," numbering anywhere from two to thirteen a year, appear in the records after 1862.11 With the passage of a truancy law
in 1869'7 status offenders again comprised a significant part of the
school's population: in 1870, 27 percent of total commitments were
78
for truancy.

Reformation of predelinquent children remained a preoccupation
of Phildelphia officials in this period. While the Philadelphia House
of Refuge did not publish statistics on causes of commitment, in
1861 the managers reported on some fifty-one children who had been
incarcerated in recent years. Of these, approximately twenty were
primarily cases of waywardness-rebelliousness at home, running
"I Fourth Annual Report of the Massachusetts State Reform School 4 (1850).
' Thirteenth Annual Report of the Massachusetts State Reform School 5 (1859).
" Twenty-second Annual Report of the Massachusetts State Reform School 29 (1868).
' Fifth Annual Report of the Connecticut State Reform School 35 (1857).
n There were three commitments for vagrancy in 1860 and five in 1864. By contrast, theft
constituted 80% of total commitments in 1860 (44 of 55) and 67% in 1864 (90 of 134). Ninth
Annual Report of the Connecticut State Reform School 33 (1861); Thirteenth Annual Report
of the Connecticut State Reform School 29 (1865).
171 In 1862, for example, there were five "boarders"; in 1864, there were 13; and in 1868,
two. Eleventh Annual Report of the Connecticut State Reform School 32 (1863); Thirteenth
Annual Report of the Connecticut State Reform School 30 (1865); Seventeenth Annual Report
of the Connecticut State Reform School 36 (1869).
'' Act of July 9, 1869, ch. 123, § 1, 1869 Conn. Pub. Acts 339.
In Nineteenth Annual Report of the Connecticut State Reform School 36 (1871).
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away, associating with "wicked boys," and the like. Perhaps ten
more were basically vagrancy cases, twelve youths were committed
primarily for theft, seven for a combination of theft and wayward
conduct, and two were simply neglected or physically abused by
parents.19

No institution used the wayward child jurisdiction more intensively in the nineteenth century than did the Western Pennsylvania
House of Refuge. In each year of the 1860's the great majority of its
commitments were for incorrigibility, vagrancy, and vicious conduct. These three status offenses represented 88 percent of total
commitments in 1861, 77 percent in 1865, and 84 percent in 1870.80
It would appear that the extremely high number of waywardness
commitments to the Pennsylvania refuge was due in part to an
abuse of the statutory wayward child jurisdiction that resulted in
incarceration of merely neglected or destitute children whom the
institution had no legal authority to receive. 8' The superintendent
of the refuge noted that the institution housed three principal
groups of children: wayward children, confined for reformation;
criminal youths, admitted for restraint and discipline; and neglected and destitute children-"good boys and girls" with "strong
moral tendencies"-committed to prevent them from falling into
vice.8 2 Candidly, the superintendent stated that while the destitute
and neglected children had been committed by the courts, "the
charges [were] vague and indefinite, evidently made for the pur" Thirty-third Annual Report of the Philadelphia House of Refuge 62-57 (1861). Examples
of commitments based on incorrigibility demonstrate that the offense was being used in the
same all-inclusive way as "stubbornness" in Massachusetts:
1. Habits were bad; committed on complaint of his father, for incorrigibility and
vicious conduct; associated with wicked boys, and refused to engage in any useful
employment.
3. Incorrigible; father is dead; mother married again; she had him committed to the
Refuge for disobedience, and refusing to work, and to go to school.
14. Bad boy; mother is dead; father kept tavern; he stole, and was incorrigible, and
disobedient; committed on complaint of his father.
15. Rather bad; he was entirely beyond the control of his mother; spent his time upon
the streets with vicious boys; visited the circus and theatre.
Id. at 52-53.
13 See, for all statistics in text, table in Seventeenth Annual Report of the House of Refuge
of Western Pennsylvania 15 (1870).
"I Act of Apr. 22, 1850, No. 540, § 15, [1850] Pa. Laws.
" Thirteenth Annual Report of the House of Refuge of Western Pennsylvania 22-24 (1866),
The refuge also included a fourth group, children suffering from hereditary disease or mental
defects, for whom the refuge was an "infirmary and a school." Id. at 23.
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pose of procuring their admission to the Institution."'1 He admitted
that if the purposes of the refuge were restraint and reformation, at
least half of the children committed annually should have been sent
elsewhere. 8 ' In other words, only half of the youths committed
under criminal or waywardness charges in fact belonged in those
categories, even given their inherent vagueness. Apparently, fictitious charges of waywardness had been lodged against the others,
whether by poor or overwhelmed parents, or by authorities intent
on separating children from "inadequate" parents. While the practices of the Western Pennsylvania House of Refuge may not have
been typical, it is likely that other nineteenth-century reformatories
confined merely neglected or destitute children under the waywardness rubric.
Despite his admission that the wayward child jurisdiction was
being abused, the superintendent of the Western Pennsylvania
House of Refuge did not think neglected and destitute children
should be removed from the institution:
[This would only circumscribe the usefulness of the Institution, without in any measure remedying the evil. Most of these
destitute orphan children, who now find their way to the Refuge as homeless wanderers, would soon be brought here as
criminals. Their ultimate ruin is only a question of time ...
It is better. . . to prevent the necessity of reformation.'"
This official thus accepted the idea of incarcerating children who
merely stood in danger of developing bad habits, although the wayward child law had to be stretched to accomplish this purpose. His
testimony is further proof that nineteenth-century reformers often
saw little point in distinguishing neglected from incorrigible children, since both stood in danger of leading criminal lives.
The Baltimore House of Refuge also incarcerated high numbers
of predelinquent children. Commitments for incorrigibility,
"vicious conduct," and vagrancy represented 94 percent of total
admissions in 1856, 76 percent in 1860, 70 percent in 1865, and 87
percent in 1870.'' Furthermore, throughout the 1860's, the refuge
received a certain number of "boarders" each year, under the law
Id. at 22.
,U Id. at 24.
,U Id.
,S Sixth Annual Report of the Baltimore House of Refuge 24 (1857); Tenth Annual Report
of the Baltimore House of Refuge 18 (1861); Fifteenth Annual Report of the Baltimore House
of Refuge 17 (1866); Twentieth Annual Report of the Baltimore House of Refuge 19 (1871).
'
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which made it possible for parents to commit children without court
process. 871 Twenty-seven such children were admitted in the war
year 1863, for example, comprising 15 percent of new admissions.'
Commitments for waywardness offenses in Ohio institutions were
also numerous. At the Ohio Reform Farm School, admissions for
incorrigibility comprised 36 percent of the total in 1861, 39 percent
in 1867, and 43 percent in 1870.89 At the Cincinnati House of Refuge, incorrigibility and vagrancy commitments made up the largest
single class throughout the 1860's. In 1863, for example, the two
categories accounted for 67 percent of total admissions, while in
1869 they comprised 74 percent of the total.""
From this survey of six states possessing a wayward child jurisdiction during part or all of the period 1840-1870, it is clear that the
laws proscribing "stubbornness," "incorrigibility," "vagrancy," and
"truancy" were intensively enforced. Indeed, the statistics show
that the incorrigible child, rather than the young criminal offender,
was the primary focus of the child-savers' zeal. Descriptions of committed children and comments of refuge officials indicate that the
law's vagueness allowed courts to commit virtually any child whose
behavior was annoying. Further, use of the wayward child jurisdiction to incarcerate neglected and destitute children provided a convenient tool by which city and state officials could avoid helping
families in need of financial assistance. It may have been more
convenient to institutionalize poor children as "incorrigible" and
separate them from their parents than to search for ways to
strengthen those families.
D.

The Response of the Courts

Challenges to the power of state and municipal institutions to
receive children on grounds of incorrigibility were rare in the nineteenth century. For some thirty years after the Pennsylvania court's
See text accompanying note 146 supra. See generallyTenth Annual Report of the Balti.
more House of Refuge (1861) through Twentieth Annual Report of the Baltimore House of
Refuge (1871).
In Thirteenth Annual Report of the Baltimore House of Refuge 21 (1864). There were 178
total admissions in 1863.
'" Sixth Annual Report of the Ohio Reform School, reprinted in ExEcutivE Do0wCieITs
(1861), supra note 156, at 133; Twelfth Annual Report of the Ohio Reform School, reprinted
in EXEcUTIVE DocuMENTs, supra note 156, at 134 (1867); Fifteenth Annual Report of the Ohio
Reform School, reprintedin EXEcuTvE DocuMENTS (1870), supra note 156, at 155.
"' Thirteenth Annual Report of the Cincinnati House of Refuge 9-10 (1863); Nineteenth
Annual Report of the Cincinnati House of Refuge 10 (1869).
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decision in Ex Parte Crouse' no cases appear to have reached the
appellate level in any state. In 1867, however, in House of Refuge
v. Roth, 92
1
Martin Roth instituted a habeas corpus action in Baltimore City Court to obtain the release of his son, Frank Roth, from
the Baltimore House of Refuge. The senior Roth himself had obtained his son's commitment by a justice of the peace on grounds
of incorrigibility but apparently had a change of heart. The city
court justice released the boy, finding that he had been tried and
convicted of a crime without indictment and trial by jury in violation of the state's declaration of rights, and that a justice of the
peace had no constitutional power to convict for a criminal offense.
On appeal by the house of refuge to the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City the court reversed the decision and sustained the incorrigibility commitment, relying on the authority of Ex Parte Crouse.'3
The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed,"' holding that it did not
have jurisiction to review a decision of the intermediate court in a
habeas corpus action. In a brief dictum the court expressed agreement with the intermediate court's reasoning, quoting approvingly
95
the text of Ex Parte Crouse.1

The Supreme Bench of Baltimore City reasoned that the father's
position could be sustained only if the framers of the state's bill of
rights had intended "to take from a father of a minor.

. .

the right

to subject him to a reformatory restraint, without indicting him by
a grand jury and procuring his conviction of crime." This could not
have been their intention, for "in all time heretofore, the rights and
duty of the parent under the allowance of the State to control his
child by any discipline, not barbarous and inhuman, which the
incorrigible and vicious conduct of such child may render necessary,
has been always admitted and acted upon."'98 The court seemed to
be saying that a parent needed no specific statutory authority to
commit his child to an institution on grounds of incorrigibility;
apparently he had a common law right to discipline the child in any
way he saw fit, short of unreasonable cruelty, including incarceration. That a parent had possessed the power to incarcerate a child
at common law in the absence of statutory authorization was a
M

4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1838).

Sup. Bench Bait. City, Feb. 6, 1868, reprinted in Seventeenth Annual Report of the
Baltimore House of Refuge 2 (1868) [hereinafter cited as Seventeenth Annual Report].
" Id. at 15.
"' Roth & Boyle v. House of Refuge, 31 Md. 329 (1869).
" Id. at 334-35.
"' Seventeenth Annual Report, supra note 192, at 12.
192
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dubious proposition, but the Maryland Supreme Court did not disagree.
Rejecting the father's contention that the commitment was void
because the justice of the peace had not annexed to the order of
commitment a summary of the testimony on which the youth had
been found incorrigible, as required by statute, the court suggested
that this provision did not apply when a father committed his own
son: "the authority and right to control and confine the incorrigible
child already exists, by force of law, in the father; and he is entitled
to exercise it, for disciplinary purposes, according to his own judgment, of its necessity.""'9 The only reason for making application to
the court, apparently, was to ensure that the house of refuge would
have to accept the committed child and perhaps to prevent abuse
of the parental right to commit; otherwise, "his own commitment
of the minor, if the institution would receive him, would be as valid
as the Justice's."'9' Finally, the court rejected out of hand the notion
that an incorrigibility hearing was a criminal prosecution, requiring
trial by jury. Invoking Crouse, the court held that the proceeding
did not deprive a minor
of his liberty but merely determined a
199
"transfer of custody."

In the companion case of House of Refuge v. Boyle,"' the court
approved a commitment for incorrigibility of a child charged with
stealing $2.38. It saw no objection to using the waywardness jurisdiction even though the charge was a criminal offense. The only
alternative, it thought, was incarceration in a penitentiary after
criminal conviction, a rather puzzling proposition since the house
of refuge could accept commitments based on criminal convictions,
including petit larceny. The court's conclusion indicates that it
accepted the child-savers' argument that a youth should be incarcerated because of his general behavior, not because he had
violated a specific criminal statute.
The Ohio Supreme Court confronted the issue of whether a child
could be committed to a reform school for reasons short of criminal
conviction in Prescott v. State, in 1869.1° Here the issue was the

constitutionality of a statutory provision stipulating that if a grand
jury found that charges against a youth were supported by sufficient
11,
Id. at 13.
|g Id.
"'
2

Id. at 14.
Id. at 17.
' 19 Ohio St. 184 (1869).
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evidence to put the accused on trial, it could make a return to the
court that the accused was a suitable person for commitment to the
Ohio Reform Farm School instead of finding an indictment; the
court was then required to order the commitment. Once again, the
petitioner argued that he had been deprived of the right to trial by
jury and the right to appear and defend himself in a criminal proceeding, contrary to the Ohio constitution. In what was becoming a
ritualistic incantation, the court held that the proceeding in question was not criminal, but a "purely statutory" protective proceeding for the care, discipline, and reformation of minors, not entailing
common law guarantees. Admitting that commitment to the institution restrained a youth's liberty, the court nevertheless held that
the reform school was not a prison and incarceration in it not punishment for crime, 22 even though, in this case, the accused had been
brought before the grand jury on charges of arson. Thus the Ohio
court also embraced the view that a criminal charge was merely
symptomatic of a child's condition of delinquency and provided a
sufficient basis for reformatory commitment.23
Until this point, the view that the state had the right coercively
to intervene in the lives of misbehaving children had gone unchallenged by the courts. One may then imagine that toilers in the
vineyards of child reform were stunned when in 1870 the Supreme
Court of Illinois handed down its decision in O'Connell v. Turner.2 1'
Repudiating the cherished assumptions of the child-savers and their
judicial allies, the court declared that children, too, had a right to
liberty, which could not be infringed without due process of law.
The case arose on the habeas corpus petition of Michael
O'Connell, who claimed that his son had been immured in the Chicago Reform School without having been convicted of crime. The
court observed that since the warrant of commitment did not indicate that the boy had been arrested for a criminal offense, he must
have been committed for "misfortune," i.e., as a child found to be
vagrant, "destitute of proper parental care," or "growing up in men= Id. at 188.
= The court conceded that the ex parte nature of the proceeding might lead to children
being committed on groundless charges, but held that the statutory appeal procedure and
the writ of habeas corpus provided adequate remedies. Id. at 188-89. The statute provided
that a parent or guardian could apply to the directors of the house of refuge or reform school
for release of the committed child. If the application was denied, the party could commence
an action in the court of common pleas or superior court to recover custody. Act of April 16,
1857, § 20, 1857 Ohio Laws 163.
2u 55 Ill.
280 (1870).
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dicancy, ignorance, idleness, or vice."20 3 Confronting the issue of
whether the state constitutionally could incarcerate a youth for
wayward behavior alone, the court held that it could not. It must
be noted, however, that neither the precise reach of the court's
holding nor the court's reasoning is very clear. Much of the opinion
is couched in rhetoric, and no authority is cited. The O'Connell
opinion reads more like an outraged protest against the reigning
interventionist philosophy than a carefully drafted legal argument.
The court began by suggesting that the terms used in the statute
were hopelessly relative and vague; without actually formulating a
"void for vagueness" argument, the court implied that the terms
were so devoid of meaning that no one could tell if a child had or
had not violated the statute. "What is proper parental care?" asked
the court. "The best and kindest parents would differ, in the attempt to solve the question. .

.

. There is not a child in the land

who could not be proved, by two or more witnesses, to be in this sad
condition." Ignorance, idleness, and vice were also "relative
terms.

' 20

The court's discussion of vagueness was inconclusive,

however, apparently intended merely as an introduction and a caution that parents and children had rights that the state could not
infringe.
The opinion then turned to a discussion of the rights of parents
and children vis-a-vis the state. Parents had a right to custody of
and assistance from a child and a correlative duty to maintain and
protect him or her, principles derived from natural law. Municipal
law, said the court, should not intrude on this relation except for the
strongest reasons. Indeed, before the parent's natural right to custody of his child could be infringed, "gross misconduct or almost
total unfitness on the part of the parent, should be clearly proved."
The court found that the present statute conflicted with that right,
because of "the ease with which it may be disrupted.

. .

the slight

evidence required, and the informal mode of procedure."', The
court thus left open the possibility that it would tolerate a statute
which created an action for neglect against a parent if the substan21

Id. at 283. See Act of Mar. 5, 1867, § 4, 1867 3 Ill. Private Laws 31.

55 Ill. at 283-84. The court inquired rhetorichlly: "What is the standard to be? What
extent of enlightenment, what amount of industry, what degree of virtue will save from the

threatened imprisonment?" Id. at 284. The court even had the temerity to suggest that while
some believed "idleness [was] the parent of vice," the former could exist without the latter,
an opinion that must have seemed heretical to nineteenth-century experts on child reform.

Id.
2

Id. at 284-85.
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tive standards were rigorous and the procedure for intervention
demanding, but it did not resolve the problem of what form this
abridgment of parental right could take. Might it include commitment of a neglected child to an institution? The court did not say.
Whatever the obscurity of the argument, the O'Connell court had
parted company sharply with child reformers who argued that the
state should encourage the dissolution of poor families; implicit in
the demand for a standard of "total unfitness" was an assumption
that most parents, even poverty-stricken immigrants, were fit to
bring up their children.
Addressing the question of the state's power over wayward children, the court rejected the notion that a father's right to discipline
a child included the authority to incarcerate him or her in an institution, and suggested that the state could not exercise a power as
parens patriaethat the natural parent did not possess.c Unfortunately, the court neither cited authority for these propositions nor
offered its own analysis of the parenspatriaepower. The prevailing
view, of course, was that parents had the duty to educate their
children, to train them in some useful calling, and to restrain them
from antisocial behavior; if they failed in these tasks, the state was
entitled to step in and assume custody of the children until majority. Merely because a parent did not have a common law right to
incarcerate a child for purposes of discipline did not necessarily
mean that the state lacked that power. If the state could act as
parenspatriaeat all, it had to use whatever means of restraint were
available to it, including reform schools. Further, if a parent had the
authority to compel a child to attend school, why could not the state
compel a child transferred to its custody to attend a reform school?
To challenge these arguments seriously would have meant rejecting the premise that the state did possess a parenspatriaepower to
discipline children who misbehaved in ways short of violating the
criminal law. The court appeared to adopt this position in the following comments:
The principle of the absorption of the child in, and its complete
subjection to the despotism of, the State, is wholly inadmissible in the modem civilized world.2

Id. at 285. The court commented: "If a father confined or imprisoned his child for one
year, the majesty of the law would frown upon the unnatural act, and every tender mother
and kind father would rise up in arms against such monstrous inhumanity." Id. (footnote
omitted).
2 Id. at 284.
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If, without crime, without the conviction of any offense, the
children of the State are to be thus confined for the "good of
society," then society had better be reduced to its original elements, and free government acknowledged a failure.2"'
And yet, as we shall see below, the court eventually backed away
from complete repudiation of parens patriae.
The most strikingly modem part of the opinion was the court's
insisteice that not only adults but children had legal rights, especially the right to liberty. The court detailed the obligations that
society imposed on minors-responsibility for crime, liability for
torts, obligation to pay taxes and serve in the militia-and suggested it was unjust not to accord them corresponding liberties:
"The disability of minors does not make slaves or criminals of them.
They are entitled to legal rights, and are under legal liabilities."' "
The right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," found in
the state's bill of rights and derived from natural law, inhered in "all
men," said the court, including children. t '
Given a right to liberty, children could be deprived of it only if
accorded due process of law. Adults tried for crimes, and even children tried for "grave and heinous offenses," had a right to know the
nature of the accusation and to a speedy public trial by jury. Yet
"misfortune" offenses, as the court acknowledged, were not considered crimes and thus carried no due process guarantees. The court
had no trouble deciding that incarcerated children were deprived of
liberty, rejecting the accepted view that confinement in a reform
school was not imprisonment: "This boy is deprived of a father's
care; bereft of home influences; has no freedom of action; is committed for an uncertain time; is branded as a prisoner; made subject
to the will of others, and thus feels that he is a slave.

2

Thus the

boy had been imprisoned without due process of law, and the statute had to fall.
2,0 Id. at 286.
21 Id. Cf. In re Gault, 367 U.S. 1, 28 (1967) ("Under our Constitution, the condition of being
a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.").
21

55 Il. at 287.

Id. Cf. In re Gault, 367 U.S. 1 (1967):
The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a "receiving home" or
an "industrial school" for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child
is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. . . . Instead of mother and father and
sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his world is peopled by guards, cuatodians, state employees, and "delinquents" confined with him for anything from
waywardness to rape and homicide.
Id. at 27 (footnote omitted).
213
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What is not entirely clear from the opinion is whether the due
process that was lacking was substantive or procedural. The court
appears to have held that any attempt by the state to exercise
control over misbehaving children for social control purposes was
inherently unconstitutional, either because the conduct sought to be
regulated could not be described accurately enough or because such
control was an unreasonable infringement on family relations. (Presumably the state could act as parens patriaeto remove a neglected
or abused child from a "totally unfit" parent.) One is left to speculate, however, whether the court would have permitted state regulation of wayward children that fell short of incarceration in a reformatory, such as probation. Would that, too, have constituted
deprivation of liberty without due process of law? Finally, it is not
clear whether extending procedural due process guarantees to wayward minor hearings would not have met the court's objections. The
court suggested both of the above possibilities in stating: "Other
means of a milder character; other influences of a more kindly nature; other laws less in restraint of liberty, would better accomplish
the reformation of the depraved, and infringe less upon inalienable
4
rights.

21

This passage seems to suggest that the state did not, after all, lack
all power to discipline wayward children. Perhaps in suggesting
"laws less in restraint of liberty" the court had in mind the new
Visiting Agent system, established by the Massachusetts Board of
State Charities in 1869, under which an agent of the board appeared
on behalf of delinquents in court and frequently obtained their discharge on probation. The court may well have been aware that
Massachusetts was attempting to reduce commitments to state institutions under this system. 2 5 On the other hand, as Fox has suggested, it may be that the Illinois court was particularly outraged
at the harshness of conditions in the particular reform school in
question and might have approved incarceration in another institution "of a milder character." ' 6
Despite the ambiguities in the court's holding and reasoning, it
had at least held that the state could not constitutionally confine
55 IM. at 287.
See 2 CHImREN AND YOUTH,pt. 4, supra note 17, at 492-94; R. MENNE., supra note 28,
at 69. See generallyREPORTS OF THE STATE VISrMG AGENT,reportedin MNAssAcruswrs BoMW
OF STATE CHAnrriEs, ANUAL REPORTs Nos. 7-10 passim (1870-73).
22" Fox, supra note 13, at 1215-17. In fact the court did just this 12 years later in In re
Ferrier, 103 I. 367 (1882), distinguishing O'ConnelL See text accompanying notes 327-28
infra.
212
225
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children in the Chicago Reform School for waywardness and had
cast doubt on the state's power to incarcerate wayward children at
all. In the aftermath of the O'Connell decision, the Chicago Reform
School was closed and the Illinois legislature repealed the laws establishing jurisdiction over "misfortune" cases." 7 Illinois thus became the first state since Connecticut in the 1850's to turn its back
on an established wayward child jurisdiction and reject the trend
toward expansion of state control over children.
At least one commentator believed that the effect of O'Connell
would be not only to invalidate laws authorizing compulsory moral
reform of predelinquents, but laws requiring compulsory education
in the common schools as well. Isaac F. Redfield, former Chief Justice of the Vermont Supreme Court, writing in the American Law
Register one year after the decision,2 18 identified two opposing
schools of thought in regard to child training-one which held that
government should require compulsory education and moral reform,
and another which resisted all government intervention in family
affairs and instead looked to family and religion to guarantee moral
development. 219 Expressing his concurrence with the latter school,
Justice Redfield concluded: "These two schools are becoming, in our
country, year by year, more and more antagonistic."' o
of May 3, 1873, § 17, 1873 Ill. Laws 145. See Fox, supra note 13, at 1219-20.
10 Am. L. REo., N.S. 372 (1871). The comment was signed by I.F.R., and Justice Isaac
F. Redfield was named as the author in Milwaukee Indus. School v. Supervisor of Milwaukee
County, 40 Wis. 328, 341 (1876).
223 10 Am. L. REG., N.S. 372 (1871). Justice Redfield expressed his sympathy with a "highly
cultured and powerful class" who held
that all hopeful and reliable moral reforms must be looked for only in a high degree of
religious faith and culture, from earliest infancy; and that this cannot be expected to
come from the common schools, or the reform schools, or any other schools; but exclusively or mainly from family training, and from the authoritative teaching of the
church and her ministers, in the daily discipline of a devout and holy life.
Id.
" Id. at 373. Justice Redfield condemned both compulsory education in the common
schools and compulsory moral reform in juvenile institutions, and he assumed that his opponents also considered these movements inseparable. In principle, it was possible to support
compulsory education and reject state intervention in the lives of wayward children, see text
accompanying notes 332-34 infra, but contemporary child reformers probably did approve of
both policies and believe their fate was intertwined. Schlossman, writing of the period after
1900, suggests that reformers and sympathetic judges considered decisions upholding juvenile
court laws crucial victories not merely because of the merits of juvenile courts, but because
they "cement[ed] the legal groundwork for sundry other reform measures [e.g., child labor
and compulsory education] geared to aid, protect, and establish new means of surveillance
over the lower-class family." S. ScHLossMAN, supra note 13, at 211 n.28. It was no doubt true
for the period 1870-1900 as well that those who supported state control over wayward children
also espoused compulsory education and child labor reform, and that they viewed court
217Act

2
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Yet the great battle between child reformers and their opponents
that Justice Redfield anticipated did not emerge. O'Connellwas not
destined to have any influence outside Illinois and would shortly be
repudiated in that state. In the last third of the century, the legislative trend was toward even wider restrictions on the activities of
children whether for their protection or society's, and dissenting
voices were few and ineffectual.
IV. THE GROWING A MVALENCE TowARD CHILDRE,

1870-1900:

PROTECTION OR REPRESSION?

Children were in the forefront of national concern during the last
thirty years of the nineteenth century. Humanitarians felt they
must be protected from the rigors of modem industrial life and
successfully lobbied many state legislatures to limit the number of
hours children could work and to exclude them from dangerous or
taxing occupations.2' Laws were enacted punishing not only those
who employed children in such occupations, but parents who permitted them to be so employed or otherwise neglected or physically
2
abused their children. 2
The growing interest in children, however, was an ambivalent
affair, involving both protection of children and severe limitation of
their autonomy. More and more states adopted legislation permitting incarceration of children for immoral behavior, and some states
which had already legislated in the area expanded their grounds for
decisions approving compulsory reform of misbehaving children as establishing important
precedents for reform efforts in other areas.
The linkage between compulsory education and compulsory moral reform was most obvious
in the status offense of truancy, but courts recognized that the intersection of the two movements went further. See, e.g., In re Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 133, 96 P. 563, 566 (1908), cited in
S. SCLossmAsN, supra note 13, at 213 n.35:
It would be fatal to the highest and greatest good, both of the individual and of the
state, as well as a decided blow at popular education and enlightenment if the state
could not enforce compulsory school laws and direct parents and guardians to send
their children to school during certain hours, or days, or months, as the case may be.
The delinquent children's act is only carrying this principle a step further, and providing for the state assuming the duties of parents or guardians where ... the parent or
guardian has neglected, or fails or refuses to observe and discharge the duties which
thus devolve upon him.
22 See J. FELT, HOSTAGES OF FORTUNE: CHM LABOR REFoRM iNNEw YORK STATE, cs. 1-2
(1965); W. TRArrER, CRUSADE FOR THE CHILDREN: A HISToRy OF THE NATIONAL CHmD LAZOR
COmsrrTra AND Cm

LABOR RE'oRz. iN AEUCA, ch. 1 (1970).

2n See Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisalof the State's Role
in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 Gzo. L. J. 887, 903-10 (1975); Rendleman, supra note
79, at 225-29; Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect, PartI: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix,
and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REv. 293, 306-22 (1972).
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commitment. Compulsory education grew in popularity, and with
it the notion that children who did not attend school must be placed
in reform or truant schools. Most curiously, under some legislation
presumably enacted for child protection, youngsters who engaged in
certain forbidden activities or occupations could themselves be punished, by fine or loss of liberty, in addition to those who employed
them. While laws that barred children under certain ages from dangerous occupations such as mining or that regulated the hours children could work in industry did not carry penalties for child violators (unless the child also violated school attendance regulations),
statutes that forbade children from engaging in morally tainted
activities such as circuses, dramatic productions, or street singing,
sometimes treated child participants as status offenders.
The effect of this legislation was to press children increasingly
into standardized molds, telling them what they could and could
not do until they became adults. With various occupations forbidden to them, with certain conduct punishable only for youth, with
the role of student increasingly required up to the age of fourteen
or sixteen, young people came to assume a status of prolonged legal
dependency that had not existed in the colonial period but which
had been gaining force since the creation of the first houses of refuge
in the 1820's. Historian Joseph Kett has noted that the end of the
nineteenth century was the period of the "invention of the adolescent,' ' r involving the notion that minors have distinctive psychological and behavioral characteristics and should exist in a social
and economic world separate from that of adults. Developments in
the legal sphere did much to crystallize the concept of adolescence
and to create a second-class citizenship for children that still pervades American law.
In the remainder of this essay, we will explore some of the statutory developments that reflect late nineteenth-century ambivalence
at 133-44, 162-72, ch. 8 passim. Kett
2" J. KErr, supra note 15, at 243. See generally id.
observes that "it was .. .from 1890 to 1920, that the institutions which have effectively
delayed the achievement of adult status by youth since 1920 were first developed," id.at 144,
and that "[b]etween 1890 and 1920 a host of psychologists, urban reformers, educators,

youth workers, and parent counselors gave shape to the concept of adolescence, leading to
the massive reclassification of young people as adolescents." Id. at 6-6. Kett devotes considerable analysis to prior nineteenth-century developments that laid the basis for the idea of a
special status for youth, observing that "[t]he concept of adolescence did not develop as a

mere by-product of the later stages of industrialization but was an expression of distinctive
values relating to children and the family that originated in America as early as the 1830's."

Id. at 7. For the historical development of the concept of adolescence in England, see F.
MUSOROVE,YOUTH AND THE SOCIL ORDER, chs. 3-4 (1964).
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toward children, the pattern of commitments to reform schools for
waywardness and related status offenses, and the response of the
courts when challenges to waywardness commitments were
mounted.
A. Statutory Developments
To understand both the protective and repressive ' side of legislation toward children in the last thirty years of the nineteenth century, it will be helpful to examine developments in three areas of
law: (1) statutes which regulated the ages at which children could
be employed in manufacturing or commercial establishments and
the hours they could work; (2) laws which forbade children from
participating in "immoral" occupations or activities, or which
barred them from frequenting undesirable places; and (3) laws
which reaffirmed or added to the wayward child jurisdiction, including truancy. For purposes of illustration, particular attention will be
paid to legislation from New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts,
and Ohio, states which frequently set a statutory pattern that other
jurisdictions followed. 5
Many states passed laws setting the ages at which children could
work and the maximum hours they could be employed. Here the
approach toward children was nonpunitive, in the sense that penalties for infraction of the law fell on employers and parents, not
children. Pennsylvania pioneered in this regard, providing as early
as 1849 that children under thirteen years of age could not work in
21 I use the term "repressive" to refer specifically to laws which excluded children from

occupations, activities, or places that middle-class reformers considered morally offensive,
and to laws which provided for incarcerating or fining children who participated in forbidden
activities or visited proscribed places. I do not mean to argue that laws which prohibited
children from employment in physically dangerous occupations or from working overlong
hours were unnecessary. Although poor parents may well have resented such laws since they
eliminated needed income, and some children may have objected to the limitation on their
freedom of choice, on balance these intrusions into parents' and children's autonomy were
justified by the physical dangers posed to children by industrial hazards. On the other hand,
Musgrove may well be right in arguing that all protective measures for children necessarily
diminished their social status: "Protective measures are a two-edged device: while they may
signify concern for the welfare of the young, they also define them as a separate, nonadult
population, inhabiting a less than adult world. The need for protection and distinctive treatment underlines their less than adult status." F. MUSGROVE, supra note 223, at 28.
21 To discover if statutes passed by these four major jurisdictions were representative,
legislation in eight other states was surveyed in the first two subject areas mentioned in the
text. These states were Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Rhode Island,
Texas, and Virginia. In addition, the statutes of all American jurisdictions were investigated
to see which states passed laws dealing with wayward children before 1900.
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certain factories226 and shortly thereafter that no minor under
twenty-one years of age could be employed in factories longer than
ten hours a day or sixty hours a week.'* As of 1885, these laws were
still operative in the state.m New York followed suit in 1886, declaring that no child under thirteen could be employed in any manufacturing establishment and no minor under the age of eighteen could
work longer than sixty hours a week."' Massachusetts, 20 Ohio, 231
and seven of eight other states surveyed 23 passed substantially similar legislation. More broadly, the Ohio legislature declared that no
child under the age of sixteen could be employed in any occupation
"whereby its life or limb is endangered, or its health is likely to be
injured, or its morals may be depraved";m employers violating the
statute were subject to fine or imprisonment. Similarly, Pennsylvania imposed criminal sanctions on those who employed children,
or custodians of children who permitted them to be employed, in
any vocation "injurious to the health, or dangerous to the life or
limb" 2m of a child, regardless of the child's age. Furthermore, to
ensure compliance with compulsory education laws, several jurisdictions prohibited employers from hiring children who had not
attended school the required number of months.2
Act of Apr. 21, 1849, No. 415, §§ 2-4, 1849 Pa. Laws 671.
: Act of May 7, 1855, No. 501, § 1, 1855 Pa. Laws 472.
1 PA. DIG. LAws, Factories,§§ 1, 3, 5 (Brightly 1885). For further refinements of the laws
pertaining to child labor, see 1 PA. DIG. STAT. LAw, Factories, §§ 1-13 (Brightly 1895).
""Act of May 18, 1886, ch. 409, §§ 1-2, 1886 N.Y. Laws 629. In 1897, the age below which
children could not work in factories was raised to 14 years. Act of May 13, 1897, ch. 415, §
70, 1897 N.Y. Laws 461. In addition, children were forbidden to work more than 10 hours a
day or at night. Id. § 77.
2" Act of May 8, 1874, ch. 221, § 1, 1874 Mass. Acts 145; Act of Mar. 16, 1876, ch. 52, § 1,
1876 Mass. Acts 44; Act of June 2, 1898, ch. 494, § 1, 1898 Mass. Act 447.
211Act of Apr. 27, 1885, § 1, 1885 Ohio Laws 161; Act of Apr. 19, 1898, § 1, 1898 Ohio Laws
123.
" These states were Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Rhode Island,
and Virginia. See Act of Apr. 13, 1886, ch. 124, § 1, 1886 Conn. Laws 624; Act of Apr. 14,
1887, ch. 62, § 1, 1887 Conn. Laws 692; Act of June 17, 1891, § 1, 1891 111. Laws 87; Act of
June 17, 1893, § 4, 1893 Ill. Laws 99; Act of June 18, 1883, § 1, 1883 111. Laws 116; Act of
Apr. 14, 1881, ch. 37, § 215, 1881 Ind. Acts 174; Act of Apr. 13, 1885, ch. 88, §§ 1-2, 1885 Ind.
Acts 219; Act of Mar. 8, 1879, ch. 10, § 21, 1879 Ind. Acts 19; Act of Mar. 25, 1876, ch. 125, §
1, 1876 Md. Laws 193; Act of Apr. 10, 1885, No. 39, §§ 1, 4, 1885 Mich. Laws 37; Act of Jan.
1853, §§ 1, 3, 1853 R.I. Laws 245; Act of Apr. 26, 1894, ch. 1278, §§ 1, 6, 1894 R.I. Laws 29;
Act of Mar. 4, 1890, ch. 193, § 1, 1890 Va. Laws 150.
21 Act of Apr. 8, 1890, § 1, 1890 Ohio Laws 161.
2m Act of May 24, 1878, No. 150, § 2, 1878 Pa. Laws 119.
21 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 12, 1882, ch. 80, § 3, 1882 Conn. Laws 162; Act of May 17, 1888,
ch. 348, § 2, 1888 Mass. Laws 301; Act of June 2, 1898, ch. 494, § 1, 1898 Mass. Laws 447;
,ct of Apr. 10. 1885, No. 39, § 2, 1885 Mich. Laws 37; Act of May 11, 1874, ch. 421, § 2, 1874
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The second area of legislation-prohibiting children from participating in "immoral" activities or from frequenting undesirable
places-embodied both protective and repressive elements. Typical
was the New York comprehensive child protection law of 1876, M
which prohibited anyone from employing children under the age of
sixteen, or permitting them to be employed, in such activities as
singing, playing musical instruments, rope or wire walking, dancing,
begging, peddling, or being a gymnast, contortionist, rider, or acrobat. More generally, employers and custodians of children were forbidden to allow them to engage in any immoral exhibition or practice or any occupation dangerous to life or health. Anyone violating
the law was guilty of a misdemeanor.w
While some of the above activities might have been physically
taxing, even dangerous, to young people, the thrust of the legislation
seems to have been to prevent their participation in morally repugnant pursuits, especially circuses and theatrical exhibitions. Under
this type of legislation some states provided that courts could treat
children engaging in the proscribed activity as status offenders. New
York decreed that courts could commit such children to an orphan
asylum or charitable institution, "or make such other disposition
thereof as now is or hereafter may be provided by law in cases of
vagrant, truant, disorderly, pauper or destitute children"3-which
of course included commitment to a house of refuge. Ohio placed the
same kinds of "immoral" activities off-limits to children and permitted the same dispositions as the New York law allowed.21 Legislators in these two jurisdictions apparently assumed that children
N.Y. Laws 532; Act of Mar. 20, 1877, § 2, 1877 Ohio Laws 57; Act of Jan. 1854, § 1, 1854 R.1.
Laws 262.
Act of Apr. 14, 1876, ch. 122, 1876 N.Y. Laws 95.
T Id. §§ 1-2.
Id. § 3. Permitting the court to dispose of offending children as "paupers" or "disorderly
persons" might have opened up the possibility of committing them to almshouses or jails.
See N.Y. CODE CM. PRO. § 903 (1882) (disorderly persons may be sentenced to six months
imprisonment at hard labor if they refuse to enter an engagement to remain on good behavior). In 1879, however, New York prohibited justices of the peace, boards of charities, police
justices, and other magistrates from committing any child under 16 years of age as vagrant,
truant, or disorderly to any jail, county poorhouse, or almshouse. Act of Apr. 30, 1879, ch.
240, § 1, 1879 N.Y. Laws 321. New York also mandated the removal of all children between
the ages of three and 16 years from county poorhouses and their placement with families,
orphan asylums, or other appropriate institutions. Act of May 15, 1876, ch. 266, § 2,1876 N.Y.
Laws 264.
m Act of Apr. 11, 1876, §§ 1, 5, 1876 Ohio Laws 219. Ohio still includes within its definition of "unruly child" one who "engages in an occupation prohibited by law, or is in a
situation dangerous to life or limb or injurious to the health or morals of himself or others."
Omo Rxv. CODE ANN. § 2151.022(F) (Page 1976).
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might have to be incarcerated to eradicate the moral taint acquired
from association with the world of the circus or theater.
Massachusetts,4 0 Pennsylvania,24' and six of the other states surveyed' 2 also passed laws barring children from employment in the
activities described above, sometimes varying the list with such
additions as acting or dancing in a saloon or theater.2 3 Of these
jurisdictions, only Maryland treated offending children as status
offenders; they were deemed vagrants and committed to the custody
of the "poor or almshouse authorities. 2' Pennsylvania provided
that upon conviction of an adult under the act, the county orphan's
court could appoint a guardian for the child or commit the child to
an "asylum or home for children," which would assume powers of
guardianship. 25 This procedure in effect treated the child as destitute rather than wayward and does not appear to have contemplated commitment to houses of refuge or reform schools. Still, however mild the place to which children might be sent,, their liberty
could be curtailed merely because they had engaged in occupations
which adults considered dangerous or immoral. Massachusetts, on
240Act
2,1Act

of Apr. 28, 1877, ch. 172, § 1, 1877 lVass. Laws 554.
of June 11, 1879, No. 151, §§ 34, 1879 Pa. Laws 142.
212These states were Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, and Rhode Island. See Act of Apr. 4, 1884, ch. 99, 1884 Conn. Pub. Acts 378; Act of May 18, 1877, § 1,
1877 111. Laws 90; Act of Mar. 9,1889, ch. 201, §§ 2-4, 1889 Ind. Acts 363; Act of Apr. 8, 1876,
ch. 392, § 1, 1876 Md. Laws 640; Act of June 10, 1881, No. 260, § 1, 1881 Mich. Pub. Acts
357; Act of Apr. 12, 1878, ch. 683, § 1, 1877-1878 R.I. Pub. Laws 111.
243See, e.g., Act of June 11, 1879, No. 151, § 4, 1879 Pa. Laws 142.
2" Act of Apr. 8, 1876, ch. 392, § 2, 1876 Md. Laws 640. Several other states enacted
legislation prohibiting children from engaging in specific immoral activites and occupations
or generally barring them from participating in "obscene, indecent, or immoral" exhibitions
or practices. Four of these states provided that the court could commit such children to
orphan asylums or other charitable institutions, or "make such other disposition thereof as
* * .may be provided by law in cases of vagrant, truant, disorderly, pauper, or destitute
children." See Act of Mar. 30, 1878, ch. 521, §§ 1-3, 1878 Cal. Stats. 813; Act of Oct. 20, 1879,
No. 342, §§ 1-2, 1879 Ga. Laws 162; Act of Mar. 20, 1889, ch. 104, § 1, 1889 Kan. Sess. Laws
138; Act of Feb. 18, 1879, ch. 75, §§ 1-3, 1879 Minn. Laws 75. New Jersey specifically provided
that such children could be sent to a reform or industrial school. Act of Mar. 9, 1885, ch, 57,
§§ 1-2, 1885 N.J. Laws 65.
Another group of states passed legislation prohibiting children from the same types of
activities and made infraction of the law a misdemeanor for an employer, parent, or guardian,
but provided no disposition for the offending child. See Amz. REV. STAT. tit. 9, ch. 2, § 444
(1887); Act of Apr. 1, 1885, §§ 1-2, 4, 1885 Col. Sess. Laws 124; Act of Mar. 18, 1879, ch, 160,
§§ 2-4, 1879 Del. Laws 218; Act of Feb. 24, 1894, ch. 19, § 2, 1894 Ky. Acts 28; Act of July 6,
1892, No. 59, §§ 1-2, 1892 La. Acts 81; Act of Apr. 11, 1895, §§ 1-3, 1895 Mo. Laws 205; MoNT,.
REV. CODES ANN.pt. 1, tit. 9, ch. 2, § 472 (1895); Act of July 19, 1877, ch. 53, § 2, 1877 N.H.
Laws 38; Act of Mar. 15, 1880, ch. 239, § 1, 1880 Wis. Laws 276; Act of Feb. 15, 1895, ch. 46,
§§ 1-2, 1895 Wyo. Sess. Laws 94.
20 Act of May 24, 1878, No. 150, § 5, 1878 Pa. Laws 119.
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the other hand, did not provide for institutionalization or other
sanctions against a child participating in a forbidden activity. 8 The
omission was significant, for it demonstrated that some late
nineteenth-century legislators could conceive of protecting children
from physical harm without feeling compelled to correct the
"immoral" tendencies they might have developed while appearing
in circuses or theaters.
States also sought to prevent children from frequenting morally
offensive establishments. New York, for example, penalized proprietors of saloons, dancehouses, or other places of entertainment
where liquor was sold if they allowed minors under the age of fourteen to remain on the premises unaccompanied by parent or guardian. 27 At the same time, children could be institutionalized as
"vagrant, truant, disorderly, pauper or destitute" if they frequented
"the company of reputed thieves or prostitutes or houses of assignation or prostitution, or dancehouses, concert saloons, theaters and
varieties. . . without parent or guardian. ' 2 Ohio prohibited minors from entering saloons, beer-gardens, or other places where liquor was sold unless accompanied by a parent or guardian, and
fined not only the offending proprietor but the child as well.2 11 Proprietors there were also forbidden to allow youths under eighteen
years of age to play pool or billiards.2
The variety of activities against which New York legislators felt
the need to protect children was endless. Minors could be fined for
climbing on the platform or steps of steam railway cars or horsedrawn street cars2sl and for smoking tobacco in a public place. 2
"Picking rags, or collecting cigar stumps, bones or refuse from markets" were added to the list of prohibited activities,2 and children
were forbidden to enter "museums or other places of entertainment"
without a parent or guardian 251and to play "any game of chance or
21

of Apr. 28, 1877, ch. 172, § 1, 1877 Mass. Laws 554.
Act of June 6, 1877, ch. 428, § 1, 1877 N.Y. Laws 486.

2U

Id. § 3.

2,6 Act

Act of Apr. 28, 1891, §§ 1-2, 1891 Ohio Laws 409.
of May 18, 1886, § 1, 1886 Ohio Laws 202. Several other states prohibited children
from being on the premises of such morally dubious places as dance houses, concert saloons,
roller skating rinks, vaudeville theaters, museums, pool or gambling halls, policy shops, and
bowling alleys. See, e.g., Act of June 22, 1895, ch. 216, 1895 Conn. Laws 565; Act of Apr. 14,
1881, ch. 37, § 182, 1881 Ind. Laws 174; Act of June 10, 1881, ch. 260, § 2, 1881 Mich. Pub.
Acts 357.
21

220 Act

226Act

of June 25, 1880, ch. 585, § § 2-3, 1880 N.Y. Laws 876.

212 Act

of May 24, 1890, ch. 417, § 1, 1890 N.Y. Laws 776.

2 N.Y. PEAL CODE § 292(2)-(3) (1887).
2M Id. § 291(4).
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skill in any place wherein or adjacent to which any beer, ale, wine
or liquor is sold or given away."' I The law was tightened to forbid
merely being in the company of reputed thieves or prostitutes or
being in a reputed house of prostitution (in addition to frequenting
the same, as under former law), whether with or without a parent
or guardian.2ss Children who engaged in any of the above activities
(except those where a fine was specifically provided) were subject
to commitment to a child-saving institution.27
The third area of law contributing to the new legal definition of
childhood was the wayward child jurisdiction itself. In particular,
laws mandating compulsory education and incarceration of school
truants proliferated during this period. New York21s and Massachusetts2ss reaffirmed their commitment to compulsory education, and
Ohio 61 joined the movement in 1871. The length of schooling required varied from state to state, tending to increase as the century
progressed. Massachusetts, for example, required parents to send
children to school, up to the age of fourteen, for twenty weeks a year
as of 1874, for thirty weeks as of 1890, and, after 1898, for the entire
states parents
time the public schools were in session.2 1 In all three
62
could be fined for failing to meet their obligations.
Along with the passage of compulsory education laws-and in
some states even in the absence of laws requiring parents to send
children to school-came enactment of truancy laws providing for
reformation of children who would not attend school. In New York,
if parents were unable to induce their children to attend school for
= Id.
Id.
2" Id. § 291(5). Ohio forbade proprietors to sell not only guns but "toy pistols" to minors
2

under 14 years of age, Act of Mar. 25, 1880, § 1, 1880 Ohio Laws 79, and to sell tobacco to
minors under 15 years of age, Act of Apr. 10, 1888, § 1, 1888 Ohio Laws 169. In Pennsylvania, minors who claimed to be over 21 years of age for the purpose of obtaining liquor could
be fined or jailed for 30 days, 1 PA. DIG. STAT. LAW, Liquors, § 10(29) (Brightly 1895), and
proprietors of bowling-saloons, billiard-rooms, or ten-pin alleys could be fined for admitting
minors, 1 PA. DIG. LAWS, Gaming, § 18 (Brightly 1885).
22 Act of May 11, 1874, ch. 421, § 1, 1874 N.Y. Laws 532.
21 See, e.g., MAss. PuB. STAT. ch. 47, § 1 (1882).

2 Act of Mar. 20, 1877, § 1, 1877 Ohio Laws 57. Pennsylvania required compulsory atten.
dance in 1901. Parents were required to send their children between the ages of eight and 16
to school during the entire time the public schools were in session. Act of July 11, 1901, No.
335, § 1, 1901 Pa. Laws 658.
2 Act of May 11, 1874, ch. 233, § 1, 1874 Mass. Acts 155; Act of June 4, 1890, ch. 384,
1890 Mass. Acts 343; Act of June 2, 1898, ch. 496, § 12, 1898 Mass. Acts 451. See also Act of
May 12, 1894, ch. 671, §§ 2-3, 1894 N.Y. Laws 1682, for later developments in New York.
2 Act of May 11, 1874, ch. 233, § 1, 1874 Mass. Acts 155; Act of May 11, 1874, ch. 421, §
5, 1874 N.Y. Laws 532; Act of Apr. 15, 1889, § 8, 1889 Ohio Laws 333.
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the requisite number of weeks, they could have them declared
"habitual truants" and committed to whatever "suitable places for
[their] discipline and instruction and confinement" the city or
town might provide."' Pennsylvania, as of 1871, provided for
twenty-four-hour detention of a child for each case of "habitual
absence" from school. If because of parental neglect a child totally
failed to attend school or attended irregularly, he or she could be
removed from the family and placed in a home for friendless chil" ' In Ohio, children who were either occadren or house of refuge.28
sional or chronic truants from school, along with children who were
"incorrigible, vicious, or immoral" while in school, could be committed as "juvenile disorderly persons" to a county children's home
or a juvenile reformatory until age sixteen.2 61 Legislatures frequently
authorized counties to establish special truant schools to service this
26
special category of status offender. 1

Some states seemed to have difficulty deciding just how serious
a status offense truancy was. In a move that demonstrated the continuing uncertainty of the distinction between neglected and wayward children, Massachusetts provided in 1894 that courts could
commit neglected children to truant schools,2 7 in contrast with that
state's legislation of the 1860's that had authorized placing truants
with criminal law violators in county houses of reformation.m This
was not the legislature's final word, however. In 1898 they decided
that there were different degrees of fault among truants themselves,
deserving treatment by different institutions. "Habitual truants,"
defined as children who "willfully and habitually" absented themselves from school in violation of mandatory attendance laws, could
"3

Act of May 11, 1874, ch. 421, §§ 7-8, 1874 N.Y. Laws 532.

"

PA. REV. STAT.

§

60(5)-(6) (Derickson & Hall 1871).

Act of Apr. 15, 1889, §§ 5, 8, 1889 Ohio Laws 333.
25 See, e.g., Act of May 21, 1890, ch. 309, § 1, 1890 Mass. Acts 261; Act of May 12, 1894,
ch. 671, § 9, 1894 N.Y. Laws 1682; Act of July 11, 1901, No. 335, § 3, 1901 Pa. Laws 658.
States also created the position of truant officer. In New York, truant officers could arrest
truant children without a warrant and return them to parents or teachers, or, in the case of
"habitual and incorrigible truants," bring them before a police magistrate. Act of May 12,
1894, ch. 671, § 8,1894 N.Y. Laws 1682. In Massachusetts, truant officers could visit factories
and commercial establishments to find children employed in violation of the law. Act of May
17, 1888, ch. 348, § 8,1888 Mass. Acts 301.
2v Act of June 21, 1894, ch. 498, § 28, 1894 Mass. Acts 607. A neglected child was defined
as one under 16 years of age who "by reason of orphanage or of the neglect, crime, drunkenness
or other vice of parents, is growing up without salutary parental control and education, or in
circumstances exposing such child to lead an idle and dissolute life. . . ." Id. Although the
statute does not specifically call such children "neglected children," that term is used in
MAss. PuB. STAT. ch. 48, § 18 (1882), to categorize children described in identical language.
21 See text accompanying note 130 supra.
2m
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be committed to a county truant school for not more than two years
if a boy, or, if a girl, to the state industrial school for girls."'
"Habitual absentees," defined as children "found wandering about
in the streets or public places of any city or town, having no lawful
occupation, habitually not attending school, and growing up in idleness and ignorance''1 - the traditional vagrant who permanently
did not attend school - could be committed to a county truant
school or to the state reform school (renamed the Lyman School for
Boys) or the industrial school for girls. Children who persistently
violated school regulations or otherwise misbehaved while attending
school, designated "habitual school offenders," could be treated as
"habitual absentees."' Thus, the more serious cases of chronic
truancy and misbehaving school attenders were now seen as needing
the tougher discipline of the reform school.
The four principal states under discussion here all maintained
their other grounds for incarcerating wayward children substantially unchanged through the latter part of the nineteenth century,
with one notable exception. Ohio, while continuing to allow
"incorrigible" and "vicious" children to be committed to houses of
refuge, 12 determined in 1881 that incorrigible boys should no longer
be sent to the state reform school. The legislature limited that
73
school's jurisdiction to boys who had committed criminal acts,
although subsequent legislation allowed admission of school truants
274
and youths who had engaged in occupations illegal for minors.
Exactly why the legislature decided to eliminate the incorrigibility
jurisdiction of the state reform school is not clear, 75 but this deci" Act of June 2, 1898, ch. 496, § 24, 1898 Mass. Acts 451.

-o Id. § 25.
-1,
Id. § 26.
r Act of Apr. 15, 1880, § 1, 1880 Ohio Laws 217.
r1 Act of Apr. 18, 1881, § 1, 1881 Ohio Laws 167.
" Act of Apr. 15, 1889, § 8, 1889 Ohio Laws 336.
211There was no Ohio judicial decision comparable to O'Connell v.Turner questioning the
constitutionality of state power over incorrigible children, and the legislature had just reaffirmed the authority of houses of refuge to accept such youths. See note 272 and accompanying text supra. Two possible reasons present themselves. In their annual report for 1880, the
trustees of the reform school indicated that public opinion opposed that institution's practice
of mixing the "less and more criminal inmates" in the same cottages. Twenty-fifth Annual
Report of the Ohio Reform School, reprinted in ExEcuriv DocuMENTs (1880), supra note 156,
at 487. Perhaps the legislature decided, contrary to the trustees' wishes, that incorrigible
youths should not be committed to the institution at all, to avoid their mixing with more
"hardened" offenders. If so, the subsequent decision to admit school truants and youths who
had engaged in forbidden employments was strangely inconsistent.
Another possible explanation is a financial one: the trustees informed the legislature in 1880

that the reform school was practically overflowing with inmates and requested funds for the
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sion, along with the similar limitation constitutionally compelled by
O'Connell in Illinois, stands as the only example of retrenchment
in the power of the state to incarcerate wayward minors that this

author has found in the late nineteenth century.

5

The trend else-

where was toward expansion or consolidation of the jurisdiction.

Indeed, in the last thirty years of the century twelve jurisdictions
provided for incarceration of incorrigible children for the first time,
in newly constructed special institutions for minors.m All except
one of these, the Ferris Reform School in Delaware, were stateowned institutions. Wyoming, although not erecting an institution
for children, provided that its incorrigible, vicious, and vagrant children could be sent to reform schools in other states.2' Of the jurisconstruction of another building to house some of the smaller and less criminal boys. Twentyfifth Annual Report of the Ohio Reform School, reprintedin ExEcumvE Documtzrs (1880),
supra note 156, at 487. The legislature may well have decided that rather than spend the
additional funds, a simpler solution to the overpopulation problem would be not to admit
"beyond control" youths any longer.
276 The Ohio legislature did not experience similar qualms about incarcerating incorrigible
girls. In 1873, it empowered counties to establish "homes for the friendless," which could
receive girls between the ages of seven and 16 who had committed criminal offenses, were
"leading an idle, vagrant, or vicious life," were homeless, or had been found "in a state of
want, suffering, abandonment, or beggary." Act of May 5, 1873, §§ 1, 8, 1873 Ohio Laws 277.
Five years later, a state industrial home for girls was created, authorized to receive girls
between the ages of nine and 15 who had committed criminal offenses, or were "evil-disposed,
incorrigible, [or] vicious." Act of May 10, 1878, §§ 1, 9, 1878 Ohio Laws 144.
2" These jurisdictions were Alabama, Colorado, Dakota Territory, Delaware, Missouri,
Nebraska, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Act of
Feb. 23, 1899, No. 817, § 6, 1899 Ala. Acts 158 (Reformatory and Industrial School: "by their
course of conduct or surroundings are likely to become base or criminal"); Act of Apr. 4,1887,
§ 7, 1887 Colo. Sess. Laws 279 (Industrial School for Girls: "habitually wandering about the
streets" beyond proper control of parents "at unseemly or improper hours"; "growing up in
habits of vice and immorality"); Act of Mar. 9, 1883, ch. 25, § 16, 1883 Dak. Terr. Laws 332
(Reform School: "habitually vagrant or disorderly, or incorrigible"); Act of Mar. 10, 1885, ch.
495, § 5, 1885 Del. Laws 713 ("incorrigible or vicious conduct," parent cannot control); Act
of Apr. 10, 1885, § 14, 1885 Mo. Laws 221 (reform schools to be established in counties with
cities having over 50,000 population: "vagrancy or any disorderly practices," deserting home
without good cause, keeping company with "dissolute or vicious persons contrary to the lawful
commands" of parents); Act of Mar. 31, 1887, ch. 74, § 5, 1887 Neb. Laws 589 (Industrial
School for Juvenile Offenders: "growing up in mendicancy and vagrancy"; "incorrigible");
Act of Feb. 20, 1893, § 16, 1893 Or. Laws 70 (Reform School: "incorrigible and vicious
conduct," beyond control of parent; "incorrigibly turbulent and immoral, vicious, or of extreme depravity"); Act of Mar. 26, 1891, ch. 195, § 1, 1891 Tenn. Pub. Acts 396 (Industrial
School for Orphan, Helpless, Wayward and Abandoned Children: "begging"; "wandering"
without home or means of support; frequents company of "lewd, wanton or lascivious persons" or "notorious resorts of bad character"; parents unable to control child); Act of Mar.
13, 1890, ch. 66, § 2, 1890 Utah Laws 97 (Reform School: "incorrigible or vicious conduct,"
beyond control of parent; "incorrigibly vicious"); Act of Mar. 7, 1891, ch. 103, § 1, 1891 Wash.
Laws 195 (Reform School: "growing up in mendicancy or vagrancy, or is incorrigible"); Act
of Feb. 11, 1889, ch. 3, § 6, 1889 W. Va. Acts 12 (Reform School: "incorrigible or vicious
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dictions that had already legislated on the subject, six created new
institutions empowered to receive incorrigible children.27 Furthermore, Connecticut once again provided that incorrigible children
could be committed to its reform school, 80 while Illinois authorized
private groups to form industrial schools for girls28 ' and training
schools for boys 2 that could receive wayward children. Finally,
thirteen states, in addition to the four principal states discussed
above, passed laws permitting incarceration of children on grounds
of truancy.m
All in all, by 1900 some thirty American jurisdictions provided for
institutionalization of children under some variation of the incorrigibility jurisdiction, and another twenty-one authorized confinement of school truants. Coercive state intervention in the lives of
predelinquent children was clearly a familiar part of the American
legal landscape by the time the juvenile court was invented.
conduct," beyond control of parent); Act of Mar. 15, 1870, ch. 66, § 10, 1870 Wis. Laws 119
(State Reform School: "incorrigible or vicious conduct," beyond control of parent).
2

Act of Mar. 8, 1888, ch. 57, § 2, 1888 Wyo. Seas. Laws 130.

211 These jurisdictions were California, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, and

Rhode Island. See Act of Mar. 11, 1889, ch. 108, § 20, 1889 Cal. Stats. 111 (School of Reform:
"incorrigible and vicious conduct," beyond control of parents); Act of Mar. 21, 1898, ch. 33,
§ 13, 1896 Ky. Acts 55 (Houses of Reform: "incorrigible and vicious conduct," not subject to
control of parent; "habitually disobeys" parent; "resorts to immoral places and practices");
Act of Feb. 11, 1879, ch. 87, § 1, 1879 Me. Acts 109 (Industrial School for Girls: "leading an
idle or vicious life," "manifest danger of falling into habits of vice or immorality"); Act of
May 3, 1882, ch. 291, § 7, 1882 Md. Laws 445 (Industrial Home for Colored Girls: "incorri.
gible or vicious conduct," beyond control of parents); Act of Apr. 4, 1871, ch. 428, § 15, 1871
N.J. Laws 78 (Industrial School for Girls: "vagrant, disorderly, or incorrigible"); Act of Apr.
16, 1880, ch. 817, 1880 R.I. Pub. Laws 126 (State Reform School: "idle, vicious or vagrant
habits," "vagrants or disorderly persons").
12 Act of Mar. 28, 1879, ch. 125, § 1, 1879 Conn. Pub. Acts 478 ("brought up to lead an
idle or vicious life"; "incorrigible, or habitually disregards the commands" of parent; "resorts
to immoral places or practices").
n' Act of May 28, 1879, § 3, 1879 Ill. Laws 309 ("begs," "a wanderer through streets,"
"frequents the company of... reputed thieves or other vicious persons"; "found in a house
of ill-fame").
I Act of June 18, 1883, § 3, 1883 Ill. Laws 168 (for jurisdiction, see note 281 supra).
These jurisdictions were Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
New Jersey, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Act
of Apr. 12, 1899, ch. 136, § 4, 1899 Colo. Sess. Laws 340; Act of Apr. 24, 1899, § 1, 1899 II.
Laws 346; Act of Mar. 8, 1897, ch. 165, § 8, 1897 Ind. Acts 248; Act of May 21, 1885, No.
108, § § 3-6, 1885 Mich. Laws 108; Act of Apr. 14, 1899, ch. 226, §§ 4.5, 1899 Minn. Laws 248;
MoNT. STAT. pt. 3, tit. 3, ch. 6, art. 14, § 1924 (1895); Act of Apr. 20, 1885, ch. 217, §§ 5-7,
1885 N.J. Laws 280; Act of Mar. 10, 1897, ch. 57, § 2, 1897 S. D. Sess. Laws 110; Act of Mar.
8, 1894, ch. 69, § 18, 1894 Utah Laws 101; Act of Nov. 20, 1894, No. 26, § 4, 1894 Vt. Acts 22;
Act of Nov. 23, 1870, No. 13, § 1, 1870 Vt. Acts 48; Act of Mar. 14, 1899, ch. 140, § 11, 1899
Wash. Laws 280; Act of Apr. 18, 1889, ch. 519, § 8, 1889 Wis. Laws 729; Act of Dec. 15, 1877,
§ 1, 1877 Wyo. Seas. Laws 115.
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B. Institutional Commitments, 1870-1900
Given the range of legislation passed to monitor the development
of children, it is not surprising that institutional commitment of
wayward youths continued at a high level through the last three
decades of the nineteenth century. The precise pattern varied with
the institution and the state, some places taking in much higher
proportions of status offenders than others. Truancy became a
major new source of commitment for certain institutions, but did
not figure prominently elsewhere. One also notes a perception dawning on a few institutional managers that parents were using wayward child laws to shift the burden of rearing children to the state,
and an occasional statement that unwanted and wayward children
did not deserve to be placed in the same institutions as criminal
offenders-institutions, some managers admitted, that were really
prisons. Such views remained the province of a small minority,
however. In this section we will examine data on commitments from
eight states, at approximately ten year intervals for comparison
purposes.
In the New York House of Refuge, the pre-1870 pattern of a rising
level of waywardness admissions continued. Indeed, whereas before
1876 the combined commitments for vagrancy, truancy, and being
a "disorderly child" at no time exceeded 50 percent of total commitments, between 1876 and 1900 the combined total for these three
status offenses was above 50 percent in all but five years.z"
Admissions for vagrancy and disorderliness accounted for 55 percent
of total new commitments in 1880, 52 percent in 1890, and 46 percent in 1900.2
Massachusetts continued its policy of incarcerating wayward children in its state reform school under the "stubbornness" rubric,
although these cases never constituted a majority of the school's
population. Stubbornness convictions represented 31 percent of
total admissions in 1880, 18 percent in 1893, and 30 percent in 1900.
Admissions for vagrancy brought status offenses in each of these
2" See SocMry FOR THE REFORMATION OF JuvElE DELmQuENTS, ANNUAL REPOR No. 54, at

23 app., table 5 (1878); SocrEr, FOR THE EFORMATION OF JuvEN1Z DmmquNT,

ANNUAL

RE'ORT No. 76, at 31, table 5 (1900). A "disorderly child" was one who deserted his or her
home without good cause, or kept company with dissolute or vicious persons against parental
command. Act of Mar. 22, 1865, ch. 172, § 5, 1865 N.Y. Laws 293.
SOCM FOR THE REFORMATION OF JuvEmLE DEmnQuEm, ANNUAL REoR No. 56, at 16
app. (1880); SOCMrT FOR THE REFORMATION OF JUVENnIE DELiNQUENTS, ANNUAL REPoar No. 66,
at 19 (1890); Socmry FOR THE REFORMAT7ON OF JuvEmLE DEu QuENTs, ANNUAL REPORT No. 76,
at 31 (1900).
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three years to 33 percent, 24 percent, and 32 percent, respectively."'s
Although in general there were fewer absolute commitments of
young women than of young men to reformatory institutions in the
nineteenth century, the number of convictions for waywardness was
often proportionately higher for women. At the Massachusetts State
Industrial School for Girls, for example, in 1880 stubbornness accounted for 57 percent of total commitments, and the combined
offenses of lewdness, vagrancy, and being idle and disorderly comprised another 27 percent. In 1890, stubbornness represented 59
percent of the total, and lewdness, vagrancy, and being idle and
disorderly, 14 percent. In 1900, stubbornness commitments were 66
percent of the total, with lewdness, vagrancy, truancy, and being
idle and disorderly accounting for 8 percent. In addition, the absolute number of commitments rose from thirty in 1880 to 101 in
1900.281
Connecticut, as we have seen, first permitted commitments to its
state reform school on grounds of stubbornness and then rescinded
that jurisdiction. In 1879, however, the legislature adopted a fullfledged incorrigibility jurisdiction permitting commitment of a boy
under 16 years of age who was
in danger of being brought up, or is brought up, to lead an idle
or vicious life . . . [or] who is incorrigible or habitually disregards the commands of his father or mother or guardian, who
leads a vagrant life, or resorts to immoral places or practices,
or neglects or refuses to perform labor suitable to his years and
condition, or to attend school.m
In 1881, those sentenced for incorrigibility represented 37 percent of
total admissions, with school truants adding another 15 percent. For
the twelve month reporting period 1890-1891, the figure for incorrigibility was 43 percent and for truancy, 3 percent. By 1900, incorrigibility commitments had risen to 47 percent of the total, and truancy
accounted for 12 percent.2ss
2u Second Annual Report of the Massachusetts Primary and Reform Schools 86 (1880);
Fifteenth Annual Report of the Massachusetts Primary and Reform Schools 70 (1893); Sixth
Annual Report of the Lyman and Industrial Schools 45 (1900). (In 1885, the state reform
school for boys was reorganized on the cottage plan and renamed the Lyman School for Boys;
between 1882 and 1893 the trustees published no statistics on causes of commitment for boys.)
20 Second Annual Report of the Massachusetts Primary and Reform Schools 138 (1880);
Twelfth Annual Report of the Massachusetts Primary and Reform Schools 95 (1890); Sixth
Annual Report of the Lyman and Industrial Schools 108 (1900).
Act of Mar. 28, 1879, ch. 125, § 1, 1879 Conn. Pub. Acts 478.
Thirtieth Annual Report of the Connecticut State Reform School 21-22 (1882); Fortieth
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The Pennsylvania Reform School (formerly the House of Refuge
for Western Pennsylvania) continued to admit more children for
incorrigibility than any other facility in the late nineteenth century.
In the two years 1881-1882, admissions for incorrigibility, "vicious
conduct," and vagrancy accounted for 85 percent of total commitments. These three offenses represented 90 percent of total admissions in 1895-1896 and 91 percent in 1901-1902.?2 The Pennsylvania Reform School thus remained an institution specializing in

the discipline of wayward children, virtually to the exclusion of
criminal offenders.
The Baltimore House of Refuge also pursued its pre-1870 practice
of committing large numbers of children for incorrigibility, vicious
conduct, and vagrancy. Commitments for these three offenses represented 85 percent of total admissions in 1878, 85 percent in 1889,
and 77 percent in 1900.21
The Ohio Reform Farm School's population also was becoming
dominated by incorrigibility commitments before the state legislature eliminated that category from its jurisdiction in 1881. In 1874,
boys admitted for incorrigibility represented 32 percent of total
admissions, while in 1878, commitments for incorrigibility comprised 50 percent of new admissions. By 1880, the last full year of
incorrigibility admissions before the legislative ban, commitments
for incorrigibility amounted to 77 percent of total admissions. 2
Annual Report of the Connecticut State Reform School 16 (1891); Annual Report of the
Connecticut School for Boys 22 (1900).
19 Biennial Report of the Pennsylvania Reform School 26 (1882); Biennial Report of the
Pennsylvania Reform School 25 (1896); Biennial Report of the Pennsylvania Reform School
28 (1902). (The name of the school was changed to the Pennsylvania Reform School in 1872.
Between 1882 and 1895 the school's reports provide no data on causes of commitment.)
Vagrancy commitments represented only 1% of the total in 1895-1896 and less than 1,% in
1901-1902.
The years 1901-1902 represented a high-water mark for incorrigibility commitments. In
1903-1904, the figure for incorrigibility and vicious conduct was down to 64% (268 of 419 total
admissions), and in 1907-1908, 41% (169 of 411 total admissions). A new category,
"delinquency," accounted for 7% (28 of 419 cases) in the former biennium, and 22% (92 of
411 cases) in the latter. Biennial Report of the Pennsylvania Reform School 26 (1904);
Biennial Report of the Pennsylvania Reform School 29 (1908). The Pennsylvania Juvenile
Court Act of 1903 created the category of "delinquency," which included both incorrigible
children and criminal law violators. Act of Apr. 23, 1903, No. 205, § 1, 1903 Pa. Lav, 274. It
is not possible to say what portion of those committed for delinquency after 1903 were committed for general misbehavior or for specific offenses.
" Twenty-eighth Annual Report of the Baltimore House of Refuge 16 (1879); Thirty-ninth
Annual Report of the Baltimore House of Refuge 17 (1890); Fiftieth Annual Report of the
Baltimore House of Refuge 14 (1901).
232 Nineteenth Annual Report of the Ohio Reform School, reprinted in ExEctrrng
Documm (1874), supra note 156, at 403; Twenty-third Annual Report of the Ohio Reform
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For some time after 1881 the Ohio Reform Farm School received
only those committed for criminal offenses, plus an occasional vagrant. The school also obtained authority to receive "juvenile disorderly" children, a term of art for school truants and chronic nonattenders. Surprisingly, by the turn of the century judges were again
committing boys to the school (now called the Ohio Boys' Industrial
School) on grounds of incorrigibility despite the absence of statutory authority. In 1900, 32 boys were committed to the school for
incorrigibility, 6 percent of total admissions.293 Judges may have
been utilizing the incorrigibility label as a way of prodding the
legislature to act, for the superintendent of the industrial school
reported in 1900 that most state judges "clamor for the restoration
to our courts of the power to send incorrigibles to the institution,
and thus safeguard society against bad boys who are unquestionably
destined to lives of criminality, and whose criminal operations-even though anticipated-cannot be prevented by police officers."294
Of course Ohio did not dispense completely with incarcerating
wayward children during this period, since local institutions, such
as the Cleveland and Cincinnati Houses of Refuge, could still receive them. In 1880, incorrigibility commitments accounted for 50
percent of new admissions to the Cleveland institution; the comparable figure for 1889-1890 (a sixteen-month period) was 45 percent."'6
Incorrigibility commitments figured less prominently in the profile
of the Cincinnati House of Refuge before 1900, but sizeable numbers
were incarcerated for the offense nonetheless. Incorrigible children
accounted for 4 percent of admissions in 1881, 23 percent in 1885,
and 32 percent in 1890; in absolute terms, while only 12 children
were incarcerated for incorrigibility in 1881, the number rose to 66
96
in 1885 and 92 in 1890.2
School, reprintedin EXECurTvE DocuMENTs (1878), supra note 156, at 737; Twenty-fifth An.
nual Report of the Ohio Reform School, reprintedin ExzcunvE DOCUMENTS (1880), supra note
156, at 498.
Forty-fifth Annual Report of the Ohio Boys' Industrial School 16-17 (1900).
n4 Id. at 11-12.
2 Tenth Annual Report of the Cleveland Workhouse and House of Refuge 50 (1880);
Report of the Workhouse 84 (1890). (The institution was closed in 1891.)
"I Thirty-first Annual Report of the Cincinnati House of Refuge 25 (1881); Thirty-fifth
Annual Report of the Cincinnati House of Refuge 21-22 (1885); Fortieth Annual Report of the
Cincinnati House of Refuge 21 (1890).
The Cincinnati refuge also admitted a large category of children characterized as
"homeless" or "without suitable homes"-32% of admissions in 1881, 31% in 1885, and 27%
in 1890. It is difficult to know if these children represented the same vagrant children who
would have been admitted to houses of refuge elsewhere, or merely neglected and destitute
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Two other midwestern states, Indiana and Michigan, also vigorously enforced laws against status offenders. At the Indiana House
of Refuge, commitments for incorrigibility accounted for 29 percent
of new admissions in 1879, 56 percent in 1890, and 49 percent in
1901.27 The Michigan Reform School originally admitted only criminal violators, but in the early 1880's it began to accept children
committed for truancy. In 1885-1886, 25 percent of new commitments were for truancy, a figure that rose to 37 percent in 1890-1891,
and 42 percent in 1900-1901.21s
Michigan also used its status offense laws against young women.
Most were committed to the State Industrial Home for Girls on
"disorderly conduct" charges but a variety of special categories for
children were employed as well. In 1892, for example, while disorderly conduct commitments accounted for 34 percent of new admissions, children committed for being "wayward and unmanageable"
comprised 8 percent, and for truancy, 19 percent. In the two-year
period 1898-1900, disorderly conduct commitments represented 35
percent of new admissions, "wayward and unmanageable," 5 percent, and truancy, 16 percent. In this latter period there were also
eleven commitments for such miscellaneous waywardness offenses
as "frequenting saloons" and "lounging on streets."
In the last third of the nineteenth century some individuals began
children, who generally were not placed in houses of refuge. (But ef. remarks of the superintendent of the Western Pennsylvania House of Refuge, at text accompanying notes 181-84
supra, indicating that that institution's waywardness commitments masked cases of neglect
or destitution.)
After 1900, incorrigibility apparently was used less as a ground for commitment to this
institution. In 1904, only 6% (26 of 422 total admissions) were committed on this ground, and
in 1910, none. Fifty-fourth Annual Report of the Cincinnati House of Refuge 11 (1904);
Sixtieth Annual Report of the Cincinnati House of Refuge 14 (1910). In the latter year,
however, 52% were committed as "delinquents" (130 of 250 total cases), the new catch-all
category for incorrigibles and criminal offenders.
Thirteenth Annual Report of the Indiana House of Refuge 25 (1879); Twenty-fourth
Annual Report of the Indiana Reform School for Boys 37-38 (1890); Thirty.fifth Annual
Report of the Indiana Reform School for Boys 31-32 (1901).
21 Biennial Report of the Michigan Reform School 21 (1886); Biennial Report of the Michigan Reform School 234 (1892); Biennial Report of the Michigan Industrial School for Boys

18 (1902).
In 1885 Michigan provided for compulsory reformatory education of "juvenile disorderly
persons." Included in that category were: (1) habitual truants from school; (2) children who,
while attending school, were "incorrigibly turbulent, disobedient, or insubordinate," or were
"vicious or immoral in conduct"; and (3) children not attending any school who habitually
frequented the streets and had no lawful employment. Act of May 21, 1855, No. 108, § 3, 1885
Mich. Pub. Acts 108.
- Seventh Biennial Report of the Michigan State Industrial Home for Girls 15 (1892);
Eleventh Biennial Report of the Michigan Industrial Home for Girls 48 (1900).
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to express doubts that wayward children ought to be committed to
institutions, or at least that they ought to be committed to the same
institutions as minors found guilty of crimes. We have already observed that after 1850 some child-savers thought children should be
placed in families rather than institutions. As the century wore on,
officials connected with the juvenile justice system occasionally observed that vague statutory definitions of waywardness could lead
to abuses at the hands of parents, police, and prosecutors. In Massachusetts, where the office of the Visiting Agent was created in 1869
to represent children at court hearings and to find suitable family
placements for them, that officer observed in his first annual report:
"The charge of 'stubbornness' is made to include disobedience,
truancy and little offences generally. Since the punishment for these
has been made easy to the parents by commitment of the children
to Reformatories, the parental duty of correction is too frequently
and readily transferred to the state."3 0°
Occasionally, refuge managers themselves commented on the injustices to which the wayward child jurisdiction could lead. The
superintendent of the Connecticut School for Boys noted in 1899:
A marked disregard for the letter and spirit of the Statutes
regulating commitments to the School for Boys is sometimes
apparent. To commit a boy to the School as incorrigible for a
frivolous cause, like hiding behind a door to avoid going to
school
ber. .

is to do that boy an injustice he will long remem.The motive in such cases is usually the unworthy one

. . .
.

of throwing the care and support of the boy upon the State. " '
The directors of the Cleveland House of Refuge, observing in 1883
that their population had increased dramatically over the previous
year and now included many very young children, commented:
This increase is largely due to our courts committing to the
House of Refuge children for no other cause than running away
from school or home. This condition of things should not exist,
and instead of the courts committing this class of children to
ANNuAL REPORT OF T
STATE VISITING AGENT, reported in MASSACHUSErrS BOARD OF
STATE CHARrriEs, ANNUAL REPORT No. 6, at 175 (1869). The Visiting Agent pursued this theme

the following year: "The charge of stubbornness can be easily sustained against almost any
child; therefore under it usually appear the cases in which the blame attaches to the parents
rather than the child, and those in which an ulterior purpose prompts complaint and not the
avowed one-the child's good." ANNUAL REPORT OF THE STATE VisiTo AGENT, reported in
MASSACHUSrrs BOARD OF STATE CHARrIEs, ANNUAL REPORT No. 7, at 276 (1870).
"I Annual Report of the Connecticut School for Boys 13 (1899).
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the House of Refuge, they should compel their parents to take
these children home and give them better care.wA strong protest against abuse of incorrigibility laws came in 1890
from the directors of the Indiana Reform School for Boys, an institution which by then had a population composed over half of children
committed for incorrigibility. The directors did not believe that
wayward youths should be committed to the reform school at all and
recommended to the legislature that they be excluded. They were
frank in referring to the school as a "criminal institution"' and
noted that the state constitution had originally intended it to be
used for the "correction and reformation of juvenile offenders."'
They disputed the wisdom of subsequent legislation that provided
for commitment of incorrigible children, particularly a law of 1879
that allowed depravity of a parent or drunkenness of a father to be
included in charges against a boy. This law, they argued, "left the
doors open for many unfortunate boys to be punished for the sins
of the parent."' 5 Under its loose provisions, many boys had been
committed by poor, drunken, or "inhuman" parents, "who had
them committed to get them out of the way."3
Even when that law was changed to permit a boy to be committed
only because of his own incorrigible or vicious conduct, it was defective, for "there might be as many different judicial interpretations
of [incorrigibility] as there are circuit judges in the State," -a
point the O'Connell court had made in Illinois twenty years before.
Unlike refuge managers in most institutions, the Indiana directors
in 1890 considered incorrigible children more innocent than criminal law violators and thought the former would only be stigmatized
and corrupted by associating with the latter in the same school.
Although the institution was operated on the cottage plan, which
provided an opportunity to separate "good" from "bad" boys for
residential purposes, they thought it impossible to prevent the boys
from getting to know each other and resuming their friendships once
Thirteenth Annual Report of the Cleveland Workhouse and House of Refuge 10 (1883).
Twenty-fourth Annual Report of the Indiana Reform School for Boys 11 (1890).
Id. at 9.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 13. In recommending to the legislature that incorrigible children no longer be sent
to the reform school, the directors concluded with a startling libertarian flourish: "Better that
ninety-nine incorrigible boys should be left to take the chances of their becoming better boys
in the communities in which they live than that one innocent and helpless boy should in after
life have the bitter memory that he was unjustly sent to the Reform School." Id. at 14.
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discharged. While the directors did not argue that incorrigible children should never be institutionalized, their remarks on the vagueness and abuses of the incorrigibility law pointed in that direction.
The views expressed above, like those of the O'Connell court, were
maverick. The Indiana legislature did not abolish the reform
school's incorrigibility jurisdiction, and that institution continued
to receive incorrigible children into the twentieth century."° More
typical were the views of the trustees of the Ohio Industrial School
for Boys, where the incorrigibility jurisdiction had been abolished
in 1881. Noting that guardians and parents subsequently had children arrested and committed for trivial offenses-even encouraging
some to commit theft-to be rid of their care, the trustees called for
the restoration of the incorrigibility law in order that the criminal
law not be used as a subterfuge to reach noncriminal children who
needed to be saved.3 ° Despite occasional misgivings, as the twentieth century approached, most legislators and institutional managers still believed that incarceration and reformation of wayward
children were necessary to protect society from the "dangerous
classes."
C.

Wayward Child Laws in the Courts, 1871-1905
Where legislators and institutional officials led, courts willingly
followed. No state supreme court after Illinois in O'Connell v.
Turner struck down a wayward child law in the period we are studying.310 Indeed, comparatively few appeals were brought challenging

" See, e.g., Fifty-first Annual Report of the Indiana Boys' School 45 (1917). In 1917, 34%
of admissions (100 of 290) were for incorrigibility, as, against 66% (190 of 290) for "felony."
The superintendent of the school still felt the incorrigibility jurisdiction was being abused:
The tendency each year seems to be smaller boys committed here. It seems to us that
boys are sent here too young. Eight, nine and ten year old boys should not be given
up as incorrigible and committed here if parents and courts would exercise proper
supervision. At these tender ages we are of the opinion it is more a desire of parents to
be relieved from responsibility of proper bringing up of the boys, and that courts should
be more rigid in the cause of commitment. . . . We have reason to feel that boys have
been sent to us more because of broken home ties than misdemeanors. This should not
be.
Id. at 15.
Thirty-first Annual Report of the Ohio Boys' Industrial School 19 (1886); Thirty-third
Annual Report of the Ohio Boys' Industrial School 21 (1888). The trustees agreed that boys
should not be admitted, whether as misdemeanants or incorrigibles, simply because their
parents wanted to avoid the responsibility of rearing them. Thirty-first Annual Report of the
Ohio Boys' Industrial School 19 (1886).
3'1Indeed, no state supreme court has yet done so. Where constitutional challenges have
been mounted against status offense laws in recent years they have been turned back with
virtual unanimity by the courts. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550, 270
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commitments for waywardness. Most of the reported cases involved
very young children taken from their parents on grounds of neglect
or destitution.311 Since the line between neglect and waywardness
was so uncertain, however, courts used the same arguments to justify state intervention in both kinds of cases, freely citing cases
upholding commitments by reason of parental unfitness to support
commitment of wayward children, and vice-versa. In both situations, the courts assumed the state had power as parens patriae to
take control of children whose behavior, or whose parents' behavior,
was inadequate to prepare them for roles as good citizens.
The reaction to O'Connell was not long in coming. A Wisconsin
court disapproved of its language in dictum, in the 1876 case of
Milwaukee IndustrialSchool v. Supervisorsof Milwaukee County.3 2

That case upheld the power of a municipal court to transfer to the
Milwaukee Industrial School children who were inmates of a poor
house. The relevant statute authorized the school to receive inmates
of poor houses, and begging, vagrant, and orphaned children. The
statute also allowed commitment of children who "frequent[ed]
the company of reputed thieves, or of lewd, wanton or lascivious
persons in speech or behavior, or notorious resorts of bad characters, 313 thus introducing a waywardness element. The court said
that it was only concerned with the provision permitting commitment of inmates of poor houses; other grounds of commitment were
N.E.2d 389 (1971); A. v. City of New York, 21 N.Y.2d 83, 286 N.E.2d 432, 335 N.Y.S.2d 33
(1972); In re Napier, 532 P.2d 423 (Okla. 1975); E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 956 (1970); Blondheim v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 874, 529 P.2d
1096 (1975). But cf. In re Doe, 54 Hawaii 647, 513 P.2d 1385 (1973) (curfew ordinance uncon.
stitutional due to vagueness of term "loitering").
Two lower court decisions striking down incorrigibility statutes on vagueness grounds have
not withstood appeals. See Gonzalez v. Mailliard, No. 50424 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 1971) (three-

judge court) (invalidating statute extending juvenile court jurisdiction over children "who
from any cause.. . fare] in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd or immoral life"),
vacated and remanded mem., 416 U.S. 918 (1974) (vacating and remanding for reconsidera-

tion of lower court's grant of injunctive relief; no discussion of constitutional issues); In re
Brinkley, No. J 1365-73 (D.C. Super. Ct., June 14, 1973) (striking down District of Columbia
statute directed at "habitually disobedient" and "ungovernable" children), reV'd sub nom.
District of Columbia v. B.J.R., 332 A.2d 58 (D.C. App. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016
(1975). Cf. Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (three-judge court), affd
mem., 406 U.S. 913 (1972) (invalidating New York's "Wayward Minor" statute authorizing
court jurisdiction over minors ages 16 through 21 who are "morally depraved or. . .in danger
of becoming morally depraved"; stresses penal character of statute).
3" See cases cited in Areen, supra note 222, at 900-09, and Rendleman, supra note 79, at
230-33, 241-47.
3" 40 Wis. 328 (1876).
3,3
Act of Mar. 17, 1875, ch. 325, § 5, 1875 Wis. Laws 632.
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independent and might stand or fall on their own. 4 O'Connell was
held not to be applicable because it dealt with the question of
"compulsory education" and with a statute involving "some nice
' unlike
fault-finding with the course of the parent with the child,"315
the total failure of parental support here.
Nevertheless, the court felt compelled to observe that "there is
much said in the [O'Connell] opinion inconsistent with some of the
views which we have expressed, to which we could not assent
....
"311 The notion that commitment to the industrial school
could be considered imprisonment (probably argued by counsel on
the strength of O'Connell) was flatly rejected. The state, as parens
patriae, had power to assume parental authority over children in
circumstances of misfortune; such parental authority "implie[d]
restraint, not imprisonment." In language that would frequently be
quoted by courts sustaining commitments to reformatory institutions on grounds of destitution, neglect, vagrancy, or waywardness,
the court added: "And, in exercising a wholesome parental restraint
over the child, it can be properly said to imprison the child, no more
than the tenderest parents exercising like power of restraint over
317
children."

Given the long history of state placement of children in poorhouses when parents were unable to support them, it was perhaps
not difficult to sanction their removal to a special institution for
children that was perceived as being milder than adult poorhouses. 3 1 No one disputed that the state owed a duty of support to

children who were completely destitute, and since outdoor relief"
of the poor had long been discredited the only real question was
what kind of institutional placement was appropriate. Institutionalization of predelinquent children was a different matter, however,
and the question still remained whether the state had the right,
much less the duty, to intervene at all in the lives of those who
"140 Wis. at 335.
311Id. at 338, 340.
"I Id. at 340.
' Id. at 338.
Indeed, in 1876 Wisconsin required poor law authorities to place pauper children in
families, orphan asylums, or other appropriate institutions, rather than in poor houses. Act
of Mar. 18, 1876, ch. 142, § 1, 1876 Wis. Laws 409.
3,1 The term "outdoor relief" referred to the poor law practice of aiding those in need of
public assistance in their own homes, through financial subsidies or donations in kind, or by

apprenticeship in the case of children. The practice was contrasted with "indoor relief,"
which referred to aiding the poor within institutions, i.e., almshouses. See, in addition to
sources cited in note 50 supra, J. L.my, CHAnrrY AND CORRECION iN N.w JEns.Y, ch. 1 (1967).
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misbehaved short of criminal misconduct. Some courts were willing
to admit that waywardness proceedings were "quasi-criminal" in
nature, 320 thus raising the possibility that incarceration of predelinquents, unlike paupers, could be considered imprisonment without
due process of law. Despite these differences, the Milwaukee Industrial School case became one of the precedents frequently cited
to justify state parens patriae power over any "misfortune" case,
including wayward children.32 '
Milwaukee Industrial School indicated that the doctrine of
O'Connell faced an uncertain future. The Illinois Supreme Court
itself virtually repudiated O'Connell in the 1882 case of In re
Ferrier.32 Ferrierarose under an 1879 "Act to aid industrial schools
for girls," 3 2 by which the state once again devolved power to accept
neglected, vagrant, and wayward children on reformatory institutions, limited now to private schools. Avoiding some of the vaguer
grounds of commitment that the O'Connell court had found repugnant in the Chicago Reform School legislation (the phrase "growing
up in. . . ignorance, idleness, and vice" was excised, for instance),
the new statute provided for incarcerating girls deemed
"dependent," including
[e]very female infant who begs or receives alms while actually
selling or pretending to sell any article in public, or who frequents any street, alley or other place for the purpose of begging or receiving alms, or who, having no permanent place of
abode, proper parental care or guardianship, or sufficient
means of subsistence, or who for other cause is a wanderer
through streets and alleys, and in other public places, or who
lives with or frequents the company of, or consorts with, reputed thieves or other vicious persons, or who is found in a
house of ill-fame, or in a poor house.2
This law, similar to the Wisconsin law involved in Milwaukee
Industrial School, thus included elements of begging, vagrancy,
See, e.g., Van Riper v. New York Catholic Protectory, 106 N.Y. 604, 610, 13 N.E. 435.
437 (1887); In re Knowack, 158 N.Y. 482, 487, 53 N.E. 676, 677 (1899).
"' See, e.g., Olson v. Brown, 50 Minn. 353, 358, 52 N.W. 935, 936 (1892).
103 Ill. 367 (1882). The Ferriercourt attempted to distinguish O'Connell, but other
jurisdictions regarded that case as having been overruled. See, e.g., Wisconsin Indus. School
for Girls v. Clark County, 103 Wis. 651, 664, 79 N.W. 422, 426 (1899) ('rhat case [O'Connell
v. Turner] was in effect overruled by later cases and is not now considered as authority.
Petition of Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367 . . .).
Act of May 28, 1879, 1879 Ill. Laws 309.
= Id. § 3.

HeinOnline -- 13 Ga. L. Rev. 421 1978-1979

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:341

waywardness ("frequents the company of. . .reputed thieves or
other vicious persons"), and perhaps moral neglect ("found in a
house of ill-fame").
The child, a girl of nine years, was brought before the court on a
petition that made out a case of waywardness: she had frequently
been picked up by the police while wandering the streets at night,
she was a truant from school, and was "in imminent danger of ruin
and harm." Witness testimony added that she lied and stole, ran
away from home, was beyond the control of her invalid step-father,
and kept bad company. Her mother was "weak-minded, and at
times insane," and had even tried to hang the girl once, but the
case did not turn on child abuse.32 A jury found the child "dependent" and she was committed to the Industrial School for Girls of
Cook County. The girl appealed, claiming that she had been deprived of liberty without due process of law.
The court dealt with this argument in three ways. First, it distinguished O'Connell by noting that the new statute provided much
greater procedural due process than that permitting commitment to
the Chicago Reform School. Whereas under the earlier law the judge
decided all issues of fact, the industrial school act provided for a
jury of six. In addition, notice to the parent or guardian was required, defense counsel was permitted, and a showing of parental
unfitness was necessary for conviction."'
The court also distinguished the schools in question. The Chicago
Reform School had been regarded as "a place of confinement, and
for punishment, and the commitment to it was regarded as imprisonment." 3 1 Unlike the new Industrial School for Girls, the Chicago
Reform School had accepted children who committed criminal offenses (a fact, it should be noted, which had not led the Crouse court
to declare the Philadelphia House of Refuge a prison!). The industrial school was different: exercising that magical power of definition which eliminated any need for informed investigation, the
court declared:
This institution is not a prison, but it is a school, and the
sending of a young female child to be taken care of, who is
uncared for. . . we do not regard imprisonment. We perceive
hardly any more restraint of liberty than is found in any well
regulated school. Such a degree of restraint is essential in the
32 103 Ill.
at 368.
Id. at 371.
2Id.
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proper education of a child, and it is in no just sense an infringement of the inherent and inalienable right to personal
liberty so much dwelt upon in the argument."'s
O'Connell thus was distinguished simply on the ground that the
industrial school was somehow less restrictive than the defunct reform school, although the court presented no facts about either
institution that might have justified that conclusion.
The third, and principal, ground of decision in Ferriereffectively
undercut O'Connell. The broad rationale of the opinion was that it
was not unconstitutional for the state to incarcerate a wayward
child, or a child suffering only from "misfortune," as the O'Connell
court had put it. The court rehearsed the by-now familiar litany
that the county court had inherited the power of English chancery
a parent of custody of a child if the parent was
courts to deprive
"grossly unfit"312 and had failed to take care of the child properly
or provide him or her with a proper education. Assuming that the
state's right to control children was superior to the parents', the
court said that while parents were usually permitted to exercise this
right, the state could withdraw it if parents proved unsuitable. The
court interpreted the industrial school statute as requiring a finding
that the parent was "not a fit person" to have custody,M which
might seem to indicate its approval of state intervention only in
neglect cases. In the factual context of this case, however, it seems
clear that the court assumed that the child's own wayward conduct
could establish that the parents' care had been inadequate. Thus,
while'Ferriercan be read narrowly as supporting the parenspatriae
power of the state only in parental neglect cases, the court's ready
acceptance of the notion that a child's conduct evidenced parental
failure indicates that the court meant to approve the exercise of
state power over wayward children as well. As was so often the case
in the nineteenth century, the court simply did not see a legally
relevant difference between wayward and neglected children.
The court's repudiation of O'Connell is made even clearer by its
severe qualification, if not rejection, of the doctrine that a child had
a right to liberty:
The right to liberty which is guaranteed is not that of entire
unrestrainedness of action. . . .There are restrictions imposed
Id.
" Id. at 372.
='Id.
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upon personal liberty which spring from the helpless or dependent condition of individuals in the various relations of life,
among them being those of parent and child, guardian and
ward, teacher and scholar. . . These are legal and just restraints upon personal liberty which the welfare of society demands, and which, where there is no abuse, entirely consist
with the constitutional guaranty of liberty.33 '
A child's liberty, therefore, did not extend to being free of the restraints of the educational process. As long as courts continued to
accept the child-savers' argument that reformatories were
"schools," they would continue to hold that the restraint of liberty
involved was no more than that required by any school and therefore
constitutional. The Ferrier court, like the Crouse court before it,
failed to distinguish compulsory education in the public schools,
which operated equally on all children, did not involve total isolation in institutions or transfer of parental custody to the school, and
provided a minimal level of intellectual competence to all children,
from incarceration in a reformatory, which depended on a court's
subjective evaluation of children's deviant conduct, cut children off
from parents and friends, and subjected them to a stultifying rou2
tine and harsh discipline.11
The Ferriercourt missed an opportunity to fashion a doctrine that
would have been fairer to children and parents while supporting a
limited right of state intervention in family autonomy. It could have
found that the state possessed authority to protect the health and
safety of children from parents who physically abused them or failed
to provide them with basic necessities of life, while denying the state
the right to supervise the moral upbringing of children.33 By allow"'

Id. at 372-73.

32

See text accompanying notes 303-07 supra. See also 2 CHLDREN AND YOUTH, supra note

17, at 460-64, 469-71; R. MENNELL, supra note 28, at 102-13; S. SCHLOSSMAN, supra note 13,
at 110-11, 118-23, 129-30. The Illinois court reiterated its views later the same year:
It would be difficult to conceive of a class of persons that more imperatively demands
the interposition of the state in their behalf than those we have just enumerated [in
the industrial school act], and for whose benefit the act under consideration was
adopted, and it would be a sad commentary on our State government, if it is true, as
is contended, there is no constitutional power in the legislature to provide, by suitable
legislation, for their education, control and protection.
County of McLean v. Humphreys, 104 Ill. 378, 383 (1882).
u3 For contemporary analyses of this position, see IJA-ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDAIRDS
PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT (Tent. Draft 1977); STANDARDS RELATING

supra note 3; Areen, supra note 222, at 920-37; Wald, State
Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children:A Search for Realistic Standards,27 STAN.
TO NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR,

L. REV. 985 (1975).
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ing the state to exercise the role of moral censor, the court rejected
the doctrine that in a pluralistic society parents should be free to
bring up children and children free to act in different ways, and
imposed instead the subjective views of judges and reform school
managers. Granting the state that power also meant accepting the
shibboleth that reformatory institutions exercised discipline no
harsher than "the tenderest parents exercising like power of restraint over children."' Individual parents might sometimes treat
their children harshly, but in an institution children were part of a
faceless mass, their conduct regulated to meet the needs of institutional efficiency. The notion that the state could and should replace the natural parents must be understood as the reflex of a
society that felt profoundly threatened by youthful deviance; the
argument that a large institution could step into the shoes of a
parent and provide the attention and love a child needed to mature
was hollow and cruel.
In the wake of Ferrier,several courts upheld wayward child and
neglect statutes against arguments that they infringed on liberty
and imprisoned youths without due process of law. Only a few need
be discussed here, since these decisions produced little fresh analysis of the parenspatriae power.
Two years after Ferrier,the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors
upheld an incorrigibility statute in Reynolds v. Howe. The statute
in question permitted justices of the peace to commit to the reform
school boys under sixteen years of age who were "in danger of being
brought up, or [were] brought up, to lead an idle or vicious life." '
Counsel put forward a variety of arguments: the term "vicious" was
too vague to pass constitutional muster; "idle" meant unemployed,
and no parent could compel a child under sixteen years of age to
labor; the statute provided no chance for the parent to be heard, and
a father could only lose custody after a finding of parental misconduct; the statute required no hearing for the minor, constitutionally
required since the youth was being prosecuted as a criminal; and
justices of the peace had no power to sentence a minor to imprisonment.37
Without citing authority, the court rejected the notion that the
proceeding in question was criminal or the reform school a prison.
Since the proceeding was not criminal, no formal hearing was neces=' Milwaukee Indus. School v. Supervisors of Milwaukee County, 40 Wis. 328, 338 (1876).
51 Conn. 472 (1884).

Id. at 476.
Id. at 475.
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sary; since confinement in a reform school did not constitute imprisonment, delegation of authority to commit to justices of the peace
did not violate the constitution. 8 Nor could the boy's father complain that he had lost custody of his son without a finding of parental unfitness or the right to be heard. He had a duty, opined the
court, to rear his children to be industrious and virtuous, and if he
"[brought] them up to vice" instead, he had no cause to complain.3 39 While the court did not impose on the statute a requirement
that parental unfitness be found in waywardness cases, it clearly felt
that the boy's vicious conduct proved that unworthiness in any case.
The court took little notice of counsel's definition of "idleness" or
his complaint about the vagueness of "viciousness." For the Connecticut court, these were palpable concepts that needed no specification. Idleness and intemperance were responsible for filling
almshouses and jails with paupers and criminals, a "worthless class
of humanity." The government had a duty to save future citizens
from "ignorance and lawlessness and crime.."340 The court simply
was not troubled by the doubts that had troubled the O'Connell
court: like their Puritan forebears, the judges knew idleness when
they saw it, and they knew its evil consequences. The court needed
no elaborate rationale to support incarcerating idle and vicious
youths, and it never even mentioned parens patriae.The only justification needed was "the social necessity of saving boys from impending ruin and the community from the prevalence of crime."'4
Finally, like almost all courts of the period, the Connecticut court
saw no difference between the wayward child law and other laws by
which society managed the affairs of dependent individuals-compulsory education, apprenticeship of minors, appointment
of conservators of the estates of incompetents, and the confinement
of insane persons.32 Rather than viewing incorrigibility laws as
quasi-criminal in nature, as did the New York court, the Connecticut court saw them merely as part of the state's educational system,
and thus as requiring neither precise substantive standards nor procedural niceties.
Courts in Minnesota 4 3 and Indiana 311 also sustained wayward

24

Id. at 477-78.
Id. at 478.
Id. at 477.

3' Id.
u24Id.

33 Olson v. Brown, 50 Minn. 353, 52 N.W. 935 (1892).
"

Jarrard v. State, 116 Ind. 98, 17 N.E. 912 (1888).
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child laws. The Minnesota court upheld a statute prescribing
"incorrigibility and vicious conduct" as grounds for commitment to
the state reform school. Against the claim that the statute was
unconstitutional because it authorized a justice of the peace to imprison a criminal for over three months, the court said simply that
incarceration in the school was neither punishment nor imprisonment. While acknowledging the O'Connell court's views, it stressed
that almost all northern states had adopted, and many courts had
sustained, incorrigibility statutes; the court was content to cite the
relevant cases and quote at length from the Wisconsin court's
Milwaukee IndustrialSchool opinion.3 5 The Indiana court was even
more succinct. Upholding the commitment of a boy for being vicious
and beyond the control of his guardian, and for associating with
"immoral- drunken, and dissolute persons," the court held it was
"settled" that the legislature could commit to a reformatory "boys
who are entering upon a career of wickedness" when their parents
could not prevent them from becoming "evil member[s] of society."3 "
Affirmance of wayward child laws on some more or less explicit
version of the parens patriae doctrine thus became routine. A few
courts, while unwilling to upset the laws, did demonstrate concern
over possible abuse by construing them narrowly. The highest court
of New York was faced with a habeas corpus action brought by a
girl of fourteen, who had been committed by a police justice to the
New York Catholic Protectory in part on a charge that she was
"improperly exposed and neglected, and wandering in the public
park... without any proper guardianship...

."-41

The only sec-

tion of the Penal Code that was relevant, said the court, involved a
minor "not having any home or other place of abode or proper
guardianship, or who has been abandoned or improperly exposed or
neglected by its parents .

.

. ,"3" The court read this section as

requiring an allegation that the child had been abandoned and neglected by the fault of her parents or custodians, which had not been
made here:
30 50 Minn. at 358, 52 N.W. at 936 (citing Milwaukee Indus. School v. Supervisors of
Milwaukee County, 40 Wis. 328 (1876)).
31 116 Ind. at 99-100, 17 N.E. at 913. For other cases upholding laws authorizing commitment of children to reformatory institutions for incorrigibility, see Pugh v. Bowden, 54 Fla.
302,45 So. 499 (1907); Dinson v. Drosta, 39 Ind. App. 432,80 N.E. 32 (1907); Scott v. Flowers,
60 Neb. 675, 84 N.W. 81 (1900); In re Mason, 3 Wash. 609, 28 P. 1025 (1892) (dictum).
- Van Riper v. New York Catholic Protectory, 106 N.Y. 604, 13 N.E. 435 (1887).
Id. at 609, 13 N.E. at 436.
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The information in these cases of summary conviction ought to
be precise, and show a case clearly within the statute. . . .It
is not consistent with the proper security of personal liberty to
indulge, in cases of summary convictions, in latitude or liberality of intendment to support the proceedings. They are conducted contrary to the course of the common law, without the
intervention of a jury, usually before magistrates of limited
experience, and are often attended with the gravest consequences." 9
Thus a conviction obtained on the basis of the charge in question
have to be overturned.,"
would
Another
New York court adopted a similarly strict attitude
in a
habeas corpus case involving commitment of a child to the Mt.
Magdalen School of Industry on a charge of "being a disorderly
child." 5 The court found that while prior to 1886 the Penal Code
permitted commitment of a child to any institution as a "vagrant,
disorderly, or destitute child," an amendment of that year had
omitted these words. Thus, being a "disorderly child" was no longer
a proper ground for commitment and the child must be released. 2
Nor would the court permit the child to be committed under a new
warrant of commitment, signed by another magistrate some two
years after the writ of habeas corpus had been served, which sought
to bring the girl's activities within the statute. Although the statute
permitted a magistrate to draw up a new warrant of commitment if
a previous one had been found defective, this provision applied only
to the magistrate who made the original commitment, in order to
353
cure a technical defect.
at 609-10, 13 N.E. at 436.
The court found, however, that the second charge in the complaint, "that the said child
was found in the company of Mary Ryan, who is a reputed prostitute," stated a valid charge
under the statute. Id. at 610, 13 N.E. at 437. While the constitutionality of this provision was
not contested, the relator argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction
because the child had been in the park on a lawful purpose, to visit parents. The court hold
that the issue of the sufficiency of evidence in a summary conviction could not be attacked
collaterally by habeas corpus. Id. at 611-12, 13 N.E. at 437-38.
331
Day v. Mt. Magdalen School of Industry, 7 N.Y.S. 737 (Sup. Ct. 1889).
"I Id. at 738. It should be noted that the 1886 amendment did not omit any of the activities
prohibited for children on which an allegation of disorderly behavior could have been based
under the 1882 Penal Code. The 1886 amendment omitted the previous requirement that a
child engaging in the prohibited conduct be brought before the court as a "vagrant, disorderly, or destitute child"; by extension, the mere allegation that a child was disorderly no
longer stated an offense. Compare N.Y. PENAL CODE §§ 291(5)-292 (1882) with N.Y. PENAL
CODE §§ 291(5)-292 (1887).
1 7 N.Y.S. at 738.
' Id.
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Concern for the liberty of children could also take the form of
demanding that procedural requirements be strictly observed. A
Minnesota statute required that charges of incorrigibility heard by
municipal courts be proved by at least two witnesses, that witness
testimony be reduced to writing, and that the evidence be transmitted to the district court, which must approve or disapprove the
conviction.31 The Minnesota Supreme Court threw out the incorrigibility conviction of a fourteen-year-old boy when the record did
not affirmatively show that testimony of witnesses had been put in
writing and transferred to the district court, stating: "[W]hen we
reflect upon the opportunity for wrong and injustice in these cases,
the reason why the law-makers have thrown safeguards about and
attempted to protect infants charged with incorrigible and vicious
habits, or with crime, is obvious."
A court might also insist on adequate notice to the parties involved. In Van Riper v. New York CatholicProtectory,'8 a child was
charged under the New York Penal Code with being "improperly
exposed and neglected, and wandering in the public park" and with
being found in the company of a reputed prostitute.31 The statute
required that the child's parent either must be present at the hearing or be given sufficient notice. Although Mrs. Van Riper was at
the hearing, the child's father was not; nor had he been given notice.
2" Act of Mar. 2, 1883, ch. 37, § 2, 1883 Minn. Laws 35.
Connolly v. Brown, 47 Minn.472, 474, 50 N.W. 920, 921 (1891). To like effect is People
v. Giles, 152 N.Y. 136, 46 N.E. 326 (1897), where children who had been found improperly
exposed and neglected by their parents and in a reputed house of prostitution appealed their
conviction on grounds that the testimony taken by the magistrate had not been reduced to
writing, and thus was not available to a reviewing court assessing the sufficiency of the
evidence. The New York court held that magistrates must keep minutes of testimony taken
in hearings and insert such evidence in the record, observing:
Our magistrates are invested with important powers. Many offenses of a criminal
nature may be summarily tried and disposed of by them .... To permit them to
exercise these important powers, without keeping any minutes or records of the testimony upon which their determinations can be reviewed, would be contrary to public
policy, and would be investing them with autocratic powers greater than those possessed by any other officer of the government.
Id. at 140, 46 N.E. at 328. Unfortunately for the children in this case, the court found that
their affidavit of appeal had been framed defectively, ruled that the lower court therefore was
not required to return the evidence in response, and sustained the commitments. Id. at 14142, 46 N.E. at 328.
- 106 N.Y. 604, 13 N.E. 435 (1887).
Id. The charge was brought under § 291 of the New York Penal Code, which also
authorized commitment of children who begged; picked rags or refuse; were homeless, orphaned or otherwise abandoned; or were found in houses of prostitution, concert saloons,
dancehouses, theaters, museums, or places where liquor was sold. N.Y. PEn. Cos § 291
(1887). It thus combined elements of parental neglect and filial waywardness.
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The court agreed with the father's contention that a father, if living,
must be given notice, because he was the child's natural guardian
and would best be able to provide for the child's defense. The court
also did not overlook the child's right to liberty: "The rights of the
child are primarily in question, and every step which the statute
requires to be taken in the exercise of this summary jurisdiction
must be observed." 358
Apart from the cases requiring that incorrigibility statutes be
interpreted narrowly or procedural niceties be observed, the other
major departure from the majority viewpoint on state power over
children came from the New Hampshire Supreme Court, in State
v. Ray."' Significantly, the case did not involve incorrigibility, but
a complaint against two minor boys for burglary. The statute permitted a justice of the peace, empowered to order minor defendants
to post surety for their appearance in court, to send them instead
to the state industrial school for such term up to majority as the
judge should think appropriate if he found it in their best interest.
Rejecting a contrary Ohio precedent, 30 the court held the law unconstitutional. Breaking with the national consensus, it refused to
hold that an industrial school was simply part of the state's school
system or that the state, acting as parenspatriae,could detain any
youth who needed its discipline. Said the court:
We cannot ignore the fact that in the public estimation the
school has always been regarded as a quasi penal institution,
and the detention of its inmates or scholars as involuntary and
constrained. .

.

. [T]he fact cannot be overlooked, that the

35 106 N.Y. at 614, 13 N.E. at 439. Cf. Reynolds v. Howe, 51 Conn. 427 (1884) (statute not
constitutionally defective for failure to provide father opportunity to be heard in incorrigibil.
ity proceeding against son); Cincinnati House of Refuge v. Ryan, 37 Ohio 197 (1881) (same,
as to hearing involving charge that child is incorrigible, neglected, or homeless, at least where
review may be had by habeas corpus).

The courts could be even more stringent in requiring notice to the parents in cases of
destitution or parental neglect of young children, where the central issue was parental unfitness. See, e.g., Van Heck v. New York Catholic Protectory, 101 N.Y. 195, 4 N.E. 177 (1886)
(statutory notice must be given to father that child has been committed to institution on
charge of begging, according father opportunity to contest commitment; commitment of child
for begging apparently requires finding of parental responsibility, or at least knowledge child
is begging); In re Heery, 58 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 372 (1889) (notice of hearing must be given to father
where four-year-old child is charged with having no home or proper guardianship; legislative
intent was not to intervene where parents are temporarily unable to furnish necessaries, but
only where they are totally unfit to retain children). But see Cincinnati House of Refuge v.
Ryan, 37 Ohio 197 (1881).
21 63 N.H. 406 (1885).
30 Prescott v. State, 19 Ohio 184 (1869).
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detention of the inmates is regarded to some extent in the
nature of a punishment, with more or less of disgrace attached
36
on that account. '
The court held that the justice did not have the power to commit
youths charged with criminal offenses to the school and that the
minor defendants had to be accorded trial by jury.
Since the issue was not before it, the New Hampshire court did
not rule on whether the legislature could constitutionally incarcerate incorrigible children in reformatory institutions. Perhaps an institution for wayward children might not be regarded as penal if
criminal offenders were not sent there? In dictum, the court hinted
at this possibility:
So children of profligate parents, or with vicious surroundings,
may be taken from the custody of their natural guardians and
committed to the guardianship of those who will properly care
for their moral, intellectual, and physical welfare. .

.

. But

this is a power exercised by the state as parenspatriae in the
welfare and interest of its citizens.-'
It may be, then, that New Hampshire would have lined up with
other American jurisdictions had the issue of the state's parens
patriaepower over wayward children been squarely presented to it.
Other appellate courts did not raise nagging questions about the
constitutionality of laws that authorized incarceration of misbehaving children in the closing years of the nineteenth century. Further,
parens patriae rationale was frequently invoked to justify removal
3' 63 N.H. at 409. To like effect is Ex ParteBecknell, 119 Cal. 496, 51 P. 692 (197), where
the California court invalidated a statute under which a grand jury, instead of finding an
indictment against a minor accused of a crime, could recommend to the superior court that
the accused be committed to the Whittier State School; the court could then order the
commitment if convinced the minor was a suitable person for reformatory care. The court
discharged the minor, declaring:
As a judgment of imprisonment, the order of the superior court is void. The boy cannot
be imprisoned as a criminal without a trial by jury. As an award of guardianship it is
equally void, for his parents-his natural guardians-cannot be deprived of their right
to his care, custody, society, and services except by a proceeding to which they are
made parties, and in which it is shown that they are unfit or unwilling or unable to
perform their parental duties.
Id. at 497-98, 51 P. at 693. Becknell was disapproved, without being explicitly overruled, in
In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 327-28, 228 P. 467, 470 (1924), as being out of line with other
holdings of the court as to the nature and purpose of reformatory legislation.
3 63 N.H. at 412. The court may have been referring, however, to the judicial power of
intervention in custody disputes rather than to the legislative power of parenspotriae, as it
cited a custody case, Prime v. Foote, 63 N.H. 52 (1884), for this proposition.
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of young children from parents declared "unfit" by the courts. 3
O'Connell was relegated to the dustbin of history, a legal curiosity
to be resurrected by twentieth-century critics of the juvenile court's
incorrigibility jurisdiction.
Against this tradition of approval of incorrigibility laws, it is not
surprising that state courts ratified that jurisdiction when it was
incorporated in the new juvenile court laws passed after 1899. The
leading case upholding the new juvenile court acts was
Commonwealth v. Fisher,364 sustaining the Pennsylvania statute.3 5

That law authorized the new juvenile court to commit "delinquent"
children, including criminal law violators and incorrigible children,
to reformatory institutions. While the case involved a commitment
to the Philadelphia House of Refuge on a felony charge, the court's
sweeping opinion justified the state's power to incarcerate incorrigible children as well. Incorporating seventy years of judicial approbation of the parens patriae doctrine in child misbehavior cases, the
Fishercourt extended its ambit even further. Although the opinion
contributed nothing to an understanding of why the legislature had
such total control over the lives of children, other American jurisdictions reviewing juvenile court acts accepted Fisher as dogma until
In re Gault in 1967.66

The Fisher court rejected the argument that the state must observe due process in the procedure by which it initiated court proceedings against minors:
To save a child from becoming a criminal, or from continuing
in a career of crime, to end in maturer years in public punishment and disgrace, the Legislature surely may provide for the
salvation of such a child, if its parents or guardian be unable
or unwilling to do so, by bringing it into one of the courts of
the state without any process at all, for the purpose of subjecting it to the state's guardianship and protection.3 1
See, e.g., Kennedy v. Meara, 127 Ga. 68, 56 S.E. 243 (1906); Van Walters v. Board of
Children's Guardians, 132 Ind. 567, 32 N.E. 568 (1892); Farnham v. Pierce, 141 Mass. 203, 6
N.E. 830 (1886); Kol v. North Dakota Children's Home Soc'y, 10 N.D. 493, 88 N.W. 273

(1901).
-4 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905).
315Act of Apr. 23, 1903, No. 205, § 1, 1903 Pa. Laws 274.
",a 367 U.S. 1 (1967). For cases approving juvenile court acts, citing Fisheras authority,
see, e.g., In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 228 P. 467 (1924); Matacia v. Buckner, 300 Mo. 359,
254 S.W. 179 (1923); In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115, 145 P. 871 (1915); Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257
Ill. 328, 100 N.E. 892 (1913); In re Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 96 P. 563 (1908); Mill v. Brown, 31
Utah 473, 88 P. 609 (1907).
3" 213 Pa. at 53. 62 A. at 200 (emphasis added).
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The state stepped into the shoes of a child's natural parents, via
parens patriae,to "shield [a child] from the consequences of persistence in a career of waywardness"; 3sr since a parent need follow
no due process temporarily to confine a child in his or her home, the
state need not either to take a child into custody.
In response to the argument that the Fisher boy was being denied
trial by jury on a criminal charge, the court reiterated the by-then
standard argument that the juvenile proceeding involved no trial;
it was instead a merciful procedure to save a child from a trial when
the child's best interests demanded that he or she not be tried in
an adult court. A jury had no role in such a proceeding: "Whether
the child deserves to be saved by the state is no more a question for
'' 1
a jury than whether the father, if able to save it, ought to save it.
Accepting the child-savers' consistent position since the 1820's, the
court agreed that whether a child had committed a particular criminal act or not was irrelevant, if his or her general pattern of behavior
demonstrated to the judge that the youth was a potential threat to
society.
Similarly, the proposition that placement in a reformatory institution constituted punishment was rejected, whatever the cause of
commitment. The court quoted at length from an 1899 Wisconsin
case upholding a statute authorizing commitment of "vicious, abandoned, incorrigible, and vagrant children" to the Wisconsin Industrial School for Girls. 30 Placement of children in industrial
schools, the Wisconsin court had said, involved no restraint on their
natural liberty, but only the exercise of the parental restraint and
In effect, a child had a
protection to which they were entitledY'
2
liberty.
to
not
but
right to custody,
= Id.

Id. at 54, 62 A. at 200. Cf. In re Ferrier, 10311. 367, 371 (1882), where the court gave as

one of its reasons for sustaining the Illinois "Act to aid industrial schools for girls" the fact
that the industrial school statute incorporated due process safeguards, including a jury of six,
unlike the reform school statute found unconstitutional in O'Connell v.Turner.See text
accompanying notes 323-26 supra.
Wisconsin Indus. School for Girls v. Clark County, 103 Wis. 651, 79 N.W. 422 (1899).
'Id. at 664, 79 N.W. at 427.
Cf. the resolution passed by the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges at their 1967
annual meeting:
Be it resolved, that the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges understands, and
will maintain in courts whenever and wherever it is permitted to do so, the following
points of juvenile court law and philosophy:
5. Immaturity is the natural and normal condition of childhood. Immaturity is not
bad, and it is unreasonable to endeavor to turn children into adults prematurely;
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Finally, in a passage with breath-taking implications, the court
stated that the juvenile court's decision to commit a child as a
"worthy subject for an effort of salvation" was
but an exercise by the state of its supreme power over the
welfare of its children, a power under which it can take a child
from its father and let it go where it will, without committing
it to any guardianship or any institution, if the welfare of the
its age into consideration, can be thus best prochild, taking
373
moted.
The court seemed to imply that there were neither limitations on
the substantive grounds by which a child could be deprived of liberty nor restraints on the dispositions the state could invoke once it
had decided to "save" the child.
With the Fisher decision the early child-savers' hopes had been
realized. State power to control the lives of misbehaving children
had been sanctioned in the broadest possible terms and had been
invested with a missionary quality. In the new juvenile court, childsavers possessed an agency to effect the reformation of predelinquent children more thoroughly and efficiently than the police and
magistrate courts of the nineteenth century had been able to do. As
the Progressive era dawned, reformers were optimistic that the juvenile court would instill proper moral values in youth, eliminate the
scourge of juvenile urban crime, and help banish the spectre of
lower-class political dissidence that had haunted Charles Loring
Brace.
V.

CONCLUSION: TOWARDS THE JUVENILE COURT

Our main purpose has been to demonstrate that well before the
invention of the juvenile court, statutes authorizing the state to
intervene coercively in the lives of wayward children, whether on
grounds of general misbehavior such as "incorrigibility" or specific
offenses for youth such as truancy, were prevalent in the United
States. Further, courts aggressively implemented these laws, committing sizeable numbers of children who had misbehaved short of
violating the criminal law to reformatory institutions, where child
reformers sought to erase the effects of corrupt environments and
6. The fundamental right of a child is not to unrestrained liberty, but to custody
18 Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 107 (1967).
m 213 Pa. at 54, 63 A. at 200.
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instill acceptable middle-class behavior.
The wayward child laws embodied the reformers' assumption,
readily embraced by state appellate courts, that children who engaged in troublesome behavior would inevitably graduate to a life
of crime if not restrained, and that to meet this threat the state had
a duty to take in hand young people who manifested the warning
signs of predicted criminalityA" For the most part, child reformers
believed criminality was fostered by the temptations of the citiestaverns, brothels, theaters-and that it bred most prolifically
among immigrants and the poor. Hence they stressed isolating children in institutions or, in the case of the New York Children's Aid
Society, sending them to live with farming families in the West.
The most difficult problem that reformers faced, one they never
really resolved, was whether distinctions should be made among
wayward, neglected, and criminal youth for purposes of treatment.
All youth, except perhaps the most "depraved" criminal offenders,
were regarded as in some sense innocent and capable of being reformed, but some were seen as further along the road to a life of
crime than others. The tension centered around wayward children:
sometimes it was thought the petty nature of their conduct warranted their placement with neglected children (who themselves
were seen as having begun the slide toward crime); sometimes they
were regarded as difficult enough to justify placement with young
criminal law violatorsY5- As the nineteenth century progressed, a
consensus seemed to emerge that neglected children should be
housed in institutions by themselves, although some states felt it
would do no harm to place school truants with them., 8 Incorrigible
children thus found their way to reform schools with criminal law
violators, with only an occasional voice arguing that they should be
institutionalized separately, or not at all.n With the notable excep3' In 1900, the belief that wayward behavior accurately predicted future criminality was
still vigorously held, as the Nebraska Supreme Court demonstrated:
[Tihe complaint charged this girl with incorrigibility. Who is more likely to eventu.
ally become a criminal than a youth who is so far advanced in following his own will
as to have become incorrigible, incapable of being corrected or amended, bad beyond
correction, irreclaimable, by those on whom society and the laws place the duty of
training him in proper conduct as a member of society?
Scott v. Flowers, 60 Neb. 675, 682, 84 N.W. 81, 82 (1900).
See text accompanying notes 95-110 supra.
See text accompanying notes 124 & 267 supra.

See text accompanying notes 300-07 supra.The debate about mixing criminal law violators and status offenders continues. The New York Court of Appeals has held that PINS
children may not be committed to the same institution as delinquents. C. v. Redlich, 32
N.Y.2d 588, 300 N.E.2d 424, 347 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1973). For the response of New York authorities
"
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tion of the O'Connell court and Justice Redfield of Vermont, there
was scant opposition to the dominant view that the state must
reform misbehaving youth to protect society from their anticipated
adult criminality. Since preventive detention of this sort would
likely have been pronounced unconstitutional if exercised towards
adults,"'8 the wayward child laws emerge as a crucial factor in the
formation of a deep gap between young people and adults in terms
of the rights and privileges they exercise in American society, a
formal separation that was by no means implicit in pre-1820 America.
Against this background, it is plain that whatever innovations
juvenile court laws may have introduced in court procedures, diagto this ruling, see INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL
STUDY OF JUDICILL REGULATION OF JUVHE

ADmINISTRATION, THE ELLERY
STATUS OFFENDERS (1975).

C. DECISION: A CASE

=' It might be argued that vagrancy laws performed the same function vis-a-vis adults that
wayward child laws did towards children, since both punished a status and provided for
"preventive detention" of those thought likely to commit crime, and that therefore wayward
child laws did not discriminate against children. It is true, as Herbert Packer has noted, that
the main purpose of vagrancy laws was to incarcerate those considered likely to commit
offenses unless restrained, H. PACKER, THE Imar OF THE CRWuz^L SANCnON 98-99 (1968), and
vagrancy laws were not finally invalidated until the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). We have argued above that the
purpose of wayward child laws was to prevent misbehaving children from developing into full.
fledged criminals.
While the purposes of the vagrancy and wayward child laws overlapped to some extent,
there were also fundamental distinctions that rendered the wayward child laws intrusive of
personal liberty in ways that would not have been tolerated for adults. First, vagrancy, a
criminal offense, usually carried a penalty of no more than six months confinement. See, e.g.,
1 N.Y. Rnv. STAT. pt. 1, ch. 20, tit. 2, § 1 (1829); Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 47, at
983-1019 app. By contrast, wayward minor offenses, not regarded as criminal, could lead to
loss of a child's liberty for his or her minority.
More basically, whereas vagrancy laws punished those whom it was feared would commit
crimes imminently, wayward child laws operated on the assumption that the child might
commit a crime some day if his character were not reformed and thus punished behavior even
further removed from the commission of crime. Further, under wayward child laws mere
undesirable personality traits rather than conduct might be penalized, or alternatively conduct so trivial that it would not have been cognizable under vagrancy categories. The
McKeagy court in Pennsylvania recognized the latter distinction, 1 Ashmead 248 (Phila. C.P.
1831), when it overturned the vagrancy conviction of a boy the court considered merely
"refractory." See text accompanying notes 62-71 supra. Finally, as broad and indefinite as
the concept of vagrancy might be, terms like "incorrigible," "vicious," and "ungovernable"
were even vaguer, allowing a court to incarcerate a child who in any significant way failed to
meet adult expectations. (Of course, a child might be declared wayward because he was a
vagrant, and some states, such as New York, conceivably stretched the concept of vagrancy
to sweep in the kinds of trivial misconduct that other states punished under incorrigibility
laws.) In requiring children to conform to the shifting and arbitrary requirements of another
class of the population, i.e., adults, the wayward child laws imposed a more sweeping regulation of behavior than did the vagrancy laws, which in all probability would not have been
countenanced had it been directed towards adults under the criminal law.
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nostic techniques, and dispositional alternatives,3ss these laws did

not originate the status offense jurisdiction, although they may have
expanded it. While the theory and practice of the juvenile court are
M0 it may be helpful to identify several
beyond the scope of this essay,3

ways in which the court followed past tradition.

First, and most obviously, juvenile court statutes maintained the
status offense jurisdiction itself. By 1925 there were juvenile courts

of varying descriptions in all but two states, and most of these had
jurisdiction over wayward children.-"' While the laws sometimes
spelled out in great detail activities that could lead to an adjudica-

tion of delinquency,382 youths could have been punished for the same
kinds of conduct before 1900 under general incorrigibility laws or

under statutes proscribing particular immoral activities. m The continuing existence of status offense statutes has meant that much of
the juvenile court's clientele to the present day has consisted of
children petitioned on waywardness charges.m
Second, the judges who took charge of the early juvenile courts
fully accepted the nineteenth-century doctrine that wayward behavior predicted future criminality. As Judge Ben Lindsey of the

Denver Juvenile Court put it,
The extent to which juvenile court theory and practice were innovative has been que3tioned. Massachusetts introduced official probation in 1869, several states had experimented
with separate, informal court hearings in the latter part of the 19th century, and the notion
of family treatment of offending children had been a leitmotif of child reform since the 1850's.
See A. PLATr, supranote 10, at 98; Fox, supranote 13, at 1229. Other writers, while acknowledging that the juvenile court consolidated past practices, stress its distinctive contributions:
its emphasis on probation as the treatment of choice, its preference for separate detention
facilities for children, and its insistence-at least in theory-that each child's case be given
individualized attention to determine the causes of delinquency and the appropriate remedy.
See S. ScHLossMAN, supra note 13, at 58-62; Schultz, The Cycle of Juvenile Court History,
19 CRarm & DEL. 457, 463-67 (1973).
For detailed discussions of the juvenile court in practice, see E. RYEMoN, supra note 13,
ch. 4; S. SCHLOssMAN, supra note 13, chs. 8-9.
21For a summary of juvenile court laws existing as of 1910, see Russ= SMIS FouNvAvo.,
JuvsNm CoURT LAws INTHE Ussizn STATES (H. Hart ed. 1910).
31 See note 11 supra. See also Act of May 11, 1901, § 2, 1901 IMI.Laws 141.
30 See text accompanying notes 236-57 supra.
3u Platt records that in the earliest years of the Cook County Juvenile Court, over 50% of
the delinquency cases involved charges of "disorderly behavior," "immorality," "vagrancy,"
"truancy," and "incorrigibility." A. PirAr, supra note 10, at 140. More recently, a national
study estimated that approximately 25% of the delinquency cases heard by juvenile courts
in America involved status offenders. PsmENr's CoMMISION ON LAw EmoacEmzr mm
ADMINISTRA TON OF JUSTInCE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENLE DELIqUENCY AND Yorrn CnmE 4
(1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPoRT]. It has also been estimated that cases of
children engaging in noncriminal misbehavior represent from one-third to one-half of the
workload of juvenile courts today. STANDARDS RELATING To NONCIUMNAL MisaMMvIoR, supra
note 3, at 1.
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[The juvenile court's] purpose is . . . to prevent crime before
crime is actually committed . . . . [The court] believes in

what the statistics show, that the inception of crime is in the
waywardness of misdirected children. It would take care of
these children in adolescence, when character is plastic and
can be molded as clay in the potter's hands. It would help to
form character and not postpone the evil day in a bungling
attempt to reform it.5
Probably few juvenile court judges today would dissent from these
views." 6
The juvenile court did witness some movement away from the
rigid condemnation of the poor, including the view held by nineteenth-century reformers that the poor were inevitably condemned
to become criminals. 87 Further, while most Progressive reformers
continued to emphasize environmental causes of delinquency,
there was a growing tendenicy to stress psychological maladjustment of the child, caused by his or her own mental deficiencies. 88
The clinic, even the hospital, became the favored metaphor of the
court, 8 ' and the new discipline of psychology was harnessed to
3" Lindsey, The Juvenile Court of Denver, in INTERNATIONAL PmSON COMMISSION,
CHILDREN's COURTS INTim UNITED STATES: THEIR ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT, AND RESULTS 30-31

(1904) [hereinafter cited as CnmWRRN's CouRS].
" See sources cited in note 6 supra. See also the vigorous defense of the status offense
jurisdiction by Judge Robert L. Drake, in which he argues, inter alia, that
[t]he proposal to eliminate status offenses misinterprets the fundamental reason for
increasing crime, and, rather than decreasing it, will result in a further increase. It
limits society's response to treatment of crime as a symptom, while accentuating its
true cause: The widespread disease in contemporary society of liberation without responsibility and family breakdown. Its end result is unlimited permissivism.
Drake, Eliminationof Status Offenses: The Myth, Fallacies,and More Juvenile Crime, 26
Juv. JUST. 33, 34 (1978).

At its July 17, 1975, meeting, the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges voted to retain
juvenile court jurisdiction over status offenses, on the grounds that "[antisocial and self.
destructive adolescent] conduct is contrary to the Welfare of the child, hinders his develop.
ment to responsible adulthood, impairs the parent's ability to guide and regulate the child's
behavior, and may also violate the rights of the community. . . ." Arthur, Should Status
Offenders Go to Court?, in BEYOND CONTROL: STATUS OFFENDERS INTHE JUVENILE COURT 245

(L. Teitelbaum & A. Gough eds. 1977). Judge Arthur also reports that in 'a recent poll 89%
of juvenile court judges surveyed (he does not give the number of respondents) felt status
offenses should not be removed from the court's jurisdiction. Id. at 244.
Social scientists have expressed doubt, however, that we possess the diagnostic techniques
to make reliable predictions about delinquency or criminality in juveniles. See E. Scnun,
RADIcAL NoN-IN RVENrIoN: RZrHNKING mTDELINQUENCY PROBLEM 46-51 (1977).
See S. ScHLOssmAN, supra note 13, at 191.

See E. RYERsoN, supra note 13, ch. 5; S. ScHLossMAN, supra note 10, at 66-69.
See A. PLATT, supranote 10, at 140-42. See also the remarks of Judge Richard S. Tuthill,
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diagnose and treat the child. 9 ' Though the perceived causes of
youthful deviance might change, the consensus remained firm that
the legal system must attempt to change noncriminal misbehavior,
whether a youth wanted help or not.
Finally-although here we must be cautious-some juvenile
courts continued the nineteenth-century practice of committing
sizeable numbers of wayward children to reformatory institutions.32 '
While we do not yet know much about the commitment practices
of juvenile courts in their early years and more research needs to be
done, there is evidence that the courts varied widely in their resort
to institutionalization as a disposition for status offenders. For example, juvenile courts in Ohio" ' and New York City1 3 sent large
first judge of the Cook County, Illinois, Juvenile Court:
Facilities in the way of schools.

. .

are needed..

. . a permanent home and school

in the country where children can live under the guidance of a good "house mother"
and "house father".... These children are suffering from disease, contagious diseases, incorrigibility, disobedience, and defiance of authority, and criminal misconduct. For such a hospital-such a school as I have spoken of-is needed as much as
are hospitals for curing physical diseases. These delinquent children should be placed
in such hospitals where they can be carefully watched, treated, and trained, not for a
period of months but for a year, or two, or three years, if need be, until permanent
reclamation is accomplished and they are adjusted to a better life.
Tuthill, History of the Children's Court in Chicago, in CHnwxm's CounTs, supra note 385,
at 5.
See R. miNEL supra note 28, ch. 6; E. RYERsoN, supra note 13, chs. 4-5.
=' Platt contends that "the child savers... recommended increased imprisonment as a
means of removing delinquents from corrupting influences." A. PLArr, supra note 10, at 135.
Schlossman disagrees, arguing that Progressive reformers sought to rehabilitate children in
their own homes and citing Milwaukee Juvenile Court statistics as evidence. S. ScM.ossMAN,
supra note 13, at 60, 203 app., & 232 n.30. It should be noted that Judge Ben Lindsey, perhaps
the most influential of the early juvenile court judges, did not disdain reform schools. He
wrote:
The industrial school is doing splendid work. It is no longer looked upon as a reform
school. It no longer has about it the odor of degradation. . . . There should be no
hesitation to send a boy or girl to an institution when it is a proper case. I rather fear
the danger of not sending them there when I ought. These schools are doing work as
important to the State as your universities.
Lindsey, supranote 385, at 30. See also the remarks of Judge Tuthill, supra note 389.
n2 In 1907, by which time all commitments to the Ohio Boys' Industrial School were coming
through the juvenile courts (except for a few committed by United States courts for violation
of federal laws), according to the superintendent of the institution, Fifty-first Annual Report
of the Ohio Boys' Industrial School 4 (1906), there were 120 boys committed for readily
identifiable status offenses (16% of 741 total admissions). The number may well have been
higher, since the school's statistics include vague categories (such as 74 boys committed for
"delinquency" or "juvenile-delinquent") which could well have included status offenders.
Fifty-second Annual Report of the Ohio Boys' Industrial School 18-20 (1907). The superintendent reported that there had been a steady increase in the school's population, due in part
to "the thorough manner in which the delinquent youth of the state are being looked after
by the Juvenile Courts." Fifty-first Annual Report of the Ohio Boys' Industrial School 4

HeinOnline -- 13 Ga. L. Rev. 439 1978-1979

440

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:341

numbers of wayward children to reform schools before World War
I, while the juvenile courts of Milwaukee394 and Boston39 did not.
Thus, while probation within the child's own family may have been
"the essential condition of juvenile justice reform," ' this new dispositional ideal did not prevent some juvenile court judges from
incarcerating incorrigible children as their nineteenth-century pred3 97
ecessors had done.

Our present-day system of state control over misbehaving children thus has a long lineage, extending back unchanged in its fundamental aspects to the Jacksonian period of American history. It
is a system based primarily on an assumed progression from youthful misbehavior to criminal activity that requires and justifies court
(1906). In 1914, of 870 total commitments to the school, 213 were for incorrigibility (24%), 87
for being a "juvenile disorderly" person (10%), and 56 for truancy (6%). Fifty-ninth Annual
Report of the Ohio Boys' Industrial School 23 (1915).
I" In 1915, the Children's Court of the City of New York committed 2012 children to
institutions: 145 were committed as "ungovernable" (7%), 152 as "disorderly" (8%), 43 as "in
danger of becoming morally depraved" (2%, all girls), and 165 as truants (8%). By contrast,
2754 children were placed on probation: 226 were "ungovernable" (8%), 236 were "disorderly"
(9%), 65 were "in danger of becoming morally depraved" (2%, all girls), and 133 were truants
(5%). Annual Report of the Children's Court of the City of New York 19 (1915).
" See S. ScHLossmAN, supra note 13, at 203 app., table 3. In 1910, for example, of 731 now
male delinquency cases heard by the Milwaukee Juvenile Court, only 22 boys were committed
to the Wisconsin state reform school. Id. The figures are not broken down by causes of
commitment, but in the same year, 13% of the children brought before the Milwaukee Juvenile Court were charged with incorrigibility, 21% were charged with being disorderly persons,
and 4% with truancy. Id. at 205 app., table 5. Between 1905 and 1916 the average number of
youths committed each year was 30, while as many as 1,000 children were put on probation
each year beginning in 1910. Id. at 154-55.
"I One reason that the Boston Juvenile Court did not commit wayward children to reform
schools is that its enabling statute did not authorize it to do so. A "wayward child" was
defined in the statute as one "growing up in circumstances exposing him to lead an immoral,
vicious or criminal life." Act of May 24, 1906, ch. 413, § 1, 1906 Mass. Acts 426. Wayward
children could be put on probation or dealt with as neglected children. Id. § 8. "Delinquent"
children, on the other hand, defined as criminal law violators, could be sent to a reformatory
institution. Id. In 1915, the Boston Juvenile Court did commit eight boys to the Lyman
Industrial School as "stubborn" and one as a "runaway" out of a total of 43 boys it committed
to the school. MASSACHUSM7rS STATE BOARD OF PRISON COMMISSIONERS, ANNUAL REPORT No.
15, at 148-49 (1915). (Stubbornness and running away from home were still technically crimes
under Massachusetts law and thus were offenses for which one could be committed.)
" Schultz, supra note 379, at 465.
3' Institutionalization of wayward children continues in many states today, although estimates differ as to numbers. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice estimated in 1967 that status offenders accounted for between 25 and
30% of the population of state institutions for delinquent children. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 384, at 4. The National Council on Crime and Delinquency has estimated that there are
more than 66,000 young people in state training schools or other institutions, and that between 45 and 55% of them are status offenders. M. RECTOR, PINS: AN AMERICAN SCANDAL
(1974).
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supervision of wayward young people, although our legal system
would not tolerate such "preventive reformation" of adults. The
system further assumes that court personnel can identify the symptoms that warrant imposition of legal controls-and screen out the
cases that do not-and that there are effective treatment programs
that can modify a youth's behavior to accord with desired social
norms, although such programs are compulsorily imposed. The system assumes, finally, that it is the youth's "deviant" behavior that
needs to be changed, and not some external factor such as his or her
family situation, school, poverty, or general sense of powerlessness.
Whether any of these assumptions are valid today, if they ever were,
is an urgent question for policy-makers.
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APPENDIX
Number of Children Committed to Houses of Refuge and Reform Schools
for Selected Years of the Nineteenth Century
Table I
New York House of Refuge
1863

1865

1868

1870

1880

1890

1900

Vagrancy
Disorderly
Other Wayward
Petit Larceny
Serious Felonyb
Other Crime

190
_

320

222
50

66
101

.
363
33
14

-

-

278
58
12

281
43
7

192
40
7

128
175
12
189
23
20

50
94
3
99
16
13

36
162
18
150
37
30

Total

538

730

603

406

547

275

433

aIndicates no cases in this category.
b In this and subsequent tables, "serious felony" includes grand larceny, burglary,
rape, arson, robbery, and homicide, including attempted crimes.
Source: Annual Reports of the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents.
Table II
Massachusetts State Reform School (Lyman School for Boys)
1849

1854

106

171

17

10

Vagrancy
Other Wayward
Larceny
Serious Felony
Other Crime

23
3
109
3
50

Total

311

Stubbornness
Idle & Disorderly

1868

1880

1893

1900

35a

29

26

52

-

-

-

-

22
1
108
9
22

7
10
21
1
41

2
2
42
2
18

9
1
45
2
63

4
7
72
3
35

343

115

95

146

173

aIncludes two children committed for "disobedience."
Source: Annual Reports of the Massachusetts State Reform School, Annual
Reports of the Massachusetts Primary and Reform Schools, Annual
Reports of the Lyman and Industrial Schools.
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Table III
Massachusetts State Industrial School for Girls
1880

1890

1900

Stubbornness
Vagrancy
Lewdness
Other Wayward
Larceny
Other Crime

17
1
5
2
5
-

33
2
5
1
11
4

67
1
3
4
19

Total

30

56

101

7

Source: Annual Reports of the Massachusetts
Primary and Reform Schools.
Table IV
Connecticut State Reform School
1851-55
(4 yrs.)
Stubbornness
Vagrancy
Truancy
Incorrigibility
Other Wayward
Theft
Serious Felony
Other Crime

Boarders
Total

1870

1881

36

-

-

-

-

41
-

14
28
70
6
49
6
13
3

6
5
65
7
44
12
11

1
23
89
51
20
6

-

3
40
89
1
11
3

184

147

189

151

-

81
7
19

1890-91
(12 mos.)

1

1900

-

190

Source: Annual Reports of the Connecticut State Reform School; Annual Reports
of the Connecticut School for Boys.
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Table V
House of Refuge of Western Pennsylvania
(Pennsylvania Reform School)
1861

1865

1870

Incorrigibility

59

56

80

182

497

Vicious Conduct

20

26

10

42

-

-

Vagrancy
Larceny
Serious Felony
Other Crime

10
11
1

31
30
2
1

17
19
1
1

36
36
3
8

6
45
2
12

6
33
9
8

101

146

128

307

562

561

Total

1881-82 1895-96
(2yrs.) (2yrs.)

1901-02
(2yrs.)
506

Source: Annual Reports of the House of Refuge of Western Pennsylvania;
Biennial Reports of the Pennsylvania Reform School.
Table VI
Baltimore House of Refuge

Incorrigible
Conduct
Vicious Conduct
Vagrancy
Stealing (Larceny)
Other Crime
Boarders
Miscellaneous

Total

1856

1860

1865

1870

1878

1889

1900

79
37
58
11

56
8
46a
25

77
17
25
31

79
26
9
1

51
2
4
7

64
3
19
8

61
4
14
9

5
5

1
20

16

1
2

-

-

-

-

-

145

171

131

-

-

185

2

5

1
13

101

102

-

67

aIncludes eleven commitments for "street begging."
Source: Annual Reports of the Baltimore House of Refuge.
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Table VII
Ohio Reform Farm School
1861

1867

1870

1874

1878

1880

1900

39
24

44
2

58
5

57
6

140
12

210
8

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Miscellaneous

25
8
4
9

40
24
2
-

41
26
4
-

81
23
12
-

63
29
19
19

23
23
8
-

32
13
87
52
164
28
72
59

Total

109

112

134

179

282

272

507

Incorrigibility
Vagrancy
Truancy
Juvenile Disorderly
Petit Larceny
Serious Felony
Other Crime

Source: Annual Reports of the Ohio Reform School.
Table VIII
Cincinnati House of Refuge

Incorrigibility
Vagrancy
Other Wayward
Homeless
Without Suitable Home
Petit Larceny
Serious Felony
Other Crime
Miscellaneous
Total

1863

1869

1881a

1885

1890

54
34
-

57
47
-

-

-

24
3
2
7

12
6
4
15
71
50
21
20

66
4
9
61
30
46
8
66
-

92
2
9
55
23
51
11
40
-

140

269a

290

284

31
8
4
131

aThe 1881 Annual Report of the Cincinnati House of Refuge evidently contains a
misprint in the statistics for categories of offenses, as they do not add up to
the total of 269, a figure for total commitments confirmed elsewhere in the
Report.
Source: Annual Reports of the Cincinnati House of Refuge.
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Table IX
Cleveland House of Refuge

Incorrigibility
Vagrancy
Other Wayward
Petit Larceny
Other Crime
Homeless
Total

1880a

1884

1889-90
(16 mos.)

54
11
6
22
8
5

30
15
2
20
9
--

22
3
2
13
9

107a

76

49

aThe 1880 Annnual Report of the Cleveland Workhouse and House of Refuge evidently contains a
misprint in the statistics for categories of offenses,
as they do not add up to 107, a figure for total
commitments confirmed elsewhere in the Report.
Source: Annual Reports of the Cleveland Workhouse and House of Refuge.
Table X
Indiana House of Refuge

Incorrigibility
Vagrancy
Truancy
Petit Larceny
Serious Felony
Other Crime
Miscellaneous
Total

1879

1890

1901

31
5
13
13
7
38

130
1
52
41
9
-

111
4
4
74
25
8

107

233

226

-

Source: Annual Reports of the Indiana House of
Refuge.
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Table XI
Michigan Reform School (Industrial Home for Boys)
1885-86

1890-91

1900-01

Source: Biennial Reports of the Michigan Reform
School; Biennial Reports of the Industrial
Home for Boys.
Table XII
Michigan Industrial Home for Girls
1892
Wayward & Unmanageable
Truancy
Disorderly Conduct
Other Wayward
Larceny
Serious Felony
Prostitution
Other Crime
Total

7
16
29
4
19

1894-96

1898-1900

9
2

14
37
68
9
28
1
24
-

10
32
69
14
28
4
38
4

86

181

199

-

Source: Biennial Reports of the Michigan Industrial Home
for Girls.
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